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Abstract: This dissertation traces Democratic Party organization 
roughly over the Obama era. It conceptualizes the party at the 
national, state, and local level, with a particular focus on Ohio. 
This project seeks to reconcile changes in the political environment 
that incentivize strengthening party structures, with American 
electoral institutions that complicate party organizational 
development. I suggest that while demographic change, 
polarization, and big data are powerful incentives to focus 
Democratic electoral strategy on an Obama-like organizational 
model and campaign strategy, institutionalization remains 
hampered by significant structural impediments. These are 
institutional as well as coalitional. While party integration has been 
uneven, I find an evolving and shifting relationship between 
national, state, and local party organization. Variation in 
competition and resource levels create disparate intra-party logics. 
“Battleground” states are marked by ephemeral high resource 
presidential organization that deeply penetrates the local level in 
service of turning out a coherent party electorate. Yet such 
organization tends to be unrooted and unintegrated in local party 
structures. This is explained by the absence of organizational 
mechanisms that bridge the diverse and path-dependent campaign 
practices of these organizations. Struggles to institutionalize such 
an apparatus beyond the presidential year, contribute to the broader 
problem of Democratic off-year turnout
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“I am not a member of any organized political party. I am a Democrat.” 
-Will Rogers 
 
       
Eight years is a long time in American politics. Barack Obama’s 2008 election 
was hailed as the dawn of a new progressive era, one in which a long-coming electoral 
majority was finally mobilized with the help of a charismatic standard-bearer and cutting 
edge campaign. Democrats had unified control of the federal government for the first 
time in nearly two decades. They would finally be able to govern without the help of a 
conservative southern wing that was the party’s historical linchpin. The future, 
cosmopolitan and liberal, was here. Or not.  
    Obama presided over two tumultuous terms characterized by landmark legislative 
victories, yet also nearly unparalleled partisanship and gridlock, exacerbated once his 
congressional majorities evaporated in 2010. While obstructionism and polarization was 
on the rise for decades, the single minded-fervor through which Republicans resisted 
Obama’s policies seemed unparalleled in modern history. 
      Despite such difficulties, it seemed a safe bet the Democratic coalition as a 
presidential majority would hold. On Election Day 2016, Obama’s approval rating was 
virtually parallel to his 2008 popular vote percentage. After eight years of stoking their 




reality TV star from wresting the nomination from a bevy of candidates with far superior 
establishment credentials and assumed general election prospects. Hillary Clinton, 
Obama’s former rival and now would-be successor, was a perhaps uninspiring, however 
solid and safe choice, to hold the Democratic coalition against such a vulgar enemy.  
      Yet Donald Trump’s shocking victory overturned virtually all assumptions about 
contemporary American politics. The progressive future had given way to right-wing 
populism, oriented in restoring American greatness on behalf of a group often forgotten 
in the new Democratic coalition-- the white working class.  True, Hillary Clinton won the 
popular vote, yet the vaunted Democratic turnout apparatus fell short across highly 
resourced battleground states, where Clinton’s vote totals declined relative to Obama. 
What happened? 
      This dissertation attempts to offer a partial answer to this, at least concerning the 
Democratic Party’s troubles in maintaining the Obama organizational apparatus. To be 
clear, many factors well beyond the party’s turnout machine influenced Clinton’s loss. 
Significant defections among white rust belt voters could not have been stopped with a 
better Get Out the Vote operation. An inability to mobilize the Democratic base is not 
just due to a lack of door knocks. However, struggles to mobilize the Obama coalition, 
not just in 2016, but also in 2010 and 2014, were in part attributable to the challenges of 
building turnout infrastructure over this period. Central to this difficulty, is how 
mechanisms of fragmentation, both old and new, distort the internal dynamics of party 
organization. Campaigning has changed vastly over the last decade. Digitalization and 
polarization have altered the way elections are fought. Still constant however, is the 




       Many, in the twenty-first century, view parties wearily, an outdated anachronism 
of Tammany Hall and the feudal south. Politics have changed since the heyday of the 
party machine. The public may well cheer the decline of the boss, yet not all recent 
developments are necessarily for the better. The last several decades have seen an 
explosion of money in politics: often filtered through new sorts of political institutions 
designed to outmaneuver America’s modest regime of electoral regulation--PACs, Super 
PACs, 527s, 501(c)4’s, and more.  New strategies for evading electoral competition have 
taken hold. These include erecting new (and not so new) barriers to voting, as well as the 
development of increasingly sophisticated efforts to gerrymander districts, insulating 
politicians from competitive elections. ‘Big data’ has revolutionized the communicative 
structures and strategies of electoral politics, leading to concern for both its massive ‘big-
brother like’ databases of citizen information, and creating demand for even more money 
to maintain such apparatus’. 
        Yet the implications of these trends are not all bad. The Obama presidential 
campaigns of 2008 and 2012 implemented new electoral strategies and organizing 
techniques geared for the digital age to mobilize a majority electorate comprised largely 
of underrepresented groups (African-Americans, Latinos, youth, etc.), leading to higher 
electoral turnout than in decades. Marrying new forms of low-cost digital communication 
to traditional field organization strategies. The outcome was not simply an increase in 
voter turnout, but grassroots activist-based political participation: through volunteering, 
small donor fundraising, and social media communication, to build the infrastructure 
necessary to mobilize a difficult to reach electoral coalition.1 Yet, it is unclear whether 
																																																								
1 Berman, Ari. Herding Donkeys: The Fight to Rebuild the Democratic Party and Reshape 




the mobilization of this electorate is largely the idiosyncratic effect of a particular 
candidate, or an institutional response to an electoral environment that better incentivizes 
mobilization on its further edges than it has in decades past. 
     If the latter is even partially the case, then what might this mean for the role of 
parties in the American system? After all, while the public may be suspicious of parties, 
political scientists tend to have a different view.  For them, political parties are thought 
traditionally to be the “socializer of political conflict.”2 Could a movement toward 
electoral strategies based on mobilization suggest a possible resurgence of parties, 
historically the dominant organizational instrument of voter mobilization? If so, how will 
this affect how parties and politicians construct and deploy resources in the digital era?  
        The politics of 2008-2016 can be viewed through the emergence of two distinct 
electorates. A presidential electorate successfully mobilized once every four years: 
younger, poorer, ethnically diverse, and ideologically liberal leaning, and a non-
presidential electorate: that is older, richer, whiter, and more conservative. While it has 
always been the case that variation in turnout between presidential and non-presidential 
years is correlated with socioeconomic status and resources,3 the Obama coalition’s 
electoral success has been particularly dependent on the mobilization of irregular voters.  
Yet as 2016 illustrates, one should not assume that this picture of two electorates remains 
fixed. Mobilization of the Obama coalition has only been successful with Barack 
																																																								
How Obama's 2.2 Million Volunteers Transformed Campaigning in America. Oxford University 
Press, 2015; Phillips, Steve. Brown Is the New White: How the Demographic Revolution Has 
Created a New American Majority. The New Press, 2016. 
2 Schattschneider, Elmer E. The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in 
America. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960. 





Obama’s name at the top of ticket, an occurrence no longer possible baring some rather 
sudden and unexpected constitutional changes. If this coalition were to be preserved 
beyond the personalistic attraction to Obama and turned into the ‘regular’ American 
electorate, it would likely have a seismic impact on American politics and representation.  
Its failure however, provides grist for a reactionary counter-coalition, based in the ethno-
cultural identity of a shrinking, if geographically well situated, minority. 
       Responsibility for the institutionalization of this progressive coalition rests in the 
hands of the Democratic Party, as its electoral competitiveness is tied to the ability to 
mobilize its 2008 and 2012 presidential coalition consistently. Like it or not, the party 
now seems married to both the Obama ‘brand’ and the coalition it represents.4 
Mobilization of this sporadic electorate is dependent upon the institutionalization of a 
sophisticated resource-heavy voter turnout apparatus. An array of challenges stands in the 
way of this: including a skepticism of the Obama coalition among various Democratic 
political actors, skepticism of the Democratic Party among many members of the Obama 
coalition, and a regulatory regime in American electoral politics that places significantly 
more rigorous restrictions on party and candidate-campaign organizations than 
																																																								
4 After the 2016 election, questions arose as to whether the Obama coalition was sustainable or 
even existed at all as a meaningful departure from the traditional Democratic coalition. Much of 
this focused on the necessity of working class white voters to Obama’s success. While polling 
confirms Obama did better with this demographic then Democrats did in recent history or 2016, 
long-term trends still show significant erosion of this cohort in both their support for Democrats 
as well as their percentage of the electorate. See:  Cohn, Nate. “How the Obama Coalition 
Crumbled, Leaving an Opening for Trump.” The New York Times-Online Only, Dec 23, 2016. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/23/upshot/how-the-obama-coalition-crumbled-leaving-an-
opening-for-trump.html. Accessed Feb 4 2017; Debenedetti, Gabriel. “Democrats Clash Over the 
Future of the Obama Coalition.” Politico. November 15 2016. 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/11/democrats-barack-obama-comeback-231391. Accessed 
Feb 4 2017; Maley, Kevin. “What Happened to the Obama Coalition.” Vox Global. Nov 2016.   
http://voxglobal.com/intersection/2016/11/what-happened-to-the-obama-coalition. Accessed Feb 




‘independent expenditure’ (IE) campaigns that run outside the purview of the party.  Yet 
beyond the surface, these challenges are reflective more broadly of American political 
institutions designed to fracture parties as the durable organizational expression of a 
majority coalition.  
          This dissertation seeks to assess how this recent shift toward electoral strategies 
centered on the mobilization of an irregular electorate has affected the party 
organizationally. It asks how does the peculiar logic of an American political system 
hostile to parties, impede strong contemporary incentives toward party building? To do 
this, I look at the contemporary history of the national, Ohio state and local Democratic 
Parties as electoral organizations.  As V.O. Key asserted: a party is best conceived as 
having three ‘faces’: the party organization, the party in the electorate, and the party in 
government,5 what is called the ‘trinity model’ of political parties.6 While this project’s 
primary focus is the tracing of Democratic Party organization, the other two faces of the 
party are not far in the background. The primary practical question of this project is to 
what extent the Democratic Party can (and wants to) turn the ‘Obama electorate’ into a 
durable ‘Democratic electorate.’ Following, an integral part of the answer to this question 
is informed by whether individual Democratic politicians value the construction of a 
long-term Democratic majority in government, perhaps at the expense of sacrificing a 
degree of individual autonomy.  
																																																								
5 Key, Vladimir Orlando. Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups. Crowell, 1955. p. 164. 
6 Alan Ware in his earlier study of American party organization notes that these lines are often 
analytically problematic as office-seekers organizational strategies are contingent on the other 
two party faces. See: Ware, Alan. The Breakdown of Democratic Party Organization: 1940-1980. 




        I choose to evaluate this with a focus at the state-level because of the unique 
character of American electoral institutions. In the United States, there are of course no 
‘national’ elections. Even presidential elections are fifty different contests, subject to the 
electoral rules of each state. I have chosen to investigate Ohio for its importance to 
presidential campaigning. Ohio, which even among ‘battleground’ states has been a top 
priority of the national party for its coordinated presidential campaigns of 2008 and 2012, 
could be argued represents an outlier based on the resources generated on its behalf.  
       I would offer however that a close inspection of any state party, subject to its 
own peculiar mix of electoral rules, civil society structure, and strategic significance to 
national priorities, would yield similar idiosyncrasies. In other words, state parties are 
like snowflakes, no two are exactly alike. Yet the features that give Ohio its character 
may suggest some generalizable propositions about the future of the Democratic Party 
and party politics in general. Ohio’s largesse of resources may help go further in 
suggesting what a ‘mature’ model of a contemporary resource-heavy party might look 
like, as well as highlight mechanisms of fragmentation generally present across the 
nation, if perhaps at lower intensity.  
        One may also question what that is generalizable about parties and the American 
party system could be said by exclusively focusing on just one of the major parties. Yet 
the dynamics that appear to be leading to change within the Democratic Party are also 
valid for Republicans, even if their coalition has made them less sensitive in the short-
term. Democrats pioneering of new ‘digitally-driven’ electoral techniques are a result of 
their need to mobilize new and sporadic voters to achieve a majority coalition. 




either mobilizing the latent segments of their own coalition or peeling off segments of the 
Democratic coalition. This includes more ‘difficult’ constituencies whose electoral 
participation is less consistent (i.e. Latinos and young people- two groups that at least 
certain Republican strategists believe it is necessary that the party appeal to7). Indeed, 
even outside U.S. borders, technological change makes it seemingly more cost effective 
to communicate with and bring in traditionally difficult to reach groups. What the role of 
the party in democratic settings will be in institutionalizing these dynamic and fluid 
coalitions will likely transcend the American political system. 
     I approach this question with a number of different strategies to paint a causal 
picture. First, I look at the academic and journalistic literature regarding this era and 
synthesize it within my model of party organization. Secondly, I will analyze pertinent 
trends in campaign finance and voter data. Finally, is my field research, based on 
participant observation and subsequent interviews and the surveying of relevant political 
actors.  
      This dissertation seeks to take a historical institutionalist approach to very 
contemporary events. Central to this project is an argument that macro-level challenges 
are explained by understudied micro-level tensions. Further, these micro-level tensions 
are not chiefly the result of interpersonal tensions or idiosyncrasies, but the historical 
development of institutions that structure the incentives of political actors.  
       I have conducted participant-observation with the Ohio Democratic Party in the 
run up to the 2014 election. Previously, I have worked with the national organization of 
Organizing for Action (the 501(c)4 offshoot of the Obama 2012 electoral campaign) and 
																																																								





worked as field staff for the Obama presidential campaign of 2008 in Ohio. In addition to 
providing me with a wealth of background information on the topic, these experiences 
have helped me select the set of relevant actors for systematic surveying and 
interviewing.  The intent is to analyze the attitudes of these actors with respect to the 
Democratic Party (both nationally and locally) and their perception of their own coalition 
and the electoral resources necessary to mobilize it.  
     The contemporary nature of this project does not offer it the sobriety of settled 
history, as does much of the American Political Development literature that it attempts to 
settle itself within. It also eludes attempts to gain more rigor over effects and attitudes 
that it spends much time discussing, with quantitative analysis. With its reliance on 
contemporary events and anecdotal data, there are reasonable qualms over the 
generalizability of the processes discussed. Yet with much of the discipline, and 
especially the study of Americans elections, focused on such quantitative measurement, 
this project attempts to fill in gaps by connecting thick description of campaign processes 
understudied in the field. It further situates these events within the tradition of party 
theory, and uses this theory to offer explanatory leverage over the empirics presented. 
 
The Mass Party and Fragmentation 
Obstructing party development in the United States are multiple mechanisms of 
institutional fragmentation. These affect the party as both a coalition and organization. 
Even developments that incentivize electoral logics of mobilization of a coherent party 
electorate will run into these hurdles across multiple dimensions. At its essence, this 




coalition and strategic innovations that support its cultivation, with the internal tensions 
that result from historical processes of fragmentation in the American system. Party 
building in the United States is inevitably constructed on an uneven foundation. Further 
chapters will analyze how at the national, state, and local level, what might appear at the 
surface level to be endogenous failures of effective organizational development, are 
products of deeply embedded structures.   
       Compared to most of its Western counterparts, party development followed a 
rather unique trajectory in the United States. In many western liberal democracies, 
universal franchise was a concession to the industrial labor movement, which formed 
socialist/labor parties as vessels to win government power through electoral institutions.8 
Yet American parties predated industrialization and strongly articulated class cleavages.9 
They were not products of movements, but rather caucus parties developed in the early 
years of the congress.10 Nonetheless, mechanisms of party competition quickly 
incentivized constructing an organizational apparatus to expand this contest into the 
electorate. Eventually such competition would enlarge the franchise over multiple critical 
junctures of American history. The modern Democratic Party has been the electoral 
vessel of choice for progressive American mass movements since at least the New Deal 
period: from labor to civil rights.11 Yet its party institutions predate these movements. 
These institutions are sticky and dominated by entrenched elites subject to peculiar 
																																																								
8 Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. "Why Did the West Extend the Franchise? 
Democracy, Inequality, and Growth in Historical Perspective." The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115.4 (2000): 1167-1199. 
9 Lipset, Seymour Martin, and Gary Marks. It Didn't Happen Here: Why Socialism Failed in the 
United States. WW Norton & Company, 2001. pp. 21-29. 
10 Aldrich 1996. ch 3. 
11 Schlozman, Daniel. When Movements Anchor Parties: Electoral Alignments in American 




logics.  Movements, and their institutional residue of reform interests, must interact, often 
uneasily, with party elites. 
      Maurice Duverger, in his seminal study of political parties, distinguishes between 
the ‘cadre’ and ‘mass’ party. He asserts, “the distinction between cadre and mass party is 
not based upon their dimensions, upon their number of members: the difference is not 
one of size, but of structure.”12 This is largely a function of whether resources are 
provided by elites or mass membership. Duverger explains the mass party as linked to the 
development of universal suffrage. Cadre parties are tools of political professionals and 
elites, characteristic of systems with property qualifications for voting. Mass parties are 
the product of the expansion of the franchise to the working class. Whereas cadre parties 
could rely on elite financial support, mass parties, by necessity, needed to cultivate 
grassroots resources.13 Consequently, centralization was paramount for a mass party 
dependent upon ordinary people. The exclusivity of cadre parties on the other hand, 
afforded them the luxury of being “weakly knit.”14 
       Duverger noted the exceptionalism of the American political experience.15 
Following, Alan Ware argues that the idiosyncrasies of the American system make 
Duverger’s terminology difficult to apply to it.16 Electoral rules particular to the federal 
system suggest, “in some circumstances it was appropriate to think of the Democratic 
parties and the Republican parties in America.”17 While early parties were still national, 
																																																								
12 Duverger, Maurice. Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. 
Methuen, 1959. p. 63. 
13 Ibid. pp. 63-66. 
14 Ibid. p. 67. 
15 Ibid. p. 66. 
16 Ware, Alan. The Breakdown of Democratic Party Organization, 1940-1980. Oxford University 
Press, 1988. 




organization was decentralized. This was a function of electoral institutions based on the 
state-level, as well the sectional idiosyncrasies of American politics. Such variation made 
generalities about party-member relationships difficult.  
      The American mass party may only exist as an ideal type, yet E.E. 
Schattschneider and other party proponents believed that efforts toward stronger parties 
were integral for responsive democracy. In this vein, he and other political scientists 
drafted for the 1950 American Political Science Conference the influential report 
“Toward a More Responsible Two Party System...,” known since as elaborating the 
theory of “Responsible Party Government.”18 RPG called for a set of reforms designed to 
strengthen American political parties. For a robust party system, it was necessary to move 
toward nationalized, ideologically coherent political parties with the power to enact a 
clear, articulated agenda after winning office. Essentially, RPG’s ambition was to graft 
parliamentary parties on to the American political system. In the more than half a century 
since its inception, RPG has faced critiques about its desirability and feasibility.19 Yet 
parties have indeed become more ‘responsible’ since the mid-twentieth century. 
Contemporary party teams are in fact nationally and programmatically coherent, in ways 
not previously realized in American history.20 
																																																								
18 Committee on Political Parties. American Political Science Association. 1950. “Toward a More 
Responsible Two Party System: A Report of the Committee on Political Parties.” American 
Political Science Review 44: Supplement. 
19 See: Ranney, Austin. "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System: A Commentary." 
American Political Science Review 45.02 (1951): 488-499; Kirkpatrick, Evron M. "“Toward A 
More Responsible Two-Party System”: Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science?." 
American Political Science Review 65.04 (1971): 965-990; Pomper, Gerald M. "Toward a More 
Responsible Two-Party System? What, Again?." The Journal of Politics 33.4 (1971): 916-940. 
20 Abramowitz, Alan I., and Kyle L. Saunders. "Ideological Realignment in the US Electorate." 





     What this project illustrates is how the architecture of the American system 
allows new ways to fragment and distort party organization. American parties are not just 
a single national party, but countless state and local organizations. These are subject to 
their own peculiar logic. Path dependence arises from their institutional position and the 
punctuated equilibrium of American party development. The growth of national party 
organization does not eradicate other party vessels. The question is not just whether 
office-seekers turn to parties to solve collective action problems, but what party vessel do 
they turn to, and how do these differing organizations relate to each other? A city council 
candidate will not turn to the Democratic National Committee (DNC). Conversely, a 
presidential campaign might have little use for a municipal party organization. The 
original sin of an incoherent federal system designed to weaken parties, does not 
evaporate through the development of national party structures, nor will these structures 
necessarily serve the logics of state and local level parties. Graceful integration should 
not be presumed. 
    The logic of electoral campaigning can be reduced to two broad variables: 
competition and resources. The level of competition an individual office-seeker faces 
will dictate electoral strategy. A safe incumbent will engage the electoral process very 
differently than a challenger in a highly competitive seat. Even in competitive races, 
variation in resources has significant impact on campaign practices. Campaign strategies 
are chosen from a menu of tactics based on the resources available to build scale. A 
suburban county auditor whose district rests in a large media market cannot afford to run 
a campaign that relies on television advertising. Such disparities affect not just individual 




as an institutionalization of the electoral logic that governs their constituent politicians. A 
low competition/low resource party organization is unlikely to provide its office seekers 
with innovative campaign techniques to prime party turnout.  
      Ware’s notion of multiple Democratic parties is no longer just geographic, but 
also temporal. Data has made infrastructure construction and deconstruction more 
dynamic. High resource national level organization, focused on maximum strategic gain 
in a single election is channeled into a community, district, or state, implementing 
sophisticated campaign strategies focused on mobilization of straight-ticket Democratic 
voters. Yet the effect of this on local party institutions will be idiosyncratic. These 
institutions are not only constructed without national resources, but often very different 
competitive considerations than high resource federal campaigns. Simply put, a lack of 
competition over a long period at the local level will likely create divergent and perhaps 
incompatible structures with those ephemerally constructed for party mobilization over a 
single election. Therefore, a national injection to the ground level will not simply transfer 
incentives for long-term local party building there.  
     Necessary for the understanding of modern American parties as well as the 
practical challenges of efficiency is familiarity with the byzantine structure of party 
organization. Since the explosion of political spending associated with the rise of PACs, 
multiple fundraising and organizational vessels have been constructed21 to take advantage 
of rules that allow donors to overcome caps on giving, through spending on multiple 
party and campaign organizations. While integral for raising as much money as possible, 
this organizational patchwork has decentralized and further fragmented party 
																																																								
21	Robinson, Jonathan. Building a Business of Politics: The Rise of Political Consulting and the 




campaigning. The contemporary ‘party-in-service,’ is not just one organization, but a 
myriad of party organizations in service to Democrats running for specific types of 
offices. The Democratic National Committee, the ostensible committee of all Democrats, 
is complemented, and even somewhat supplemented, by various ‘Hill’ and ‘Leadership’22 
committees controlled by congress members. While all working for the ostensible goal of 
electing Democrats, each of these committees have specific prerogatives and are 
competing among themselves for finite donor resources. These committees become 
valuable power centers for their leadership, often integral in legislative wrangling and 
increasing prominence for members looking to rise in congressional leadership or run for 
higher office.23 Priorities will therefore depart from simply using committees to 
efficiently cultivate and deploy resources for the general betterment of Democratic 
electoral fortunes.  
      Committee leadership can be an entry to national prominence, but comes with 
responsibilities. These mainly center on short-term electoral success. Leadership will 
often have a short leash and be expected deliver legislative majorities, or at least 
progress, within one election cycle.24 Resources are distributed with the purpose of 
having the maximum marginal effect on a small group of competitive races. The 
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) for example, will usually not 
																																																								
22 The difference being Hill committees such as the DCCC and DSCC are ostensibly responsive 
to their particular caucus, while leadership committees are to individual members. In practice, 
these networks and their decision-making are often closely aligned.  
23 Grim, Ryan and Siddiqui, Sabrina. “Call Time Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak 
Work Life for Democrats.” Huffington Post-Online Only. Jan 8 2013. 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/call-time-congressional-
fundraising_n_2427291.html. Accessed Feb 21 2017. 
24 Herszenhorn, David. “Schumer Steps Down from D.S.C.C. Post.” New York Times-Online 
Only. Nov 24 2008. https://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/24/schumer-steps-down-from-




focus on permanent staffers or organizers on the ground, instead sending a check to 
supplement a finite number of races projected to be closely competitive. Money from Hill 
committees is not usually concentrated on behalf of supporting the Democratic slate 
through field. Instead, it is dispensed for paid media campaigning. Campaign finance 
rules further exacerbate this by incentivizing Hill committees to run their own non-
coordinated IE campaigns to avoid hard money regulation. The result is a further 
fracturing of party campaigning on the ground. 
     This pattern in Washington D.C. replicates itself on the state level. State 
legislative caucuses will usually have their own dedicated committees. These committees 
are subject to state-level finance rules, and by raising state money are often unable to 
coordinate with federal level campaign organizations. The Democratic Governors 
Association (DGA) and Democratic Legislative Campaign Committee (DLCC) are also 
national organizations responsible for helping Democrats in state races. Yet their 
contributions are also subject to numerous firewalls. 
      Party organizations are chiefly responsible for supporting lower salience races 
that cannot generate sufficient resources through individual candidate donor networks. 
Yet fragmentation means that help is usually in its most fungible form, money. Building 
field, a longer-term enterprise whose efficacy is through building economies of scale, is 
often viewed as inefficient. The system as it exists creates disincentives for joint party 
infrastructure building. Money is most effectively raised through fragmented 
organizational structures that can elude hard money donation limits. Yet, how money is 
best spent is another question. Individual prerogatives of party leaders and operatives are 




competence for individual gain. Efficiency as a party can be universally agreed upon in 
the abstract, but is not a high salience priority for most actors within the party who must 
be responsive to their narrower logics, necessary to keep their job (whether as office-
holder or operative). Only the DNC is truly institutionally aligned with broad national 
party electoral prerogatives.25 Yet, the DNC is just one organization, operating in an 
ecosystem of party vessels responsible for far more parochial interests.  
      State parties, patterned on a similar structure, are institutionally responsible for 
all levels of campaigning in their state. This means they can form relationships with 
various national committees that have races of interest in their state. Yet finance rules 
will create firewalls between different funding sources that must be navigated by state 
parties and restrict coherence and efficiency.  
     The consequences of this dizzying set of pathways to campaign funding mean that 
money cultivated on the national level in support of the party makes scaling lower-level 
campaigns challenging, especially in regard to field mobilization. Rather than building 
coherence locally, resources are subject to legal firewalls, in addition to the prerogatives 
of their national organizational sponsors. Put simply, the rules mean that individuals and 
factions pursue resource cultivation through means more efficient in raising money than 
attaining party voters. No entity is properly incentivized to pay the upfront costs in 
overcoming these structural barriers and creating efficient organization that provides 
party-wide collective goods.     
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     When considering Duverger’s conception of the mass party, American politics 
presents many challenges. The American system makes party structures not simply, or 
even centrally, a matter of bottom-up vs. top-down, but holistic vs. fragmented. Are 
resources constructed efficiently enough to build economies of scale that emphasize field 
organization on behalf of party mobilization? Money dedicated to this task, even if it 
comes from big donors, can have important democratic participatory effects: erecting 
structures for grassroots volunteer activism and marrying the party to an irregular and 
marginalized electorate. Conversely, grassroots money through fragmented structures is 
unlikely to be significant enough for grassroots mobilization efforts, at least on a national 
scale.   
 
A Theory of Political Parties  
Per John Aldrich, parties solve collective action problems amongst politicians: 
including the development of a (1) brand, and (2) organizational economies of scale. 
The combination of office-seeking ambition and the very nature of 
electoral institutions generates incentives for candidates to solve two 
collective action problems affecting voters: becoming informed and 
turning out to vote. Candidates have two kinds of incentives to affiliate 
with a political party, ameliorating both of the public’s collective action 
problems. Party affiliation provides an initial reputation that reduces 
decision-making costs and provides a core of likely supporters. Party 
campaign efforts, whether conducted by the party organization itself or by 
its various candidates, provide economies of scale for all the party’s 
candidates as they seek to reduce the costs and increase the benefits for 
supporters to come to the polls.26      
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       In political environments where politicians are incentivized to form joint 
resources to solve these problems through party teams, we should expect to see ‘strong’ 
parties. Whereas when there is little incentive for politicians to sacrifice autonomy to a 
party, we should expect to find parties comparatively ‘weak.’ Exogenous shifts such as 
changes in technology and civil society patterns, as well as institutional variance in 
electoral rules, will affect the raw materials that structure electoral competition, and will 
therefore influence whether office seekers decide to amass resources individually or 
through joint party structures.  
        This ‘politician-centered’ view of parties has been challenged recently by the 
team of Bawn et al.27 Using network analysis, they suggest that contemporary parties are 
better conceived as coalitions of interest groups rather than politicians.  
We argue that parties in the United States are best understood as coalitions 
of interest groups and activists seeking to capture and use government for 
their particular goals…The coalition of policy-demanding groups develops 
an agenda of mutually acceptable policies, insists on the nomination of 
candidates with a demonstrated commitment to its program…In our 
account parties are no great friend of popular sovereignty. 
 
      If correct, this interest group-centered conception of parties28 would undermine 
the central normative claim on their behalf. Proponents of parties have argued since the 
height of American behaviorism in the mid-twentieth century, that by driving politicians 
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into two ‘teams,’ parties provide coherence to the average voter, faced with an unruly and 
incredibly complicated federal electoral system. Competition incentivizes party teams to 
bring new and marginalized groups into their electoral coalition, giving them meaningful 
representation within the political system.29 This stands in contrast and as a corrective to 
the interest group sphere, which privileges the resource rich, not a popular majority. 
Competitive parties are vehicles for the socialization of conflict. Yet if the party as 
‘interest group coalition’ theory is correct, parties are not representatives of a broad 
majority coalition, but simply a group of already-favored interests.  
        I confess I remain both intellectually sympathetic to the explanatory power of 
politicians as the ultimate structural aggregator of party politics, and lean normatively 
toward parties as at least a partial corrective to the inequality of the interest group 
sphere¾ and an integral institution to meaningful practice of popular democracy. This is 
especially the case in the context of fragmented institutional arrangements such as the 
United States, where popular government would otherwise seem hopeless under its anti-
majoritarian constitution. Yet parties are no democratic panacea. They must—even at 
their best—negotiate both their institutional incentives to form a majority under 
(relatively) equalitarian American electoral institutions, and the need to procure the 
resources to engage in the electioneering necessary to do this, by appealing to elite-
dominated interests.   
This tension animates confusion over the institutional role of parties. Parties must 
aggregate both interests that provide resources, and citizens that provide votes.  How 
these two responsibilities are reconciled will be contingent upon the ways in which 
																																																								




parties’ link to both interest organizations and citizens at any given moment in time. 
Where strong party-citizen linkage exists, the mediating role of interest groups as 
resource providers will be weak.  Conversely, when these linkages are weak, politicians 
will make the decision to solicit the interest group sphere to amass resources necessary to 
attract voters from a de-aligned electorate. 
        It is fair to say that the interest group sphere’s power as electoral resource 
brokers has increased since the ‘PAC explosion’ of the 1970’s.30 Successful electoral 
campaigns must court interest group organizations to raise the funds necessary for federal 
and even most state-level offices. In federal elections, few, if any, party machines could 
currently procure the resources necessary to win a competitive election without the strong 
support of organized interests through PAC contributions, and increasingly Super PAC IE 
campaigns.  
The movement from professionalized to amateur activists over the twentieth 
century has also weakened parties vis a vis interest groups.31 Professional activism of the 
machine era was induced through selective material benefits of party patronage. The 
party’s institutional control over the cadre necessary for an effective turnout apparatus 
made it the vital organizational vessel for those hoping to win office.32  Yet as machines 
have withered, activists are now motivated not by patronage, but by ideological and 
programmatic goals. Those chiefly motivated by policy ends will first seek alliance with 
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sympathetic interest groups and associated donor networks, not a party organization. 
Because new style activism is not predicated on exclusionary rewards for participation, it 
is more generally vulnerable to collective action problems,33 as well as socioeconomic 
bias.34 This activism is not a vocation, but a civic endeavor for those who have the 
resources to bear its burden. 
      In addition, electoral reforms that have put party nominations in the hands of 
primary voters have weakened the influence of party leaders and created new demands 
for interest-centered electoral resources. While primaries ostensibly made party 
nominations more ‘democratic,’ they are, as Sarah Anzia illustrates, low-salience 
elections in which low-turnout is likely to increase the influence of organized and 
entrenched actors.35   
      Yet despite the increasing necessity of office-seekers reaching out to organized 
interests over the internal party hierarchy for electoral resources, party politicians—still 
in my view—remain at the center of solving the social choice problems that are the main 
challenge of electoral coalition-building. They have both the final call in articulating the 
campaign program of aggregated interests, as well as brokering this program through 
government policy while in office. Politicians (and the electoral staffers that serve at their 
pleasure) also, are still the ultimate decision makers regarding electoral strategy.  While 
the increasing influence of interest groups may decrease politicians’ autonomy in the 
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simple brokering of the preferences of a majority coalition, it does not obviate the 
continuing reality that politicians¾and their joint party structures¾ remain the principal 
as the broker of popular and organized preferences through the electoral system. The 
party remains the vessel through which these politicians act collectively and build 
organization that centrally serves their electoral goals: the building of a majority electoral 
coalition. It remains their collective agent in negotiating an electoral majority and the 
electoral resources necessary to mobilize it. 
       Of central focus to my analysis is illustrating a dynamic model of how 
electoral resources move through party organization over time. One weakness in the 
study of parties is a tendency to describe their internal dynamics in the abstract or 
unsystematically. Much party organizational analysis holds singular focus on the 
relationships of politicians, resources, or perhaps voters. Insulating one of these variables 
is perhaps most conducive for cross-sectional analysis. Yet party organization is an 
integrated apparatus designed to aggregate all of these variables in a coherent organism. 
Similarly, most attempts to map parties hold relationships as static, mapping a particular 
event or point in history. Yet parties and electoral resource construction are inherently 
dynamic: switching modes and goals in accordance with the moment in the electoral 
cycle, and a reflection of the constant fluidity in both strategy and resources. What is 
needed then, and what this dissertation hopes to advance is a model of, is how party 
organization changes over the course of the quadrennial election cycle. This includes 
both how resources flow and who makes the decision to cultivate and deploy them. This 
dynamism is especially true in our current era, where rapid technological advance leads 




        Despite the rise of interest groups and decline of traditionally conceived party 
resources, parties have, a number of unique strengthens as political institutions. This 
includes perhaps most importantly, that they are indeed institutions. Individual politicians 
and campaigns, and the resource networks they construct, come and go, but parties 
remain as durable mechanisms for electioneering. Secondly, parties by building a vessel 
through which all members of the party team can combine resources for their collective 
good, can build economies of scale to promote efficient campaigning.  
        Yet caveats also emerge from these strengths. As Aldrich notes, economies of 
scale are only beneficial if they construct resources that promote the electoral fortunes of 
the entire party team.36 If voters are not straight ticket party-line voters, or members of 
the party want to make vastly different appeals, constructing resources jointly through a 
party makes little sense. A related second concern is that certain forms of campaigning 
may have greater benefits through building economies of scale than others. For example, 
the mobilization of party voters (presuming they will be loyal party-line voters if they 
make it to the polls) yields great efficiencies when done collectively through a party 
organization. Yet television advertising, predicated on more charismatic and personalistic 
appeals to undecided and often-low information voters, is more effective if focused on an 
individual candidate,37 not the abstract and/or transactional appeal of the party vote. 
        As a result, under circumstances in which mobilizing clearly delineated party 
loyalists are a priority of electoral strategy, we should expect to see increasingly robust 
party organization. Whereas when goals are focused on using strategies to persuade 
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voters with few or unpredictable party allegiances, especially through the more emotional 
appeals of mass advertising, politicians will be more apt to construct resources 
individually. This in part helps explain party weakness of the late twentieth century, as 
campaigning had become increasing focused on television advertising. 
        The line between party and interest group organization is also increasingly 
difficult to untangle. Historically, campaigning was the purview of parties and individual 
candidates’ campaigns. Yet interest-based associations act not only as financial 
intermediaries between their constituents and candidates/parties, but often autonomously 
participate in electioneering on behalf of their preferred candidates through independent 
expenditure (IE) campaigns. Therefore, interest groups can develop organizational scale 
themselves, exerting more strategic (and perhaps policy) leverage over individual 
politicians as well parties. However, as these organizations have grown increasingly 
sophisticated, and parties have resorted along coherent ideological lines, IEs have begun 
to take up party-like functions of advocacy for an entire slate of party candidates.38 While 
there are coordination firewalls between parties and IEs, they still may be complementing 
coherent party mobilization strategies, making them— while legally distinct from 
parties—conceptually muddled.  
       If IE campaigns and their more durable organizational sponsors, are devoting 
resources to the mobilization of dependable party-line voters, they may while operating 
outside of formal party channels, be acting to in consequence ‘strengthen’ the party.’ For 
this to be the case however, it must have a clearly partisan effect. This means, if the IE is 
mobilizing based on an issue and supports candidates of both parties or mobilized 
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supporters who may be loyal only to a specific issue; this may not be helping party 
mobilization. Because coordination firewalls exist, mobilization efforts may not be 
efficient. Interest groups competing for resources may engage in mobilization credit 
claiming, but in practice be engaging in superficial and/or redundant tasks when it comes 
to mobilization. Recognizing this, Herrnson reimagines parties through a set of 
concentric circles of multi-layered coalitions.39  Yet this model misses both qualitative 
differences in party and interest group-based IE campaigning, and how coordination 
boundaries between these different groups affects the decision-making and the 
organizational form of a party electoral apparatus. 
     I seek to evaluate party strength as resources devoted to the electoral 
mobilization of loyal party voters. This may be through explicit party organizations, but 
also through ancillary organizations and networks that serve this function. The 
fundamental metric is to what extent politicians perceive their electoral fortunes as tied to 
a dependable and loyal party electorate and an effective apparatus to mobilize this 
electorate.  
      
A Model of Party/Electoral Resource Construction Over Time 
      Resource construction is a function of the short term caculations of politicans 
aggregating electoral majorities. Environmental factors exogenous to a campiagn or party 
organization set the context for internal decision-making. Strategy is path dependent. 
Practices that have been successful in the past are likely to be replicated, especially when 
lacking robust competition that could force innovation.   
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Figure 1.1: Temporal Model of Resource Construction 
         
     The chart above illustrates a temporally based general model of resource 
construction for electoral campaigning in the United States. This is a cyclical process. 
Institutional factors (electoral rules) will combine with more fluid civil society resources. 
This process patterns the political environment for electoral campaigning, and the 
strategies and organizational forms used by office holders and seekers.  The perceived 
success of these strategies will influence long-term modes of resource construction, 
including whether politicians decide to construct individual candidate–centered 

































Independent Variables: The electoral regulatory regime is the set of legal rules that 
structure electoral campaigning. These include laws on fundraising as well what sorts of 
activities parties, campaigns, and other organizations who do electoral work can 
participate in.  This also encompasses the firewalls that exist between these organizations. 
Parties are subject to both federal and state-based electoral laws. The civil society 
configuration is what Schattschneider calls the ‘raw materials’40 of politics: this includes 
the people, networks, expertise, financial resources, as well as the communicative 
apparatus that facilitates their relationships. This exists primarily outside of the political 
sphere, but is the primordial material of electoral resources. As these materials and 
resources change, parties must modify strategies to capitalize on these shifts.  
 
Intervening Variables (t1): This is the set of resources and organizational structure used 
for electoral campaigning. Practically speaking, these are the electoral campaigns 
themselves. Structure is a function of the materials that exist within civil society, and how 
the electoral regulatory regime institutionally patterns these resources into electoral 
activity.  As a result, campaigns will use a diverse set of strategies to assemble a majority 
coalition, and configure a certain set of resources¾ what Nielsen refers to as “campaign 
assemblages”¾ to facilitate this strategy.41 These can be through individual electoral 
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Intervening Variables (t2): These are the outcomes of the campaign assemblage. They 
include both the general success of voter mobilization, as well the degree that 
mobilization has benefitted the party ticket. This is not just the substantive causal 
relationship between the assemblage and electoral outcomes, but its perceived strategic 
impact. In addition to electoral outcomes, another vital consequence is whether the 
resources generated on behalf of the assemblage (activists, networks, data, voters, etc.) 
are durable beyond a particular campaign, or the idiosyncratic effect of a particular 
candidate and/or election. The networks forged during electoral campaigning also affect 
civil society configuration beyond the explicitly political sphere. 
 
Dependent Variable: This is the strategic decision-making of politicians to construct 
organization either individually or jointly through a party team. This is a result of 
politicians’ perception of electoral success and the generation of resources necessary for 
future electoral success.  Where mobilization strategies have successfully produced a 
majority coalition on behalf of a party slate of candidates, and the resources used to build 
this apparatus appear to be durable or at least replicable, it politicians should construct 
resources through party organization on behalf of continued mobilization of this 
coalition.  Politicians may decide to construct party resources even without both 
conditions being satisfied. If an electoral strategy is successful, it may be reproduced 
even if there is little demonstrable value-added by particular aspects of the strategy, such 
as the tactics used to build the field apparatus. 
        There is also the possibility that even without immediate electoral success, if the 




these resources in the hopes of constructing a long-term successful electoral strategy. 
Because of the cyclical nature of electoral campaigning and party organization building 
on behalf of it, strategic incentives of politicians are an intervening variable in the 
cultivation and construction of electoral campaigning resources.   
 
Variables that Impact Contemporary Party Building 
A number of particularly salient variables effect campaign strategies, creating 
both incentives and challenges to building electoral resources through party structures. 
An evaluation of party strength should be analytically focused on the impact of these 
variables:  
 
-Costs and capacity for party mobilization: Technological change has lowered costs of 
identifying potential party voters and constructing the mobilization apparatus to activate 
them. Yet both these tasks still involve capital-intensive (and largely long-term) 
economies of scale to be effective. Although mobilization requires economies of scale, 
there is the possibility that costs may decrease over time with the depreciation of the 
price of digital ‘tools,’ and the information /resources that these tools have previously 
procured (e.g. robust state voter/volunteer files will cost less to activate than ones that are 
not thoroughly developed).  
 
-Electoral Competitiveness: The level of electoral competitiveness-especially at the ‘top 
of the ticket’- has two important consequences for party building: (1) incentives for 




in regard to mobilization, and (2) the ability to capture resources necessary for 
mobilization through organizational economies of scale (as mentioned above).  State 
party resources will be effected by the dynamics electoral competiveness (both federal 
and state elections) within its boundaries.   
 
-Coalitional Congruity: The degree to which across the various levels of government 
there is minimal conflict between the voter in the party coalition and voters that party 
politicians want to mobilize. Where there is incongruity in the coalition of party 
politicians, politicians will be reticent to focus on building an apparatus on behalf of 
party mobilization. Another important area for study in this project is the reciprocal 
causal process: meaning to what extent (if any) do strategies that focus on party building 
impact overall peaceable coexistence in the party coalition.  
 
Strong Networked Party Characteristics  
      Because of the difficulty in conceptualizing the party as a structure, challenges 
arise in analytically evaluating shifts in party strength. Yet, here I suggest a set of metrics 
that measure the construction of party resources and tendency of politicians to use a party 
apparatus to construct resources. This includes both how politicians conceive of the party 
as an apparatus to effectively mobilize a majority coalition, and a party voter universe 
that can be depended upon to be ‘coherent’ in support of a party ticket. Beyond office-
seekers propensity to use party organization, analysis should also focus on the 
development and durability of the resources necessary for effective party mobilization: 





Figure 1.2: Strong Party Criteria. 
 
Specifically, there are a number of characteristics that would indicate a ‘strong’42 party 
under contemporary electoral conditions: 
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-Resources are concentrated in formal party organizational structure. Party organization 
is focused on building an effective coherent apparatus to mobilize party voters. 
Organization is capital intensive and builds voter file and activist databases. 
Organizationally, we should hope to see electoral campaign resources concentrated in 
explicit party structures that are supported broadly by party politicians. This organization 
should be focused on building durable linkages between the party and a loyal coalition.  
 
-Party targeted voter universe is clear and coherent based on identifiable party-line 
voters who vote consistently. Universe is predictable and durable. 
In order to create this durable coalition, the party must know where its voters are and 
should have confidence that this coalition can be consistently mobilized come election 
season. This means both having an effective apparatus to mobilize voters and the 
confidence that issue-based preferences can be successfully aggregated to keep voters 
within the party ‘tent.’ 
 
–Activist networks are durable and can be channeled broadly into party mobilization 
activity.  Activists who participate are integrated into party organization that serves the 
ticket. 
As the voter universe must be durable and identifiable, so too must the activist networks 
charged with mobilizing them. Activists must be committed to participation on behalf of 
the slate of party candidates. Practically this may not necessarily mean a strong 
commitment to every ‘down-ticket’ race, but at the least a consistent dedication to serve 





-Politicians are committed to pooling resources through the party organization and 
pursuing electoral strategies based on a coherent party universe. 
Politicians must see their electoral path as existing primarily through the mobilization of 
the party electorate and sacrifice building robust individual campaign organization to 
construct joint resources on behalf of the party team.   
 
-Resource construction is focused on formal party structure. Other electoral activity 
outside formal organization, such as Super PACS/Independent Expenditure campaigns 
form a concentric circle outside of party also engaging in electoral strategies based on 
mobilizing a coherent party coalition, with efficient division of labor (even without 
coordination). 
     To whatever extent possible, electoral resources should be constructed through 
formal party vessels. While electoral rules may limit this, and the IE sphere may be a 
major conduit of electoral resources, it should do so on behalf of the mobilization of a 
party electorate. 
 
The Historical Development of Party Organization and Electoral Resources 
Electoral organization has varied historically depending on how civil society 
resources have interacted with electoral political institutions.  Electoral strategies are a 
function of how broader social forces--from political cleavages to technological change -- 
are mediated through the campaign environment to promote office-seekers electoral 




the development of Van Buren’s ‘party machine.’  The nineteenth century political 
machine followed a conventional logic of clientelist politics.43  A party apparatus, 
maintained by activists seeking selective benefits through government spoils, linked a 
mass electorate with little in the way of conventional class-based political identification, 
or independent civil organization, to a highly coherent party.  The populace was placated 
by regional and ethno-cultural claims, easing the brokerage relationship between the 
electorate and the party. Material goods facilitated this apparatus, being dispersed to 
activists and other political elites, yet not as a transactional demand of the broad 
electorate. Party allegiances were durable and predictable as there was little in the way of 
extra-partisan political association or dynamic issue uptake that would jeopardize loyalty.   
          Yet by the turn of the twentieth-century, the logic of machine organization would 
begin to erode. Progressive-era reforms such as the advent of the Australian ballot and 
the professionalization of civil service, weakened the ability to assemble an apparatus 
that could successfully deliver a consistent party vote. Party ability to translate and broker 
citizen preferences was also greatly complicated by the New Deal era introduction of 
programmatic and material claims as an animating force in the American electorate.  The 
New Deal also led to the flourishing of a number of public interest organizations. Labor 
unions, as well as mass constituent organizations such as the AARP, represented more 
distinct elements of the electorate, often playing the role of organizational intermediaries 
between activists and parties.  The post-World War II era also saw a boom in non-
explicitly political civic organizations that often provided the sorts of associational 
linkages that can be channeled into electoral organization, especially as machine-activism 
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declined.44 Party activism was now less a product of the selective benefits of spoils, as 
much as comparatively weaker, yet more diffuse and dynamic programmatic motivations.  
         By mid-century, party organization persisted as an amalgamation of the remnants 
of urban machines that could still use patronage to ensure a functioning mobilization 
apparatus, and issue based activists and organizations more loyal to programmatic goals 
and the politicians who supported them, than to a particular party. At the fulcrum of these 
two distinct types of party resources in the Democratic Party was the labor movement. 
Unions’ long-standing relationship with local machines spurred a closeness to local party 
elites, and strong motivation to protect the status quo. Yet labor’s more progressive 
elements were also a major force for change and reform within the Democratic Party. J. 
David Greenstone suggests,45 that unions were in many ways the chief intermediaries 
between the traditional party machine and liberal activists.  
        By the 1970’s, interest group ascendance was beginning to alter parties’ 
unquestioned status as American politics chief institutional vessel of electioneering. The 
Federal Elections Campaign Act (FECA) led (however inadvertently) to the rise of the 
PAC as a form of major political organization.46 PACs revolutionized interest group 
politics by creating an organizational medium capable of providing resources for 
electoral politics that could be scaled in a strategically sophisticated manner, yet exist 
outside the organizational control of the party. Interest groups could-- directly as 
organizations-- now leverage and support individual candidates through targeted financial 
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contributions while eluding party structures. This was buttressed by the increasing 
dependence on campaign contributions to service an ever-expanding need for television 
advertising as the emerging primary communicative tool for campaigning.47   
        The rise of television advertising dovetailed with the decline of the participatory 
grassroots resources necessary to run an effective field mobilization apparatus. Unions, as 
well as other sorts of civil organizations that could provide electoral resources, were on 
the decline. This was complemented by broader societal attitudinal and participatory 
erosion in regard to institutional political participation.48 Without patronage or robust 
civil society organization, party apparatuses were starved of the resources necessary to 
mobilize voters and therefore shifted strategy accordingly. 
         In addition to a lack of resources to mobilize irregular groups, the Great Society 
era left the Democratic Party coalition with a high degree of internal tension.49 The party 
faced a struggle for power between the white working class that formed the backbone of 
the New Deal coalition, and urban non-white constituents, who were the (perceived) 
beneficiaries of the Great Society, and voted less consistently than their white 
counterparts. Because this ‘irregular’ electorate was viewed by many elites within the 
Democratic Party as a liability that could not be counted on to produce electoral 
majorities, this further disincentivized spending resources on its mobilization.  
        Instead, a campaign template arose in the 1980’s that eschewed field 
mobilization strategies for capital intensive mass advertising: with a primary focus of 
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returning working-class white ‘Reagan Democrats,’ who had become increasingly 
alienated from the Party to its fold. Rosenstone & Hansen suggest the apparent 
participatory effect of this was a demobilization of the electorate as the party canvass 
withered. 50 Activists became further invested in ideologically based interest 
organizations, and the post-civil rights regional resorting of partisan allegiances appeared 
(at the time) to produce a confused and unstable electorate in matters of partisan 
loyalty.51 While unions maintained a role in both mobilizing their members and providing 
some of the financial resources necessary for campaigning, party candidates were under 
pressure to turn to the increasingly dominant sphere of business PACs to reach enough 
relative parity with Republicans to remain electorally competitive.  
         As further discussed in the next chapter, the decline of mobilization resources, 
the rise of PACs, and the internal tension between ideological, regional, and ethnic wings 
of the party, all weakened the Democratic Party as a coherent organization dedicated to 
constructing a collective apparatus focused on mobilizing a party electorate. As a result, 
the party modally transitioned from a vessel of locality-based electoral mobilization to a 
national infrastructure primarily focused on raising and distributing financial resources 
(and staff) to vulnerable member politicians.52  The party could no longer offer 
candidates an effective mobilization-focused organization, instead turning to constructing 
financial networks that could compete with their Republican counterparts. This is what is 
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referred to as the party-in-service organizational model.53 Rather than party bosses 
asserting control over member politicians, the party had become as a passive organization 
acting as an intermediary between the ascendant interest group sphere and its increasingly 
fragmented member politicians.  
      Yet by the early twenty-first century, a shifting environment led to 
experimentation with a new set of electoral strategies. The rise of the Internet and social 
media challenged television as the dominant communicative mode: both in a broad social 
context, as well as specifically in the political arena. Where television’s capital-intensive 
top-down structure incentivized primarily vertical communication of elite actors making 
impersonal and charismatic appeals to the electorate; the Internet created the potential for 
low-cost horizontal collaboration and resource construction. Tools such as email and text 
messaging created the opportunity for specifically targeted, low cost appeals to voters 
and activists, cultivating resources that would have been unfeasible in the previous era. In 
addition, social media gave activists and supporters a place to collaborate and build 
community with each other, buttressed by tools like ‘Meetup,’ pioneering techniques 
moving digitally based communities into the ‘real-world.’ Whereas field organization 
required ‘too costly’ of an apparatus to build in the mass media era, these tools altered the 
calculus of pursuing electoral mobilization, as activist resources were more efficiently 
cultivated.54  
        In addition, a re-sorted electorate with two ideologically and regionally coherent 
parties’ left fewer and fewer true ‘independent’ voters for candidates to target. Unaligned 
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Reagan Democrats appeared to finish a transition into the core of a Republican Party now 
firmly ensconced in the white south.  The rise of big-data also contributed to more precise 
and effective voter-targeting techniques as political strategists began to incorporate 
consumer data into models, finding not just increasingly small and prized groups of 
unaligned voters, but also unmobilized potential partisans.55 Perhaps the effects of this 
were first seen on the Republican side in 2004, where George W. Bush, despite having 
sagging poll numbers (as well as other negative electoral indicators) used a strategy of 
mobilizing non-voting white evangelicals on the basis of social issues to successfully 
compensate for his poor performance among independents in battleground states and win 
reelection.  
        As important however, is the seemingly never-ending arms race of campaign 
funding was beginning to reach its ceiling of efficacy through mass advertising. Simply 
put, campaign advertising had become so ubiquitous (in national elections at the least) 
that it began to be perceived as delivering diminishing marginal returns. As a result, 
campaigns began to look for other, more effective ways to spend their ever-burgeoning 
war chests. Conventional forms of campaign funding have now been complimented by 
new vessels of campaign organization through IE campaigning: injecting even more 
financial resources into electioneering. The growth of financial resources and finite 
amount of productive mass media bandwidth, has incentivized campaign strategies that 
channel resources into newer digitally-based modes of social contact.   
        Apparent is a resulting campaign template that dedicates significant resources and 
strategic focus to the mobilization of a sporadic electorate comprised of would-be loyal 
																																																								





party voters. Digital media has created a new forum to cultivate activism through low 
cost digital communication, which complemented by the financial resources necessary to 
hire significant field staff, responsible for training and coordinating activist activity, 
begat opportunity to mobilize an irregular electorate in competitive electoral 
environments. 
        Noteworthy of this ‘new’ field apparatus, is the incorporation of organizational 
techniques traditionally associated with community organizing groups, into electoral 
politics.  These strategies originate from long-standing experimentation by Marshall 
Ganz, historically focused on California politics. In 2004 however, the presidential the 
Democratic primary campaign of Howard Dean—one of the first ‘internet-driven’ 
campaigns—sought Ganz out to apply a community-organizing model to strengthen 
linkages among an activist community based largely in the digital realm, and channel this 
support into tradition campaign field prerogatives of voter contact.  
        While the results of this effort were mixed, they should be situated in the 
context of a first step in developing a model for cultivating grassroots participatory 
resources for electoral politics in the digital era. The ability to engage in low cost digital 
communication created new potential for activist mobilization. Techniques originated in 
the Dean campaign were quickly diffused within the Democratic Party, and eventually 
adapted and refined with far greater success in the Obama campaigns of 2008 and 2012.56 
        The Obama campaigns focused on mobilization through devoting unprecedented 
financial resources to their new media, analytics, and field departments. Field staff 
responsibilities diverged from traditional electoral campaigning. Focusing less on the 
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management and deployment of previously existing resources for voter contact, and 
instaed on organization building through community organizing strategies. Priority was 
given to developing activist leadership of locally based “neighborhood teams,” (NTs) and 
teaching activists both how to run logistically sophisticated voter turnout operations, as 
well as the basics of community organizing to build their NT organizations. 
        This model is a response to the particular electoral environment of the early 
twenty-first century. As we have seen, a diminishing pool of unaligned voters, and 
advances in data making newer and sporadic voters easier to target, has reincentivized 
strategies of field mobilization. Yet, without machine-based activism or the labor and 
civil society organizations of the previous eras, the challenge of building an apparatus to 
mobilize these potential voters remains. Campaigns now must cultivate their own 
activists, and build durable organizations through which their foot soldiers participate. 
Viewed in this light, community-organizing methods make sense as grassroots 
organization-building tools that strengthen networks and build organizational leadership 
over time. 
        While the Obama campaign successfully used this model, its generalizability 
remains questionable. Inducement to activist participation in the Obama campaign was 
the result—not just of technological change – but also of a charismatic and historically 
unique candidate, as well as the salience of a presidential election. Activist participation 
was predicated on the movement-like appeal of the campaign. Absent this, campaigns 
must fall back on the sort of programmatic appeals to activists that have been historically 
ineffective in building this apparatus. Further, the financial resources necessary to build 




levels necessary to facilitate this apparatus would appear unfeasible outside the height of 
the presidential election season. 
       Attempts to explicitly institutionalize the Obama apparatus within the Democratic 
Party have been to this point unsatisfactory. After the 2008 election, the campaign 
organization spun off into ‘Organizing for America,’ (OFA 2.0) which was housed under 
the umbrella of the Democratic National Committee. Yet maintaining even a shell of 
presidential electoral organization proved a steep challenge.  In addition to resource and 
salience issues mentioned above, another impediment to institutionalization was evidence 
of a tendency of Obama activists to be skeptical of the Democratic Party brand, or of 
devoting their efforts broadly to its support. In part, this was a reflection of the remaining 
tension between the traditional institutional elite of the party, and a younger, diverse, and 
perhaps even more liberal, locus of activists.  
        Consequently, after the 2012 election the campaign apparatus was transformed 
into a 501(c)4 (OFA 4.0) moving out from under the party organizational tent, with the 
hope that simply maintaining activist networks would eventually translate into party 
electoral resources. Yet on a systematic basis, this strategy has also appeared to be 
unsuccessful. The root of these difficulties remains a bit puzzling. Obama activists tend 
to be ideologically committed to the articulated programmatic agenda of the Democratic 
Party. This group appears motivated by more than just a cult of personality, as they 
articulate a largely coherent set of policy preferences consistent with the Democratic 
Party as well as being demographically rooted in the Party’s emerging electoral coalition. 
Yet they remain largely skeptical of electoral politics and institutional actors independent 




       Despite the failure of transferring explicitly the Obama activist base into durable 
Democratic Party electoral resources, the party still has the benefit of an expanded voter 
universe and robust data on these would-be voters. Campaign assemblages are 
contemporarily characterized (to the extent this is possible) as a collage of labor and 
progressive activists, along with floating fragments of Obama’s activist organization and 
networks, with digital tools used to cultivate activism and resources outside of the 
geographic location of an election.  
 
Preview of the Dissertation 
 
Chapter 2 further orients the project to the challenges that have faced the 
Democratic Party nationally at the end of the twentieth century, and the response of the 
party in the early twenty-first century. It will seek to synthesize existing academic and 
journalistic literatures on Democratic campaigning from 2004-2014 and evaluate it within 
a theory of party organization and contemporary party building. I will begin with a 
discussion of the aftermath of the 2004 election and how the characteristics that have 
marked the current campaign environment-- digital media, field organization, IE 
campaigning --developed, and then discuss how the development of these techniques has 
influenced the renewed strategic focus on voter mobilization and the consequences of this 
on party organization through 2014. Central is the development of what I call horizontal 
and vertical dimensions of fragmentation. These are macro lines of fragmentation based 
upon coalitional divisions and the disjuncture between national electoral institutions and 




      In Chapter 3, I trace this history within the context of the Ohio Democratic Party. 
I evaluate how these tensions have affected the party in a highly competitive presidential 
battleground state that is the beneficiary of quadrennial infusions of national resources. I 
trace the party’s attempt to meet the challenges of building federal, state, and local 
electoral majorities over this period. Has the party—as a holistic entity—moved toward a 
focus on the mobilization of the ‘Obama’ electorate, and what have the consequences 
been on its strength and coherence? Here, fragmentation is illustrated through different 
institutional actors all ostensibly committed to mobilizing a statewide Democratic 
majority. Yet still, divergent logics impeding party integration are observed.  
      Chapter 4 brings the scope of the analysis to the local level. It conceptualizes 
what these tensions mean on the ground, across the various campaign and party 
assemblages. Here, fragmentation is crystalized as various party actors responding to 
their own structural incentives struggle to integrate and institutionalize an efficient 
organizational apparatus. Here, most clearly and concretely, consequences of heterodox 
path dependent campaign cultures are laid bare. 
 Finally, I conclude by returning the themes drawn out in this introduction. I 
suggest how this project calls into question several concepts central to contemporary 
party studies. I assert that while it may be too soon to tell whether our current 
environment will lead to stronger party institutions, modal changes in party organization, 
and a broader lack of scholarly qualitative party study, have left contemporary party 







The National Party 
 
        On November 25, 2014, Democratic Senator Charles Schumer of New York 
addressed the National Press Club in the wake of the Democratic Party’s disastrous 
recent midterm election performance. Schumer, who was the party’s Senate whip at the 
time,57 former chair of the DSCC,58 and a chief conduit to the donor class, is widely 
thought to be among the most influential forces on party strategy. The speech was 
conceived as an early attempt to frame a way forward in the run-up to the 2016 
presidential election. Ostensibly introducing a new Democratic Party populism, what 
raised most eyebrows was what this meant in coalitional and policy terms: 
 
“…The Affordable Care Act was aimed at the 36 million Americans who 
were not covered. It has been reported that only a third of the uninsured 
are even registered to vote. In 2010 only about 40% of those registered 
voted. So even if the uninsured kept with the rate, which they likely did 
not, we would still only be talking about only 5% of the electorate. 
      To aim a huge change in mandate at such a small percentage of the 
electorate made no political sense. So when Democrats focused on health 
care, the average middle-class person thought the Democrats are not 
paying enough attention to me…”59 
 
       The idea that the Democratic Party’s focus on poorer, non-white, and younger 
voters is an electoral luxury that it cannot afford is far from a new trope. Yet, considering 
the previous two presidential elections its persistence might seem surprising. This chapter 
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seeks to situate the logic and consequences of dueling impulses in the contemporary 
Democratic Party as a national organization. Efforts to build a Democratic Party 
apparatus that links the party to a coherent electorate over the period in focus have been 
bolstered by a successful national mobilization strategy in two presidential elections. This 
success was facilitated by steady demographic shifts in favor of underrepresented yet 
strongly Democratic elements of the electorate. Further advancing these opportunities 
was the rapid development of new digital tools that made identifying and communicating 
with both potential voters, and the activists to mobilize them, exponentially more 
efficient. Yet despite these developments, the party remains constrained by fragmentation 
deeply embedded in the American party system. 
        On a national level, incongruity remains a function of a presidential majority 
coalition never fully transitioned into a party-wide resource. An analysis of Obama as a 
“party builder” can point to the success of a coherent two-time presidential electorate. 
Yet this coalition could not be sustained for midterms or policy advocacy over this 
period. While the Obama campaigns did seem to identify, and mobilize, a long 
anticipated Democratic majority electorate, its failure at institutionalization can be traced 
to an inability to mediate party tensions and build strategic coherence through national 
organizations. Neither the Obama brand, nor organizational infrastructure, was a 













Table 2.1:  2004-2014 Federal election results. Presidential Electoral votes, House of 
Representatives totals, Senate totals (whole senate make up after each election) 














2004 251 286  202  232    45    55 
2006    233  202    51    49 
2008 365 173  257  178    59    41 
2010    193  242    53    47 
2012 332 206  201  234    55    45 
2014    188  247    46    54 
*Includes Independents who caucus as Democrats 
 
      This chapter will describe the development of the organizational strategy of the 
Obama presidential campaigns, and the efforts to institutionalize an apparatus that could 
mobilize the Obama electorate on a durable basis. Further, it will situate this within the 
broader framework of systematic party fragmentation and attempts to overcome it. This 
can be analyzed, to borrow from the American Political Development literature,60 as an 
intercurrent relationship between newer forces that suggest a stronger, more coherent 
party, and deeply embedded structural hurdles that have so far inhibited these forces from 
reaching maturation. In the American system, even in moments in which incentives 
toward party building seem apparent, party organizations must deal with centrifugal 
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A Structural Explanation for Party Fragmentation 
        In the American system, parties are weak as brokers of coherent majoritarian 
preferences. This is not an accident, but a reflection of an institutional design that uses 
elections and government to fragment national coalitions by creating a set of hurdles to 
their rule. One might conceive of this fragmentation as existing across two dimensions: 
(1) horizontal- representing coalitional/factional tensions inherent in a ‘big tent’ major 
party of a large and diffuse republic, and (2) vertical- the disjuncture of institutional 
logics within the party in a system characterized by separation of powers and federalism. 
Specifically: the imperatives of state (and local) parties, national ones, and constituent 
politicians, may differ as they operate under different regulatory regimes and often over 




Figure 2.1: Axis of Fragmentation 
       
Horizontal fragmentation is a result of the diverse interests accommodated in a 
majority political coalition. In a winner-take-all system such as the United States, major 
political parties must aggregate the interests of broad coalitions, both programmatically 
and though the political identity associated with the party brand.61 Crosscutting material, 
ethno-cultural, and sectional tensions must be reconciled within a national political 
coalition. The difficulty of achieving this in a long-term equilibrium position has 
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historically weakened party coherence;62 and consequently the incentive to create a 
national apparatus focused on mobilizing such an electorate. Politicians will not want to 
put resources into the hands of a national party, if there is not broad coherence in the 
party coalition. Therefore, historically the locus of strong party organizations such as 
urban machines, have been at the local level, where electorates tend to be somewhat less 
unruly. 63 
Figure 2.2: Democratic Intra-Party Cleavages  
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Even at the height of New Deal Democratic Party dominance, the party 
necessarily had to assimilate its northern urban liberal wing with its Dixiecrat southern 
faction. FDR tried—and failed—to nationalize the party by attempting to primary and 
pressure undependable southern Democrats.64 While the partisan realignment of the 
south65 has created a more rationally (and responsibly) sorted party, a majority party in a 
nation so large and diverse is likely to be burdened with factional tension. Championing a 
party apparatus that can give a party power to govern, rather than simple protection of 
member politicians’ idiosyncratic coalitions, would be dependent on broad agreement 
within the various party factions that their interests are served by sacrificing autonomy 
for the possibility of programmatic control of government. 
    The vertical axis is a function of fragmentation of government and electoral 
representative institutions themselves. Even if a party is ideologically and 
programmatically coherent, staggered election cycles and differing campaign finance 
laws surround each level of government, creating different strategic priorities for party 
politicians. For example: a party organization structured to prime turnout for quadrennial 
presidential elections does little to suit the needs of vulnerable congressional members 
who face midterm elections, as well as the overwhelming number of state and local 
officials not on the presidential clock. The federal patchwork of electioneering laws 
creates firewalls between coordination and resources of federal and state candidates. 
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Expenses such as palm cards paid for with state party money cannot legally feature 
federal candidates. 
      These crosscutting dimensions of fragmentation create a powerful bulwark 
against national organization: as party politicians, both as factions and individuals, will 
be hesitant to focus on resource construction through a singular apparatus. Even in a 
political environment where high turnout elections appear both feasible and to heavily 
advantage the Democratic Party, as the period of the Obama presidency demonstrates, 
significant challenges remain to aligning the priorities of Democratic politicians 
operating under divergent institutional logics.  
 
Background: The Fall of the New Deal Coalition and the Rise of the Two Electorates 
       From a bird’s eye view, the federal elections of 2008-2014 represent the 
crystallization of the “two electorates”66 thesis in American politics. Indeed, binaries do, 
and always have, permeated American politics. We have two parties as a response to 
institutional conditions. Progressive politicians have often referred to “two America’s” as 
a reflection of economic inequality. One could perhaps even view the two electorates as 
mediating these other binaries. Those disadvantaged remain only partially included in the 
polity. They are more difficult for political actors to mobilize, and are therefore left with 
less influence on government.  
          The idea of two consolidated coherent electorates occupying the same moment, 
but coming to the fore at different junctures of the electoral cycle, puts a twist on 
traditional conceptions of parties as democratizing mechanisms. Schattschneider’s 
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classical allegory of the political “street fight,” presents the crowd’s behavior and 
willingness to enter this fight as determinative of political outcomes: 
The spectators are an integral part of the situation, for, as likely as not, the 
audience determines the outcome of the fight. The crowd is loaded with 
portentousness because it is apt to be a hundred times as large as the 
fighting minority, and the relations between the audience and combatants 
are highly unstable. Like all other chain reactions a fight is contained. To 
understand any conflict it is necessary therefore, to keep constantly in 
mind the relations between the combatants and the audience because the 
audience is likely to do all types of things that determine the outcome of 
the fight. 
…the outcome of every conflict is determined by the extent to which the 
audience becomes involved in it. 67  
 
       We might however imagine this phenomenon as leading to an equilibrium with a 
critical percentage of the citizenry with ‘one foot in and one foot out’ of this street fight. 
For party leadership, the central question persists as to whether efforts should be spent 
attempting to bring both feet in or disassociating from this group in search of more 
dependable brawlers. Systematic fragmentation does not just operate exogenously acting 
as a bulwark against majoritarian rule, but though creating disparate institutional logics 
internally among party actors, frustrating the development of party infrastructure as a 
mobilization tool. It’s not just that our system prevents a majority coalition from easily 
controlling government, but that the system’s incentives dissuade an internally coherent 
and consistent view of who is in the majority and the mechanisms necessary to maintain 
















2004 55.3 11 8 17 
2006 37.1 10 8 12 
2008 56.8 13 9 18 
2010 37.8 10 8 11 
2012 53.6 13 10 19 
2014 36.3 12 8 13 
 
        If heightened attention to the two electorates is new, the outlines of this dynamic 
are not. Underrepresentation of groups on the low end of the socio-economic spectrum 
has been a persistent characteristic of American electoral politics, as is the exacerbation 
of this tendency in lower salience elections.68 Yet what is striking about the period under 
discussion is the sharpness of the correction during presidential years, contrasted with its 
apparent minimal residual effect during midterm elections. Of further concern for 
Democrats is evidence of a counter-reaction of more “moderate,” yet stable blocs of 
voters, now increasingly aligned with Republicans.69 The consequence of this is the 
consolidation of a presidential majority coalition rooted in poorer, non-white, and 
younger subsections of the American populace: where aggregate levels of electoral 





68 Schlozman et al. 2012; Leighley, Jan E., and Jonathan Nagler. Who Votes Now?: 
Demographics, Issues, Inequality, and Turnout in the United States. Princeton University Press, 
2013. 
69 Kilgore, Ed. Election 2014: Why the Republicans Swept the Midterms. University of 




Table 2.3: Democratic share of the vote. Source: Kilgore (2014), CNN Exit Polls 
Year Whites Blacks Latinos 18-29 65+ 
2004 41 88 53 54 47 
2006 47 89 69 66 49 
2008 43 95 67 66 45 
2010 37 89 60 55 38 
2012 39 93 71 60 44 
2014 38 89 62 54 41 
 
       The coming of this electorate, now often referred to as the ‘Obama coalition,’ 
embodies the hopes of some and fears of others going back several decades. Anxieties 
among Democrats have been prevalent since at least the civil rights and Great Society 
reforms of the 1960’s. What would happen to the party that to paraphrase Lyndon 
Johnson had “lost the south for a generation”? In place of this solid south, was a northern 
party increasingly anchored programmatically in what was often euphemistically 
described at the time as an “underclass”70 of undependable voters, and ideologically in a 
“left” thought too far removed from the moderate center of American politics. Much of 
intra-party contention in the 1980’s was a function of battles between those championing 
these lower resourced constituent groups, and those who believed they were a liability 
that would turn the Democrats into a permanent minority party. Tensions were a result of 
multi-dimensional yet overlapping cleavages within the party involving race, class, and 
region. Indeed, by this period, the New Deal coalition, based upon an American public 
broadly supportive of the party as broker of an interventionist state, was falling apart.71  
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        Yet while these racial and ideological vulnerabilities affected the party’s national 
hopes, the nature of American party fragmentation meant that individual Democratic 
politicians would feel these pressures differently. Many Democrats anchored not just in 
the south, but also the Sunbelt and mountain west regions, began to feel the party’s 
national brand was toxic, yet Democrats in urban northern areas remained insulated from 
such shifts in public opinion.72 These vulnerabilities were further exaggerated by the 
newly emboldened role of interest groups, particularly business interests, through 
Political Action Committees (PACs).73 One might expect business organization to view 
the southern and more conservative wing of the party in relatively more favorable light 
than northern liberals. Yet, business was less concerned with the politics of individual 
members than with strategically leveraging resources to help Republicans win 
congressional majorities, while currying at least relative favor with ‘safe’ Democrats who 
they had little chance of upending. Business would therefore, often give perfunctory 
financial support to safe Democratic liberals, while focusing their resources on the 
eradication of the Democratic Party in the newly competitive south. This led to further 
friction between an insulated liberal wing of the party, which had little to fear electorally 
in representing the Democratic Great Society coalition, and a panicked conservative wing 
whose constituents were turning away from the party’s national brand and facing the full 
brunt of organized business interests’ political force.74   
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     By the 1980’s, the party experienced decline as a presidential coalition, yet still 
maintained congressional majorities through an amalgamation of its safe northern wing 
and durable (yet fading) bloc of southern incumbents. On a national level, the party was 
linked to a coalition of underrepresented (poorer, non-white) and declining (unions) 
segments of the electorate that neither had the votes nor resources to keep the party 
competitive. Strategically, there was little consensus on how to return to a majority, and 
who to blame for its failure. Some believed that the party had to regain working class 
white “Reagan Democrats,” which could only occur by distancing the party from its 
African-American base. Others, suggested a more business friendly party, a response to 
the increased importance of big donor fundraising (and decline of unions) to electoral 
campaigning. These factions looking to reinvent the party found an organizational outlet 
in the burgeoning Democratic Leadership Council (DLC). In an influential paper 
published by DLC-associated think tank, the Progressive Policy Institute, Elaine 
Kamarck and William Galston accused traditional liberals of ‘evading’ the electoral 
reality of the Democratic coalition as constructed: 
Liberal fundamentalism refuses to adjust to changing circumstances by 
adopting new means to achieve traditional ends. Instead it enshrines the 
policies of the past two decades as sacrosanct and greets proposals for 
change with moral outrage. Whether the issue is the working poor, racial 
justice, educational excellence, our national defense, the liberal 
fundamentalist position is always the same; pursue the policies of the past. 
During its heyday, the liberal governing coalition brought together white 
working-class voters and minorities with a smattering of professionals and 
reformers. Over the past two decades however, liberal fundamentalism has 
meant a coalition increasing dominated by minority groups and (white) 




interests and its values. The inescapable fact is that the national Democratic 
Party is losing touch with the middle class, without whose solid support it 
cannot hope to rebuild a presidential majority. Jimmy Carter forged his 
1976 victory with the help of a majority of middle income voters, while 
Michael Dukakis was able to win only 43 percent of this vital group.75 
     
      During this period the party experienced a related modal shift organizationally.76 
Under the chairmanship of Ron Kirk, the DNC as a bricks and mortar organization 
expanded as cultivation of business resources helped fill the party’s coffers.77 Yet this 
new groundswell of funds did not bolster a centralized apparatus to mobilize base voters, 
but was typically funneled to individual candidate campaigns for the purposes of 
television advertising. Efforts concentrated on enlarging the party’s remaining base as a 
share of the electorate through greater mobilization were most closely associated with 
Jesse Jackson’s presidential campaigns of 1984 and 1988, and the associated growth of 
the Rainbow coalition as a nexus of black and progressive forces within the party looking 
to consolidate left-wing influence within it.78 Contrasted with Kamarck and Galston’s 
calculus, was Jackson’s, seeing the party’s increasing diversity as a strength: 
America is not like a blanket -- one piece of unbroken cloth, the same 
color, the same texture, the same size. America is more like a quilt: many 
patches, many pieces, many colors, many sizes, all woven and held 
together by a common thread. The white, the Hispanic, the black, the 
Arab, the Jew, the woman, the native American, the small farmer, the 
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businessperson, the environmentalist, the peace activist, the young, the 
old, the lesbian, the gay, and the disabled make up the American quilt.79 
     
      While this tension has never fully abated, it has been mediated by demographic 
shifts that would appear to advantage those that comprised the Democratic base in the 
coming decades. Most influential in arguing this was John Judis and Ruy Teixeira, with 
claiming an “Emerging Democratic Majority”80 (EDM) also known as the “New 
American Electorate,”81 (NAE) based on consolidating a coalition of non-whites and 
upper-middle class social liberals (especially women), with segments of the party’s 
traditional white working class base. While party’s national coalition was a losing one in 
the 1980’s, long-term demographic drift would soon start to advantage Democrats if such 
a coalition could be maintained: 
As a result of the transition to postindustrial society, each of the 
McGovern constituencies (women, professionals, and minorities) will 
continue to grow as a percent of the electorate. And barring a sea change 
in Republican politics, these constituencies will continue to vote 
Democratic. Second of all, as post-industrial areas continue to grow, white 
working-class and professional voters in these areas are likely to converge 
on a worldview that is more compatible with Democrats than 
Republicans…it is fair assume that if Democrats can consistently take 
professional by 10 percent, keep 75 percent of the minority vote, and get 
close to an even split of white working-class voters, they will have 
achieved a new Democratic majority.82  
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      Yet how soon this would take hold, and how strong this would be, would depend 
on the party’s ability to bring these groups percentage of the electorate in line with their 
percentage of the voting age population. Questions remained about whether a party 
anchored in the Democratic ‘base’ coalition could be depended on to turn out come 
election time. From a mechanical perspective, the party’s shifts in the 1980’s left it 
unequipped as an apparatus to pursue mobilization.  The party was focused on the 
nationalization of networks to move financial resources and staff in pursuit of campaign 
strategies centered on mass media communication.83 Urban machines that used unions 
and patronage to turnout the masses were shells of their former selves.84        
      Who would be the foot soldiers of this new mobilization effort? Political activism 
in the United States had declined (at least in the institutional context), with remaining 
activists loyal to specific issues rather than party.85 Effective mobilization efforts do not 
come about overnight through a finger snap, but are a years-long process of identifying 
voters on a precinct by precinct basis, building an activist infrastructure (volunteer or 
otherwise) that can be depended on to efficiently and effectively assure voter turnout. 
Even if a majority coalition did exist for Democrats somewhere in the farthest reaches of 
the polity, it would still take years for the party built the capacity to locate it.86 
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Dean as Prelude 
        The turn from vague exhortation in some corners of the party, to the actual 
realization of such an apparatus finds its modern genesis in the 2004 election and the 
primary candidacy of Howard Dean. In fact, the defeated presidential hopeful’s influence 
on the story is far broader. While Dean’s presidential campaign failed, he and his staff 
would play an integral role in diffusing his campaign’s innovations throughout the party. 
Most directly he would continue to shape the Democratic Party’s response to this 
changing political environment through his subsequent role as Democratic Party 
chairman and the development and implementation of a “50 state strategy” of party 
building over his tenure.  
      Dean’s campaign of 2004 was marked by his strong anti-war stance, making him 
a darling of the party’s liberal activists.  In a sense, his campaign could be viewed 
dismissively, as another in a long line of insurgent flavor-of-the-month candidates, 
characteristic of the long primary season, inevitably destined to fail once actual primary 
voting began. Yet, even if this were the case, Dean’s run took place at a critical historical 
moment that precipitated the invention of a swath of new campaign tactics ideal for a 
candidate of his particular appeal.  Dean’s, was the first campaign to use digital tools to 
transition amorphous grassroots enthusiasm into concrete campaign resources. These 
included using early social networking technology such as ‘Meetup’ to facilitate 
organizational meetings of campaign supporters, as well and using the campaign’s email 
“listserv” to solicit small donor contributions from its grassroots supporters. This was not 
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just evident in the campaign’s innovations in communication, but in the understanding of 
a potential voter universe, through the development of a dynamic digital voter file.87  
      Fundamental to this was a change in the communication environment of 
campaigns that virtually eradicated costs of dynamic interaction with campaign 
supporters, incentivizing their cultivation. That these techniques would be forged in a 
Democratic primary campaign should not be a surprise. Policy differences between 
primary candidates are often negligible. Elections will often be won or lost not so much 
on programmatic differences, but campaigning: incentivizing experimenting with new 
campaign tactics to produce marginal gains in efficiency.88     
        Dean spent much of early campaign season in the lead among Democratic 
candidates in fundraising (thanks largely small donors89), media attention, and national 
polling. However, his campaign faltered once the actual voting started, evident in his 
poor showing in the Iowa caucus, from which the campaign never recovered. John Kerry, 
the eventual nominee, who spent months before actual voting as a middle-of-the-pack 
candidate in a crowded field, wound up quickly and easily wrapping up the nomination. 
Veterans’ of Dean’s campaign believed that this was due to the campaign’s 
misapplication of its digital tools. This technological focus came at the expense of more 
traditional campaign fundamentals. According to Jeremy Bird, a Dean Field staffer who 
would become a critical architect of OFA:  
The technology is the net…but not necessarily the engine…when we try to 
fit the strategy into the technology, I think we’ve also done a disservice to 
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the work we’re trying to do. When we come up with a strategy and a 
program and then we say what resources do we have to do this, I think 
we’ve been more successful.90  
    
      There was an incongruity between simply amassing resources made possible by 
digital campaigning, and transitioning these resources into effective campaign 
communication.  During the Iowa Caucuses Get out the Vote (GOTV) effort, Dean’s 
“orange hat brigades” of young liberal volunteers who would descend on the farms of 
Iowa, were particularly indicative of the campaign’s flawed approach. Despite their 
enthusiasm, the cultural divide between these activists and Iowa caucus goers made them 
poor campaign surrogates. As put by a journalist at the time: 
Maybe it’s unfair to blame the hats, but put yourself in the boots of an 
average Iowa Democrat a few days before the caucus. The campaign is so 
intense that it has become a form of political harassment. Your phone 
rings every 10 minutes with an automated robo-call on behalf of one 
candidate or another. Your mailbox is jammed with political junk mail. 
Then comes a knock on your door and there you find a couple of 
committed campaigners from Park Slope or Noe Valley or Wicker Park 
telling you that Howard Dean is your man. And they’re wearing these 
really loud orange caps.91 
 
This was exacerbated by haphazard voter data produced by these canvassing 
efforts. Activists’ combination of enthusiasm and lack of training led to the reporting of 
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overly optimistic measures of candidate support, distorting mobilization-targeting 
efforts.92 
      Dean’s story did not end however in the snowy beginnings of 2004. The first 
notable indicator of an important shift occurring was the transitioning of his electoral 
campaign apparatus into a permanent organization, “Democracy for America” (DFA). 
This organization was the first digitally facilitated post-campaign “bridge” organization: 
attempting to take an ephemerally based campaign apparatus and transition it into a 
permanent political force. While in some sense presaged by Camp Wellstone, an 
outgrowth of Paul Wellstone’s senate campaign,93that effort focused on the diffusion of 
campaign techniques on behalf of advocacy.94 DFA however, represented a pioneering 
attempt to institutionalize a campaign activist network in a digital space. Before email, 
the costs of keeping an activist base mobilized without a resource heavy, staff centered, 
organization would seem nearly impossible. Yet once a campaign listserv is established, 
maintaining communication with its cadre has almost no financial cost and with little 
labor, allowing the potential to maintain organizational coherence and capacity.  
        Dean’s legacy on the party might be most pronounced in his tenure as chairman 
of the DNC. In this role, he attempted to integrate the ethos of his campaign with the 
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party’s national infrastructure. Dean ran his primary campaign stressing his insurgent 
brand, positioning himself as a candidate taking on the party establishment. Yet 
becoming DNC chair (when the party does not hold the presidency) is dependent upon 
winning the support of state party chairs.95 These were the sorts of party insiders that 
Dean spent his campaign railing against. Yet after another poor performance by 
Democrats in 2004, many in the establishment were open to organizational change. Dean 
consequentially, sold the state party leadership on a vision focused on building state party 
infrastructure. He made his pitch as a fundamental shift away from the previous 
chairmanship of Clinton era stalwart Terry McAuliffe. McAuliffe, who following and 
expanding on the organizational model of Kirk, was a prodigious fundraiser, successful in 
keeping Democratic campaign accounts competitive with their Republicans counterparts, 
fostering even closer relationships to business donors.  Yet, he spent little time on 
building party infrastructure, especially in assisting struggling state party organizations. 
Dean, however promised a ‘50 state strategy’ based upon funding state party hiring of 
field and digital staff across every state in the nation. Dean made his case that party 
fortunes are tied to assisting state parties in cultivating grassroots resources over the long 
term by building durable activist leadership and networks. This should not just be 
temporal organization based on short-term national electoral imperatives, but scaling 
infrastructure across the country that will make the party regularly competitive from local 
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elections on up. This marked the first deliberate contemporary attempt to move away 
from a party-in-service model, to reinvigorate a more traditional party organizational 
apparatus focused on a joint structure to serve the needs of the party team. Yet if this 
marked an important shift in party architecture, it would be another presidential campaign 
that would take the next step in scaling such an organization.   
 
The Development of OFA 
       The organizational strategies deployed by Obama for America (OFA) built on 
those developed by Dean and the party in 2004. Central was combining new digital 
technologies with field methods based on relational organizing, traditionally associated 
with community organizing groups such as Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF).  IAF 
characterizes this strategy as based on the “golden rule”: 
Never do for people what they can do for themselves. Applied to 
organizing it means professional organizers should train leaders on how to 
run action campaigns, not do it themselves. In practice organizers often 
assist leaders. This way they help leaders grow, and avoid the risks of 
costly mistakes. 
The staff of most community organizations conduct campaigns 
themselves, and give little time to developing new leaders. As a result 
their member base gets smaller and smaller. By making the focus of staff 
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      The large-scale adoption of such methods by electoral campaigns is a direct 
response to a changing political environment. OFA’s implementation of relational 
organizing techniques represents a strategic response to the need for building durable 
activist-based resources where the traditional pathways for this have declined. Without 
patronage or strong civic society organization to channel into political activism, the 
campaign’s central challenge was to harness its groundswell of grassroots interest and 
create durable bonds over the course of the election. Its fundraising prowess and 
dependence on the mobilization of a non-traditional electorate, gave both the capacity 
and necessity to construct such an apparatus. This strategy was based on upfront 
investment in field staff, trained at not just managing voter contact operations, but using 
relational organizing techniques to build the social bonds necessary to construct a durable 
volunteer-based apparatus.97 
      This model was a response to intra-party competition in the 2008 Democratic 
Party primary. The Hillary Clinton campaign had the loyalty of the Democratic Party 
establishment, including party politicians and operatives, as well as an electorate 
grounded demographically in groups likely to vote in a primary election.98 OFA then, 
was incentivized to focus on mobilization among youth and African-Americans. These 
were groups that Obama’s narrative generated tremendous enthusiasm amongst, yet were 
traditionally underrepresented in the overall electorate, and even more so in primaries. 
Such a fight had echoes of the intra-party coalitional wars of the 1980’s. Yet, Obama’s 
campaign consequentially melded two insurgent factions within the party: The African-
American and left base associated with Jesse Jackson’s presidential runs, with the 
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reformer wing of the primary associated with Gary Hart, Bill Bradley, and more recently 
Howard Dean. Dean and his forbearers did not have the capacity, or any particular 
incentive to move beyond the traditional primary electorate.99 By uniting these groups 
into Obama’s primary coalition, Clinton’s advantages with a more stable primary 
electorate could be overcome.100  
      OFA had the financial resources101 to make early and robust investments in field 
and the participatory resources of its millions of supporters, most of whom had never 
been political activists before. Having staff not just throw volunteers out on the streets 
with clipboards, but develop social bonds within the campaign that could lead to durable 
participation, as well volunteer based leadership capable of organizing sophisticated 
campaign events themselves, could add exponential value, even over the course of a 
single election.102 
         Fundamental to this OFA template was an early and capital-intensive devotion to 
field organization, eventually developing a sophisticated organizing model. The role of 
																																																								
99 These were what Ron Brownstein popularly and pejoratively dubbed “wine track” candidates, 
who appealed to primarily white, educated upper middle class liberal activists. These voters, 
while loud and well organized, were not indicative enough of the broader primary electorate to 
win the nomination. Yet as limited, blinded, or constrained by their activist support, were unable 
to broaden their appeal to other important segments of the Democratic primary electorate: such as 
non-whites, unions households, etc. See Brownstein, Ronald. “The Warrior and the Priest.” Los 
Angeles Times, Mar 25 2007. http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/25/opinion/op-brownstein25 
100 Both of these wings had their own particular, yet complimentary, resources. The reformer 
wing, made up largely of the middle class activist base, could be used similarly to the Dean 
campaign, integral for small-donor fundraising. While African-Americans made up a large share 
of the Democratic coalition, they were underrepresented in the primary electorate. Mobilization 
could change the landscape of the primary electorate, especially in the south where the 
overwhelmingly black.  Youth’s enthusiasm for Obama presented opportunities in both these 
regards: soliciting volunteers through the movement like campaign environment as well having 
the potential to change the party’s primary universe.     
101 By the end of third quarter 2003, Dean has raised in historical context an impressive $25.4 
million dollars. Yet by the end of the third quarter 2007, Obama had raised over $80 million 
dollars (FEC).   




the field organizer was transitioned from simply a recruiter and manager of voter contact 
activities to the implementer of community organizations known as neighborhood teams 
based on organizational modes (one on ones, house meetings, etc.) traditionally used by 
IAF-style community organizers, not electoral campaigns. This template, prefigured by 
Dean’s 2004 campaign, the further development of technology,103 as well as the tactical 
evolution prompted by having experienced Dean’s mistakes, helped make these efforts 
more effective. Why neighborhood teams? Community organizing after all is based on 
long-term goals of organization building, whereas electoral politics is grounded in short 
term imperatives, and the construction of transient and haphazard organization that 
services the immediate election.  Building durable social bonds would seem to be a poor 
use of activist time in the short period of an electoral campaign, where there are always 
doors to be knocked and phone calls to be made. One important lesson of the Dean 
campaign however, was the importance of precision of volunteer voter contact as a 
linkage between the campaign and voters. For campaigns to effectively use the data 
produced to model their electoral universe, volunteers had to be trained to record accurate 
results. Building effective mechanisms to diffuse such skills through durable volunteer 
leadership was paramount.  
     Such strategies had a history in Democratic politics. Harvard professor Marshall 
Ganz, a consultant to Dean and Obama campaigns, and a teacher and mentor to many 
who played integral roles in developing the field organizations for both, has been 
experimenting with using community organizing for grassroots electoral politics since 
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Robert Kennedy’s California primary campaign in 1968.104 The neighborhood team 
model itself, had its origins in Ganz’s work with organization behavioral scholar Ruth 
Wageman and the Sierra Club between the 2004 and 2008 elections.105  A number of 
recent developments however, have incentivized its systematic adaptation. In addition to 
new forms of media, were the diminishing returns and bandwidth of traditional forms of 
political communication.  
While money in electoral politics continued to increase, the amount of television 
advertising space and its utility could not continue to expand at a uniform pace.106 As a 
result, campaigns would look for new ways to use their funds. The Dean campaign 
advanced a model of cultivating activists, but OFA with its strategic necessity for 
mobilization, and fundraising and activist numbers that quickly dwarfed even Dean, 
believed that the most efficient path to mobilization was through channeling funds early 
in the campaign season into field organization. Staff deployed to use relational organizing 
techniques to build a formidable volunteer apparatus that could mobilize a non-traditional 
coalition on Election Day. 
     To do this, OFA concentrated on early investments in field organization in the 
all-important first set of primary states: Iowa, New Hampshire, Nevada, and South 
Carolina.107  Iowa, with its difficult to navigate caucuses was especially important: as a 
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well-developed field organization was needed to expand the caucus universe in this 
traditionally low turnout process. Perhaps most striking when evaluating institutional 
barriers to participation and OFA’s approach during primary season was their focus on 
state caucuses. Traditionally, the complexities of the caucus process led campaigns, even 
ones with high levels of grassroots enthusiasm, to eschew pursuing mass mobilization in 
caucus states. OFA however, saw its combination of grassroots enthusiasm and 
organizational sophistication as an opportunity to vastly increase turnout in these 
caucuses and run up their lead in the delegate count.108 The higher the transaction costs of 
participation, the more motivation OFA had to use its superior organization, here, higher 
thresholds to participation were successfully navigated as a result of campaign 
enthusiasm and an effective apparatus to mobilize it.  In the all-important Iowa caucus for 
example, Democratic turnout reached over 227,000, a near 50% increase from the record 




Table 2.4: Increase in youth (17-29) share of Democratic Primary/Caucus Turnout 
in early states. *Nevada did not have exit polls conducted in 2004. Sources: Pew 
Research, NBC Exit Polls, CNN Exit Polls. 
 
State 2004 2008 Diff 
Iowa 17 22 5 
New Hampshire 14 18 4 
Nevada* n/a 13 n/a 
South Carolina 9 14 5 
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      The cumulative result of turnout efforts during the primaries was dramatic. In 
2004, overall Democratic primary turnout was approximately 16.1 million; in 2008, it 
more than doubled to over 35 million. This included approximately 2% increases in the 
share of African-American and Latino proportions of the electorate, and an over 5% 
increase in the youth (17-29) share.  Democratic primary turnout as a share of eligible 
voters in primary states rose to highest point on record in 2008 at 19.5%. This was nearly 
double the 9.5% who voted in 2004.110 While this was in part due to both Obama and 
Clinton campaigns waging battle through nearly all 50 states before Clinton conceded, 
the result of this was the mobilization of nearly half of the party’s projected vote totals in 
the general election. This was an extraordinarily valuable down payment on the data and 
GOTV apparatus necessary for the general election.  
 
Table 2.5: 2008 Democratic Primary Early State Youth Vote (17-29) Preferences. 
Sources Pew Research, NBC Exit Polls, CNN Exit Polls 
 
State Obama Clinton Diff 
Iowa 57 11 46 
New Hampshire 51 28 23 
Nevada 59 33 26 
South Carolina 67 23 44 
 
      Schattschneider would be impressed. Here was an instance where in fact 
competition does appear to overcome fragmentation, strengthening party resources and 
expanding participation. Perhaps ironically, competition was not between parties, but 
within a singular party. The horizontal domain of coalitional party fragmentation helped 
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to expand the scope of conflict through a competitive electoral system. A competitive 
primary gave two highly resourced campaigns the incentive to organize and mobilize 
their targeted coalitions across primary states. At the time, it was feared that this 
competition might depress general election turnout among Democrats. The rationale 
being that its fraught nature might lead to the losing side’s supporters staying home, if not 
defecting in large numbers come November.111 Yet, a highly competitive, high salience 
primary in fact greatly helped bolster the party’s general election apparatus. Party voter 
and activist files were strengthened through the primary season, as well as activist 
networks given an important jumpstart. Classical party theory points to the cue of binary 
competition between well-established party brands as essential mechanism of making 
political decision-making understandable to the average person.112 Yet, even intra-party 
competition, if robust, presents incentives and opportunity to expand the sphere.113 
       After the primaries, Obama field staff spent several weeks at Chicago 
headquarters debriefing, discussing what worked and did not across the various states.  
Methods pioneered during the primary, were instituted on a larger and more systematic 
scale in the general election campaign.114 This included the neighborhood team model, 
digital tools, and using new media for grassroots communication. OFA was now tasked 
with increasing electoral turnout by tens of millions to win a general presidential election. 
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Significant field staff focused on implementing neighborhood teams deployed to 
battleground states by the early summer of 2008. These organizers used their relational 
organizing model to build organizations that by November featured volunteer leadership 
that could be depended on to run sophisticated GOTV operations through locally grown 
teams, to mobilize among the Obama coalition at a much larger scale for the general 
election.  
        Campaigns in recent resource-heavy presidential battleground states have 
typically been run as coordinated campaigns (campaigns organized as joint ventures of 
OFA, the DNC, and the respective state party), ostensibly on behalf of the entire party 
slate of candidates. Coordinated efforts combined the presidential necessities of winning 
a statewide popular majority, with the specific imperatives of the particular campaigns. 
Neighborhood team boundaries were drawn around the needs of particular state parties 
(e.g. in instances where winning the state senate was the highest state priority, staff 
organizers were based in state senate regions).  Yet, staff and strategy existed largely 
independently of the preexisting state party infrastructure. State OFA organizations ran 
through ‘Chicago,’ under the chain of command of OFA national. 115  Implicit is the 
assumption that what was good for the top of the ticket would serve the electoral 
prerogatives of all Democratic candidates. Indeed, success in 2008 and 2012 would seem 
to support this point. Yet, this did not obviate tension on the vertical plane resulting from 
institutional party fragmentation. OFA’s methods were foreign to many party veterans 
and politicians. Organizational focus on a dynamic and precise set of voter targets 
facilitated by ground level organizers often deviated from traditional forms of local 
																																																								




outreach.116 This aroused suspicion by among many in the party’s old guard. National 
presidential campaign resources were largely no-strings-attached patronage, not as 
handfuls of young out-of-state organizers with laptops and team building metrics.  
        While it would be hard to quantify the value added by neighborhood teams, it is 
difficult to argue with the overall electoral results. Obama’s victory was predicated on 
raising turnout to its highest percentage in decades. Exit polls suggest that turnout 
increased among traditionally underrepresented groups such as non-whites, youth, and 
economically downscale voters.117 Internal campaign records and independent polling 
further suggest that the numbers of voters contacted by campaigns was also significantly 
increased compared to recent elections.118 
       Obama’s victory appeared to have strong coattails for the party, at least on a 
federal level. Democrats won seven seats in the Senate and twenty-one in the House. In 
no state that Obama carried did Democrats lose a Senate seat or race with a non-
incumbent, or suffer a net loss in House representation.  
 
Democratic Victory, but Governance?  
        After the 2008 election, as is common practice, the Obama constellation took 
control of the Democratic National Committee. Former Virginia governor Tim Kaine, an 
early supporter and friend of the president, replaced Howard Dean as committee 
chairman. Most organizationally consequential was the canceling of Dean’s 50 state 
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project. This was replaced with “Organizing for America” (OFA 2.0), led by two OFA 
field veterans Mitch Stewart and Jeremy Bird. The ostensible purpose of OFA 2.0 was to 
transition the grassroots campaign organization created for the presidential race, for the 
purposes of advocating for the president’s agenda, electoral mobilization, and broader 
civil society projects.119 The decision to house this project under the DNC reflected a 
commitment to connect the Obama organization to the durable institutions of the party. If 
the volunteer-based field apparatus of the presidential campaign could be institutionalized 
within the party, it would have enormous impact on party resources and subsequently 
electoral outcomes in campaign years to come, or so it was thought.  
     Decisions about OFA 2.0’s structure were acrimonious. In one of the few 
journalistic accounts of its inception period, such in-the-moment tensions were 
illustrated. Tim Dickenson described the centrality of campaign manager David Plouffe 
in the decision to move OFA 2.0 inside the DNC: 
Steve Hildebrand, Obama's deputy campaign manager, tried to dissuade 
Plouffe. "The DNC is a political entity," he says. "Senators who you are 
going to need to put significant pressure on to deliver change — like Ben 
Nelson of Nebraska, who was opposed to health care reform — are voting 
members of the DNC. It limited how aggressive you could be." 
Hildebrand pushed Plouffe to make "Obama 2.0" an independent 
nonprofit, similar to FreedomWorks and Americans for Prosperity, the 
right-wing instigators of the Tea Party uprising. Free from the party 
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apparatus, Hildebrand argued, the group could raise unlimited funds and 
"put enough pressure on conservative Democrats to keep them in line." 
But Plouffe was resolute. Obama was troubled by the prospect of big-
dollar donors driving an independent nonprofit, and the DNC offered a 
ready infrastructure and fewer legal hurdles. "The president is a 
Democrat," says Stewart, a veteran of Obama's victory in Iowa who took 
over from Plouffe as OFA's director. "It would be very hard to explain 
why Obama's grass-roots field team is not housed with his party."120 
 
      The move from the 50 state project to OFA 2.0 marked an important shift in 
national party infrastructure building. Ostensibly, both projects simultaneous operation 
would seem redundant, as OFA 2.0 planned to operate in every state (contingent on 
meeting projected fundraising goals) with levels higher than under Dean. The promise of 
OFA 2.0 was an attempt to institutionalize a much broader grassroots activist base within 
the party. While Dean gave state parties resources previously deprived, vast grassroots 
enthusiasm was not among them. OFA 2.0 presented the potential for party building in a 
hurry, if it could successfully transition the campaign infrastructure to the party.  
       Despite (or perhaps because of) Democratic victory, suspicions endured. Indeed, 
what could be viewed as the “shock therapy”121 of the OFA-party transition brought back 
to the fore both horizontal and vertical domains of party fragmentation. Coalitional and 
strategic tensions that endured caused unease among loyalists of both the president and 
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the party. Unsurprisingly, Obama’s victory meant that when push comes to shove, it 
would be his coalition –on both horizontal and vertical planes—that took priority. Yet 
party coherence still required out of power factions to buy in, as their defection 
organizationally (and programmatically) could still weaken the party.   
     Even if the Obama coalition became the strategic driver of the party on a national 
level, this did not necessarily alleviate suspicions of the party brand and its institutional 
vessels among rank and file Obama supporters.  These activists’ enthusiasm and 
continued participation was integral for OFA 2.0. Grievances persisted among the party 
establishment as well, as the president’s victory took power away from the state party 
chairs and their priorities. Party tensions seemed inevitable as in a world of finite 
resources, disparate party actors all operating under different institutional logics will be 
difficult to satisfy. 
       The electorate of 2008 ushered a coalition that was young and non-white to the 
center of the party, along with non-institutionally organized liberal activists. This 
coalition was linked to a new congressional class that successfully rode Obama’s coattails 
through OFA’s mobilization efforts.  Outside of this were many established party actors 
aligned with Clinton’s primary coalition, along with state party leadership. These ‘losing’ 
factions overlap, yet were not the same. While many members of state party leadership 
cut their political teeth during the Clinton years, Dean’s instillation as DNC chair was in 
part a rejection of the McAuliffe/Clinton model of party organization. State party 
leadership wanted infrastructure (and control of it), not just money funneled to candidate 
campaigns. The aftermath of the 2008 elections presented a significant opportunity to 




the nation in a highly competitive 50 state primary cheered by party organizations finally 
showing some signs of life after Dean’s reign. Yet abstract commitment to party building 
is not necessarily enough to bring a disparate set of national factions, with histories of not 
always seeing eye to eye, together. As one state party operative put it: 
The (incumbent Democratic) governors didn’t endorse [Obama in the 
primary], so the relationship wasn’t there, the trust wasn’t there to begin 
with. They [state parties] felt like they were on the outs and [the 
administration and OFA] wasn’t sensitive to their concerns…that was the 
perception, was there merit to it? There was probably blame to go around. 
Again though, it’s about relationships, communication. That wasn’t 
always there. You could argue over whose lap that falls into, but I don’t 
think in the early days (of Obama’s presidency) there was a sense of what 
the states need (from the DNC)122 
     
     The 50-state plan hoped to win gradual consensus among divergent party actors. 
To show that the DNC was there to serve their needs in good faith, OFA 2.0 as an 
alternative structure presented a new dynamic in national-state party relationships. Its 
staff would fall under the chain of command of the DNC, with state party leadership 
having no formal control and little in the way of influence over strategic and staffing 
decisions within their states. Despite commitment to 50 state staffing, the pace and scale 
of this seemed to suggest a bias toward presidential battleground states, especially when 
compared to Dean’s tenure.   
      This felt like a lost opportunity for state parties. Even in non-battleground states, 
highly competitive primaries and the excitement around Obama’s general election 
																																																								




campaign were a tremendous boon for state parties’ data files and organizational 
resources.  Party databases benefitted from the flurry of new activists and voters. Even in 
non-competitive states, OFA had a presence. While they did not run the type of capital-
intensive field program of neighborhood team building indicative of battleground states, 
staff and grassroots enthusiasm still had campaign offices overflowing with volunteers 
ready to call (and travel) into battleground areas.  Yet for parties struggling financially, a 
lack of post-campaign funds made cultivating these new resources continually difficult. 
What effect the maintaining of 50 state organization would have had remains unclear, but 
its absence and the subsequent sense of a missed chance to build locally, increased 
friction between party stalwarts and the new national regime. 
        Presidential victory transferred control of the party from a proxy of the 
aggregated interests of the state parties and individual federal politicians to the 
presidential national standard-bearer, shifting institutional priorities along with it. Instead 
of the building of state infrastructure, prioritization went to efforts to consolidate the 
party’s new presidential majority coalition. Because OFA largely subverted the Clinton-
leaning state based party infrastructure in the primary, this exacerbated still simmering 
tensions. Dean navigated the implementation of insurgent techniques by putting 
organizing efforts under the discretion of establishment party actors. OFA 2.0 however, 
appeared less as a complementary organization, and more as a potential colonizing force, 
with little in the way of formal linkage to state party organization. 
     Even from congressional Democrats’ perspective, the decision to house OFA 2.0 
within the DNC--the chief organization nationally dedicated to the election of 




DNC morphed into a lobbying arm of the president, resources previously dedicated to 
electing candidates might now instead potentially bully members into supporting the 
president’s agenda. While the party’s legislative caucus was not a safe majority coalition, 
let alone a governing one, most of its members (including many of its most senior and 
powerful ones) had the benefit of safe seats. This would suggest little interest on their 
part in reinventing the traditional vessels of party organization. 
       Everyone had reason to be distrustful of the potential implications of building 
party coherence through an Obama-led DNC, especially when electoral victory gave all 
party factions seeming proximity to power and their goals. This trepidation was present 
among many Obama activists who were skeptical of the Democratic Party brand, and of 
devoting their efforts broadly to its support.123 The Obama campaign’s rhetoric of change 
portrayed itself against a political establishment that for many of its supporters included a 
Democratic Party that had grown stale. That was at best ambivalent, and at worst 
resistant, toward the Obama coalition. Memories of a Democratic organization that was 
largely hostile to Obama and his coalition in the primary, and at times lukewarm even 
during the general election were still fresh. Moving the organization within the party ran 
the risk of having it coopted by the ‘establishment’ it spent much of the campaign 
framing itself in opposition of. 
       Beyond broad unease over the possible ramifications of the OFA-DNC merger 
was the difficulty of getting OFA 2.0 off the ground. After announcing in January of 
2009, the organization struggled with fundraising out of the gate. Campaign donors, 
already fatigued from the election, were asked first to contribute to the ornate first 
																																																								





inaugural rather than funding OFA 2.0. With the campaign organization having gone 
largely ‘dark’ in the post-election period until after the inauguration, organizational 
momentum among campaign activists had come to a halt. Only skeleton staffs appeared 
in many states until well into the summer of 2009, by which time many activist networks 
were long dormant. 
      Fragmentation was not limited to the organizational face of the party. It did not 
take very long for splits to emerge within the party caucus of the 111th congress. The 
Republican Party responded to their losses by becoming a disciplined opposition party 
singularly focused on obstructing the Democrats agenda. Even traditionally moderate 
Republicans, thought to be unlikely to engage in procedural gamesmanship or be overly 
hostile to the new agenda, quickly cowed to party leadership and the reemerging 
conservative activist base exemplified in the Tea Party movement.  In the case of Arlen 
Specter, a long serving Pennsylvania moderate, this pressure led to his abandonment of 
the Republican Party, giving the Democrats a 60-vote “supermajority,” in the senate.124 
      With the parties polarized, even on procedural issues, Democrats would have to 
count on equivalent unity within their party. Any piece of significant legislation would be 
subject to forty de facto Republican votes against cloture.  The consequences of this were 
effectively turning every Democratic senator into a veto player, as any singular defection 
before a bill reached the floor would lead to its doom. A number of the party’s more 
moderate to conservative senators signaled a willingness to defect from the party on 
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necessary procedural votes if programmatic and/or patronage based concessions were not 
granted in the legislation.  
       These tensions culminated in the yearlong wrangling over the signature legislative 
accomplishment of the Obama presidency: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (known commonly as the ACA). The battle over the ACA crystalized this new 
balance of power in the party caucus, where the party’s moderate outliers leveraged their 
individual veto power, curtailing both the scope of the bill and slowing down the 
legislative process. Glacial pace of legislative movement made the bill particularly 
vulnerable to media distortion. This not only affected the legislation’s public popularity, 
but became an important rallying point for the then burgeoning Tea Party movement. 
From Aldrich’s conception of party strength, even with supermajority status, Democrats 
appeared weak as a caucus that could solve the social choice problems of its members. 
Rogue Democratic senators were neither beholden to the party brand, nor its 
organizational resources, and had little incentive to usher the bill through to protect the 
popularity of the president and generic Democratic brand. These senators instead chose to 
emphasize an image that stressed independence from the national party, and cultivated 
resources from as an idiosyncratic amalgamation of groups, many of which were 
ambivalent, if not outright hostile to the party and its constituency’s broad agenda.125 
     While the Tea Party emerged on the right, grassroots activism on the left was 
disappointing during this period. OFA 2.0 fell short of having the transformative effect 
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on the legislative process that Democrats had hoped. Activists met the transition to issue-
based campaigning with lukewarm support.126 Electoral work uses a clear objective with 
a defined date. Issue-based organization however, must react to a convoluted legislative 
process with many key decisions opaque to ordinary people. While OFA 2.0 attempted to 
use its still massive email list in support of the ACA and other high profile items on the 
president’s agenda, it did not distinguish itself within the patchwork of interest groups 
within their coalition, and fell short of the transformative political organization hoped for 
in the wake of the 2008 election. Strategic tensions between OFA activists, the White 
House, and the party came to the fore. It was reported that when activists approached 
white house Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel to pressure conservative Democrats, he 
retorted "We won't give you call lists. We can't go after Democrats — we're part of the 
DNC."127 When OFA 2.0 did run ads lobbying Democrats to support the ACA, it received 
quick rebuke from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid: "It's a waste of money to have 
Democrats running ads against Democrats."128  
     OFA 2.0, as a proxy for the party, appeared to be in a difficult position. As a 
party organization, it was stuck between the white house and congress, grassroots 
activists and politicians, party building and legislative advocacy. Consistent Republican 
intransigence left no margin for defection among Democrats, putting intra-party tensions 
at the fore of the legislative process. Under such conditions, an organization 
institutionally tasked with representing all of these actors has a near impossible mission. 
Ultimately facing such challenges, it was unable to capture the sort of enthusiasm and 
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political resources of the campaign within the national organization of the Democratic 
Party, even for its most pitched legislative battles.129 
       Conditional party government scholars have claimed increasing coherence of 
parties in the legislature since the 1970’s.130 As polarization has increased, office-
holders’ goals are consequently more closely tied to the partisan composition of the 
legislature. Indeed, over this period, legislative behavior increasingly patterned itself on 
party blocs, with strategy emanating from party leadership. Yet legislative coherence 
does not solve the incredibly complex coordination problems of electoral organization. 
Whereas office-holders unified programmatically can have compatible strategies in the 
legislative context, when constructing electoral organization, institutional fragmentation 
still puts politicians on different planes. Resource construction is highly idiosyncratic and 
uneven. Whereas parties-in-the legislature brings office-holders together, party electoral 
organization is still subject to disparate actors, operatives, activists, and political cultures. 
These are not easily bridged.  
 
The 2010 Midterms: A Return to Form 
        The 2010 midterm elections saw the voter universe regressing to “normal” 
levels, as the ascendant elements of the Obama coalition stayed home on Election Day. A 
still sputtering economy and dissatisfaction with the legislative process, especially of the 
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ACA, appeared to move independent voters into the Republican column, as an anti-
incumbent mood prevailed.131 Yet evidence is not clear to what extent Republican victory 
was a result of independent voters breaking for Republicans as opposed to the 
consolidation of a Republican electorate based on older, whiter, richer voters that are 
more likely to turn out in midterm elections. Disconcerting for Democrats was how the 
negative political environment dampened enthusiasm among sporadic Democratic voters. 
From a social-psychological outlook on voting behavior, seeing Obama under fire and the 
party seemingly being ineffectual from a political and policy standpoint, altered 
perception of the efficacy of participation in electoral politics.132 Explanations of 
enthusiasm levels being weaker among the presidents’ party has historically at least 
partly explained the difficulties of a presidential party in midterm elections.133 It would 
follow that if that incumbent coalition is especially dependent on a non-consolidated 
electorate, the effects will be more pronounced. 
      Whereas Obama’s approval rating was overall mixed, he remained popular still 
with self-identified Democrats. Polling showed large discrepancies between approval 
rates of Obama among registered voters, and those who would vote in the 2010 midterms. 
Per the Pew survey taken in the lead up to the midterm: Republicans were favored 46-42 
among registered voters, but 50-40 among likely voters. Obama’s approval also reflected 
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this trend as his approval/disapproval was -4 (44-48) among registered voters, but -9 
among likely voters. Further illustrating a still pronounced bias among those in the 
electorate compared to the unregistered, Obama’s approval was actually +1 (46-45) in the 
general public.134 Whereas for Republicans, the midterms stood as a referendum on 
Obama, sporadic Democrats did not view the election with similar salience. From a 
programmatic standpoint, the ACA, passed but not implemented, was a rallying cry for 
conservatives, and yet had not developed a coalition of stakeholders ready to defend it at 
the polls.135  
    Could these losses have been mitigated by the construction of an organizational 
apparatus on par with 2008? Social-psychological effects are not simply limited to voters. 
A negative climate is likely to have the same adverse effect on organizational resources 
as it does on base voter attitudes. Activists will be less likely to contribute money and 
time for the same reasons that sporadic voters will be less likely to show up at the polls. 
This vulnerability will only increase when resource networks are not consolidated. For 
example, an activist who turns out to canvass for Democrats habitually from election to 
election is less likely influenced by the idiosyncratic dynamics of a specific election year, 
than someone whose first effort in activism was in the previous election. If salience is 
consistently lower during non-presidential years, an organizational apparatus dependent 
on an irregular volunteer base will be more vulnerable to losses, than was true historically 
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when participation was motivated by patronage or union activism. Notably, two states 
that bucked national trends were Colorado and Nevada, which both celebrated statewide 
top of the ticket victories.  Both states were presidential battlegrounds, which then had 
competitive 2010 races. As a result, these states had the resources to build on the 
infrastructure established in 2008.  
       Yet nationally, the party in 2010 was not able to reconstitute the apparatus of 
2008. Financially Democrats lagged behind Republicans, even more so with Independent 
Expenditure (IE) money factored in.136 On the upside Democrats reported a near doubling 
of campaign contact form 2006, yet this still fell far short of OFA’s 2008 efforts.137 OFA 
2.0’s volunteer apparatus was not a major factor, never reestablishing the scope of its 
2008 operations and mobilization capacity. Party-wide mobilization efforts ran through 
the under-realized reconstruction of the OFA apparatus. By August, OFA 2.0 volunteers 
had knocked on 200,000 doors, one-tenth of the total at the same point in 2008.138 
     Losses however exacerbated accusations within the party that OFA 2.0 was less 
concerned with transitioning the Obama organization to the party broadly, than 
subordinating party mechanisms to the narrow electoral prerogatives of the president. 
Over half the DNC budget for the 2010 campaign was under OFA 2.0. This was seen by 
some in the party less as an effort to mobilize voters in 2010, than as a backdoor 
abdication of efforts to stem midterm losses, to bolster infrastructure for the coming 2012 
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presidential race.139  The emergence of the Obama coalition seemed to arouse suspicions 
that those not on the right electoral clock could be abandoned by party organization now 
acting as a proxy of a quadrennial presidential coalition. 
     The 2008 and 2010 dichotomy illustrates the crystallization of the two-
electorate’s theory. Causal impact can be broken down to two separate (yet far from 
mutually exclusive) variables. One social psychological, with organizational decline 
echoing voter turnout: lower salience and a negative political environment made activists 
less likely to build the apparatus, and voters less likely to vote, creating a mutually 
reinforcing dynamic that depressed Democratic turnout. The other is mechanical: based 
upon the institutional logics of vertical fragmentation. A presidentially-led party will 
prioritize the quadrennial presidential year over alternative party priorities-- including its 
midterm election year performance.  
     While congressional Democratic losses were the loudest cause of despair at the 
time, perhaps most far reaching was how down ticket Republican success altered the 
partisan composition of state governments. In 2010, Republicans gained full control of 11 
new state legislatures, bringing their total to 25, their highest since 1952.140 Such losses 
would be especially costly for Democrats with post-census legislative redistricting 
immanent. As it would turn out, Republican success at the state level was not just the 
happy coincidence of a national wave election. Republicans embarked on a under the 
radar state legislative strategy known as REDMAP, attempting to maximize victories in 
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state government and increase advantage over redistricting. According to journalist David 
Daley, who has tracked REDMAP closely: 
The idea was that you could take a state like Ohio, for example. In 2008, 
the Democrats held a majority in the statehouse of 53-46. What RedMap 
does is they identify and target six specific statehouse seats. They spend 
$1 million on these races, which is an unheard of amount of money 
coming into a statehouse race. Republicans win five of these. They take 
control of the Statehouse in Ohio - also, the state Senate that year. And it 
gives them, essentially, a veto-proof run of the entire re-districting in the 
state. 
 
So in 2012, when Barack Obama wins again and he wins Ohio again, and 
Sherrod Brown is re-elected to the Senate by 325,000 votes, the 
Democrats get more votes in statehouse races than the Republicans. But 
the lines were drawn so perfectly that the Republicans held a 60-39 
supermajority in the House of Representatives, despite having fewer 
votes.141 
 
        Republican control of redistricting would lead to advantageous maps for the 
GOP, as well as reducing local competition through the drawing of more safe districts. 
This would have indirect but important consequences on party building, as later chapters 
will discuss. Most immediately pertinent however would be an increasingly uphill battle 
for Democrats to regain the House. There is evidence that the role of gerrymandering in 
the decline of competitive seats has been overstated. Most notable is Bill Bishop’s 
persuasive analysis of increasing voluntary self-clustering of socially and politically like-
																																																								
141 “Understanding Congressional Gerrymandering: It’s Moneyball Applied to Politics.” NPR. 





minded people.142 Yet while it may be true that geographic clustering is the main driver 
of  competitive decline, this does not suggest that political actors do not use the 
redistricting process to compound the effect of growing partisan geographic coherence.143 
As REDMAP illustrates, strategies directed toward marginal shifts in districts can have 
outsized impact on representation, as well as party/candidate incentives.   
 
2012: The Obama Coalition Remerges 
       After 2010, anxieties were high that the 2008 coalition was an aberration based 
upon the historic nature of Obama’s campaign to be the first black president, imperiling 
both his and the Democrats chances in 2012. Yet, the 2012 election would once again see 
Obama victorious successfully remobilizing his 2008 coalition. In some ways, this was an 
even more impressive organizational accomplishment. The enthusiasm level of the 2008 
race was no longer apparent. Further evidence of this being an organizational victory is 
suggested in the disparity in turnout between battleground states and “safe” states: which 
did not get the benefit of resource intensive field campaigns.  
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Table 2.6: 2008 and 2012 Turnout Disparity. Source: Obama for America. 
 
  
      Whereas overall electoral turnout declined from four years earlier, battleground 
states actually experienced a modest increase. Voter contact once again had reached an 
all-time high.144 OFA trumpeted that 2.2 million volunteers had been scheduled for 
GOTV—an 80% increase from 2008.145  Despite this, impressionistic evidence suggests 
that neighborhood teams were not as robust as they were in 2012. The increase in voter 
contact is a product of the development of more sophisticated and user-friendly digital 
technologies, specifically call tools that allowed out of state volunteers to call voters in 
battleground states easily through their computers without having to visit a campaign 
office. 146 
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Table 2.7: 2012 OFA voter contact. Source: Obama for America. 
 
    
       The reconstitution of a high resource mobilization apparatus helped down-ticket 
Democratic fortunes as Obama vote totals replicated across federal elections. This led to 
Democratic gains in Congress. Yet 2010 redistricting helped protect Republicans, 
minimizing losses in the House. Redistricting further exacerbated vertical fragmentation 
within the party, as even in presidential years, congressional gerrymandering can dampen 
the advantage of base mobilization in House races. If districts are uncompetitive, even 
significant turnout increases cannot put seats in play.  
     One major shift in Democratic campaigning during 2012 was an embrace of 
Super PACs. This marked a dramatic departure from 2008 and 2010, when donors were 
generally discouraged from giving to non-coordinated vehicles. Resisting such vessels 
could be tempting, and not just as protest. After the Supreme Court’s loosening of 
campaign finance rules on non-coordinated electioneering in the Citizens United and 
Speechnow decisions, there were still strategic reasons for hesitancy to embrace Super 




nonprofit organizations) have relatively few financial restrictions, coordination firewalls 
between such organizations, candidates, and parties are strict. This sort of fragmentation 
has little downside in regards to paid media, yet pursuing voter mobilization through a 
fragmented organizational structure can lead to redundancy and inefficiencies.  This was 
the case in 2004 where battleground states were flooded with 527 organizations dedicated 
to mobilizing Democrats, but were outflanked by a more centralized and efficient 
Republican operation.147  
      OFA discouraged sympathetic organizations from doing supplemental field 
campaigning in 2008, believing that building a coherent voter file and volunteer 
apparatus through explicit coordinated campaign organization was the most effective way 
to do mobilization. While field efforts were successful in ’08, a massive upswing in IE 
spending by Republicans in 2010 was due at least partial credit for their electoral 
success.148 In response, the Democrats were more open to the strategic use of Super PAC 
campaigns in 2012,149 including the Obama-led Priorities USA and AFL-CIO backed 
Workers United, complimenting OFA efforts. While viewed as necessary to keep up with 
Republicans, such organizations created another level of fragmentation within the party, 
instituting a number of high resource electoral vessels that would not be able to 
coordinate.  
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      After the 2012 election, the presidential electoral campaign apparatus (OFA 
3.0) restructured into a 501(c)4, dubbed Organizing for Action (OFA 4.0). Eschewing a 
party organization,150 the hope that a focus on maintaining activist networks would 
eventually translate into party electoral resources. Restructuring was premised on a hope 
that freeing OFA from the restrictions of a party brand many activists still viewed with 
suspicion, as well as the fundraising limits placed on party organization, activist networks 
could be more easily maintained. Under OFA 4.0’s status, the organization be freer to 
raise large sums of money, as to expand their staff support of activists. Activists would be 
more attracted to participate, by having more influence over the issues, with control 
devolving to local volunteer leadership. While the ambition was that by keeping these 
networks active they could be channeled back into electoral politics, OFA 4.0 marked an 
explicit retreat from the task of institutionalizing the Obama apparatus within the 
Democratic Party. Yet on a systematic basis, this strategy has appeared to be 
unsuccessful. OFA 4.0 has also struggled like 2.0 to maintain activist networks as well as 
the financial resources necessary to induce participation.151  
      Despite intra-party tensions, the roots of these struggles remain a bit puzzling. 
Obama activists tend to be ideologically committed to the articulated programmatic 
agenda of the Democratic Party.152 Activists appear motivated by more than just a cult of 
personality, as they articulate a largely coherent set of policy preferences as well as being 
demographically rooted in the party’s emerging electoral coalition. Yet per OFA’s own 
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internal polling, they remain consistently skeptical of electoral politics and institutional 
actors independent of Obama.153  
 
2014: Midterms Redux 
     The 2014 midterm elections followed a similar pattern to 2010. The DNC (still 
presidentially-led) sensitive to criticisms of its 2010 strategy, focused on a broader 
collection of states, devoting $60 million dollars to the “Bannock Street Project.” This 
initiative used capital-intensive OFA mobilization strategies in a number of strategically 
important states, attempting to build an apparatus to mobilize an Obama-like electorate in 
competitive senate races concentrated in the South.154 Much like the presidential 
campaigns, this was temporary infrastructure with a focus derived from short-term 
electoral goals based on national strategy, than long-term state level party building. Yet 
this project included a number of states that were not presidential battlegrounds and saw 
their first large-scale financial infusions in an attempt to build OFA-like infrastructure.155    
       If the 2014 election saw a broader party dedication to mobilizing the Obama 
coalition, the results tracked closely to those of 2010. Why should this be so? In part, the 
variation in strategic focus from year to year meant that resources were often not built 
evolutionarily, but were based on the attempt to rebuild an Obama-like apparatus under a 
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lower salience election, without preexisting infrastructure. OFA’s original success in the 
2008 election was a combination of both high levels of financial resources and the 
salience of the election. The DNC trumpeted that it made 41 million voter contact 
attempts on behalf of 2014 races, yet this was still under half of OFA’s totals for 2012. 
This was also largely the result of out of state phone banking, rather than door to door 
canvassing. While increases in phone banking in 2012 helped work against voter 
disenfranchisement due to new electoral barriers, the task of mobilization in lower 
salience elections such as midterms may require comparatively stronger communicative 
methods such as canvassing to be effective.156  
     This is not to say that Bannock Street’s efforts did not have an effect. An analysis 
by the Brookings Institute, concluded that Bannock targeted states saw an increase of 
81,000 Democratic votes compared to their counterparts.157 While the study does not 
claim that this disparity just attributed to Bannock money, it does suggest that Bannock 
might have had a significant marginal effect on Democratic turnout. Yet significant is not 
determinative. Further investment in such efforts is challenging if they are not associated 
with party victory, regardless of actual causal effect. 
     Even in states that were both presidential and midterm battlegrounds, the party 
still fell short. North Carolina and Colorado benefitted from both being presidential and 
2014 battlegrounds. Yet in neither of these states were the cumulative amassing of 
resources sufficient to carry the top of the Democratic ticket to victory. North Carolina’s 
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senate race was a race more competitive than the national dynamics might indicate. This 
might suggest that the long-term success of building toward a consistently mobilized 
Democratic electorate will be a slow process and dependent on consistent resources. Such 
gradualism however will give little solace to office-seekers searching for an electorate for 
their next race, not a far-off campaign. Nor will it convince politicians to buy in to such a 
long-term strategy at the expense of their own electoral fortunes. 
 
Conclusion: The National Legacy of the Obama Years 
      The Democratic Party of the post-civil rights era has been marked by coalitional 
tensions. White working class defections compromising the party’s national majority, 
spanning the half century since the New Deal, was a constant vulnerability. Entering the 
2008 election, Democrats had not received a majority in the popular presidential vote 
since 1976. While organizational transition to a party-in-service helped Democrats 
remain financially competitive with Republicans, candidate-centered campaigning did 
not suggest sufficient incentives for mass mobilization through party mechanisms such as 
during the high point of the New Deal Era Democratic-labor nexus. 
      How has the development of a new campaign template, prioritizing mobilization 
affected the party nationally? The most broadly recognized durable resource developed 
has been data. Voters and activists have become more legible and easier to communicate 
with, which incentivizes political strategies based upon doing so.  If the construction of 
robust and durable voter and activist files make the future cultivation of actual concrete 
resources easier, it still is not a guarantee of success. Obama’s victories and deep party 




fragmentation has prevented the party from moving successfully toward consistent 
victories dependent on such a coalition.  
       While twice mobilizing a majority electorate in presidential years, an inability to 
institutionalize this voter universe is both a reflection, and cause of, tensions remaining in 
party. These tensions are no mere accident, but the result of institutional arrangements 
that have stymied the construction of an American mass party. Yet parties have still had 
periods of relative strength when the political environment has provided an opportunity 
for organizational responses to mitigate such barriers. Digitalization and increasing 
national ideological coherence of parties appear to suggest such a period. The political 
environment should incentivize campaign strategies based on an expansion of the scope 
of conflict. This is at least for a Democratic Party anchored in a coalition that comprises a 
majority of the populace, if not always the electorate. The broad goals of the party seem 
best served by consolidating its presidential coalition of an irregular, yet coherent 
majority.   
       Still, the persistence of fragmentation has frustrated efforts to construct an 
effective and durable organization to mobilize such an electorate consistently. 
Coalitionally, the party has made progress since the 1980’s in creating a more peaceable 
and coherent electorate. Yet coherence to the point in which disparate party factions all 
buy into the centrality of mobilization of a party electorate remains unrealized. The 2008 
primaries, the inability to fold Obama activists into the party organization, and the 
immediate second-guessing of such mobilization strategies after losses (as expressed by 





      Obama’s victories overcame these challenges. Yet the struggle to institutionalize 
both the campaign’s electorate and turnout apparatus point to fragmentation still 
impeding consolidation. Ephemeral resource construction at the presidential level can 
overcome party fragmentation in a specific election, but does not provide a path for 
integration and institutionalization. Outside the high tide of the presidential season, 
tensions that have plagued the party since the New Deal era continued to persist. In some 
sense, the disjuncture became even greater as the presidential wing of the party’s success 
further alienated other actors within it. A new campaign template was constructed, but 
institutional fragmentation prevented adoption throughout the party. Without 
consolidation of the presidential electorate, coalitional tensions are likely to persist. 
Without broad coalitional congruence, the party will have difficulty efficiently 
constructing organizational economies of scale. A conundrum remains.  
     The American constitutional structure has presented a set of formidable barriers: 
creating divergent logics for politicians in different levels of government, and on 
different electoral calendars. Even a coalition dependably mobilized as a presidential 
majority, does not service the needs of numerous party politicians in the wrong place and 
at the wrong time, unable to ride presidential coattails. Most notably, a successful 
presidential coalition will see its efforts at maintaining such a coalition immediately cut 
against the interests of disparate actors in the party who do not benefit from a presidential 
majority’s electoral path.    
      A quick look at top-line election results of 2008 and 2012 might give the 
impression of a party vote, broadly exploitable by Democratic office-seekers. Yet, even 




idiosyncratic electoral environments. If in a macro sense, the party looks more coherent 
and organizationally capable, the test of consolidation still lies in the perception and 
decision-making of various party actors all over the nation. From their standpoint, party 
integration looks much different from the neighborhood teams and hi-tech digital tools of 
presidential campaigns.  
     In the following chapters, this story will move to Ohio and down to the local 
level, where we will see how both these processes of mobilization and fragmentation play 


























Ohio: So Goes the Nation 
         
Ohio encapsulates both the promise and the perils of the Emerging Democratic 
Majority. Like nationally, Democrats were largely successfully in 2006, 2008, and 2012. 
Yet these victories were interrupted by bitterly disappointing midterm elections in 2010 
and 2014. Ohio is also the case that perhaps best captures campaign resource disparities 
between presidential and non-presidential election years. Institutional fragmentation 
produces variation in the strategic priorities of the national party and aligned donor 
networks. Even in a specific state, organizational scale is contingent upon the short-term 
electoral priorities of national party leaders.   
      There is nowhere more coveted during the presidential season than Ohio. It 
received more money for the presidential campaigns of 2008 and 2012 than any other 
state. Yet this influx most clearly crystalizes how a temporary injection of resources can 
present challenges to institution building on behalf of mobilizing a consistent party 
electorate. Ohio did not feature top of the ticket priority races in 2010 and 2014. Its 
vulnerability to the ebb and flow of the national spigot illustrates the difficulties of 
building durable institutions with such fluctuation in resources. This instability 








Table 3.1: Ohio Democratic Party Fundraising 2008-2014158 Source: Federal 
Election Commission  
	
Year	 Fundraising	
2008 $25,946,114  
2010 $19,053,549  
2012 $37,082,076  
2014 $8,171,726  
     
 
      This chapter focuses on state level party organization over this period. It 
recounts these elections through interviews with senior staffers of both the Ohio 
Democratic Party (ODP) and Obama for America’s Ohio operation (OFA). It then 
attempts to tease out the challenges to institutionalization of the campaign apparatus, and 
intra-party, inter-organizational tensions that follow from the contemporary American 
political campaign environment. Of central importance is how the presidential campaign 
as a provider of money, staff, activists, and campaign strategy, interacts with the state 
party as an institution.  
As a case, Ohio illustrates that presidential party building is a very specific type 
of organizational development. Its integration into durable party structures is highly 
contingent. Strategic theories of campaigning suggest that some states will be winners or 
losers organizationally due to their priority for national party and specifically presidential 
prerogatives. Yet, even for battleground beneficiaries, goals of the state party may be 
very different from just quadrennial statewide mobilization. Institution building is a 
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function of the cultivation and maintenance of networks, data, and processes that bring 
diverse party stakeholders together. Such development benefits presidential organization 
in the long run. Yet to borrow from Keynes, “in the long run we are all dead.” Short-term 
imperatives reign in electoral politics. Campaign infrastructure might be determinative 
for party success, yet party building in the contemporary era appears to be largely a 
positive externality of more narrow short-term electoral priorities. Fragmentation disrupts 
the building of a statewide apparatus, even where presidential resources are generous.  
        Also illustrated is a movement away from candidate-centered campaigns to top 
of the ticket-dominated parties. Data and polarization strengthen the logic of mobilizing a 
party electorate. Yet this is not centrally contingent on durable state party structures, but 
on top of the ticket campaigns that control resources and therefore strategy.  If these 
campaigns construct resources to mobilize a party electorate, they are as formal 
organizations, only temporary. Formal party structures play an ancillary role, and yet are 
the ones charged with bridging resources from one election to the next. It is this paradox 
of party-based mobilization without an integrated party apparatus, which marks the broad 
challenge of this era in high-resource states.   
  
Brief Background on a Battleground 
       Demographically, Ohio’s national representativeness might depend upon the 
metrics that one chooses. It earns its reputation as a reflection of American regional 
diversity. It has media markets and cultural characteristics distinct to the Northeast, 
Appalachian, and Midwest states it borders.159 The state also captures the common rust 
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belt struggles of deindustrialization and economic decline (although with signs of a late 
period coda of revitalization).160 Yet, attributable to its economic condition, it has faced 
recent stagnation in its population.161 As a result, it has not been subject to the rapid 
influx of immigrant and younger workers that has shifted the national political picture 
and driven much of Democratic battleground strategy. Ohio curiously, is at the fore of 
national priority and yet incongruent with the demographic shifts that animate party 
strategy.  
      While its African-American population of approximately 12% is roughly 
reflective of the national average, the state is otherwise significantly older and whiter 
than the nation as whole. Its Latino population rests at under 2%. Although Ohio boasts a 
large public university system, it is well behind the national average of 18-29 year olds as 
a population cohort.162 This leaves a Democratic Party more oriented toward the 
traditional labor-farmer nexus of the New Deal coalition.163 Urban political organization 
is often characterized by still functioning machines. Cuyahoga, the largest county in the 
state and home to Cleveland, still boasts Democratic clubs in most of its 56 
municipalities.164  
        Electorally, the state has recently drifted from leaning red to blue in presidential 
years. Despite experiencing competitive races at the presidential level, Ohio Republicans 
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enjoyed unified control of state government from 1995-2006; and held the governorship 
from 1980-2006. This streak was interrupted by a Democratic governor from 2006-2010, 
and state house from 2009-2010.  Yet precipitous drops in midterm voting coupled with 
districts gerrymandered for optimum Republican representation, have helped insulate 
Republican state legislative majorities from the Democratic presidential coalition.165 
Gerrymandering has also strongly affected congressional elections. Despite statewide 
competitiveness, the GOP retains a sizable lead in their House delegation with few seats 
competitive.166 The consequences of this partly accounts for the lack of national 
Democratic money during the midterm cycle, as congressional fundraising goes 
elsewhere.  
        Inducements to party building in Ohio remain as variegated as in the nation as a 
whole. Consistently competitive statewide elections incentivize the mobilization of a 
party electorate every two years. Yet from the top-down, national resources are typically 
relegated to presidential year priority: when campaign and party money floods the state. 
From the bottom-up, gerrymandering minimizes robust electoral competition. This 
diminishes incentives to build strong mobilization apparatus’ locally, as most seats below 
the statewide level remain uncompetitive.  
 
Strickland, Redfern and the ODP 
        Despite decades of being shut out of the governor’s mansion, Democratic 
candidate Ted Strickland’s personal popularity, scandal within the previous Republican 
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administration, and a national Democratic wave led him to an easy victory over his 
opponent Ken Blackwell, by a 60-40% margin in 2006.167 Strickland, the son of a 
steelworker, and an ordained minister from rural Scioto County, represented a potent 
combination of the populist union and farmer traditions of the Ohio Democratic Party.  
Having been elected to congress (after two unsuccessful tries), he ran for office having 
built potent fundraising networks as well as relationships with state politicians. Yet 
despite large leads in polls heading up to the election, Strickland remained in relative 
parity with his opponent in fundraising. According to Strickland staffer, Carri Twigg: 
“in the 20 years previous to 2006 there hadn’t been a Democrat anywhere and so 
you probably saw the greatest amount of collaboration and goodwill…by the time 
we got to autumn of 2006 we could taste that the tide was in our favor, the polling 
reflected that, Ken Blackwell was a mess, people believed in Ted to carry the 
ticket.”168 
Yet the strategic tensions involving urban vs. rural remained: 
“You saw a huge amount of resources comparatively going into the places that 
Ted was strong: the Appalachians, industrial (sic) Youngstown, Steubenville. 
There was a constant tug for resources with the cities and they got the resources 
they need, but it wasn’t like we’re going to win this campaign by winning 
Cleveland, that was never the catalyst. It was lose better everywhere else, where 
Democrats historically have lost.”169 
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        Strickland’s ascent to office was paralleled by that of the new party chairman, 
state assembly minority leader Chris Redfern. Redfern was a logical bedfellow for 
Strickland, hailing from a conservative district he navigated with his own populist 
sensibilities.170 Yet in contrast with Strickland’s amiable old-line minister persona, 
Redfern’s loquacious and bombastic personality somewhat belied his small-town roots. 
The state’s executive committee, half elected and half appointed, decides the state party 
chair.  Traditionally, like the national party, control over the appointed portion of the 
committee, and by extension the chairmanship itself falls de facto to the highest elected 
Democrat in the state. For Redfern, Democratic struggles to win statewide races however 
had created a leadership gap with the party: 
“When you have no natural leader like a governor or a United States 
Senator, there is a vacuum of power that is created, and there are a lot of 
people that want to fill that vacuum, some for their personal political 
reasons, some more nobly for idealistic reasons, but the overwhelming 
majority for money and power” 171   
 Redfern in the years leading up to 2006 found himself by default hoisted into this 
positon: 
“When I became chairman there were no elected officials in Ohio, and as 
the minority leader I had spent the previous two years (sic) traveling the 
state doing the things the highest ranking elected official would do. He’d 
be the surrogate for John Kerry in 2004, he’d be the guy carrying the torch 
in 2005 convincing Democrats that we ought not write our obituaries”172 
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        Gubernatorial victory in 2006, gave Democrats a significant opportunity to focus 
on party building efforts. Redfern saw the chance to give the party organization two 
things it desperately needed: a statewide officeholder tethered to the electorate rather than 
party insiders, and the fundraising network that came with control of the governor’s 
mansion.  If Redfern had become the party leader by default during its time in the 
wilderness, he lacked the office necessary to cultivate resources to induce party cohesion. 
Leading a legislative minority does not come with much cache for major donors and 
interests. Without the power of the purse, and its carrots and sticks, there is little party 
leadership can do to induce unity and build the party as a coherent team of politicians. 
Taking control of at least one branch of state government, especially the executive, gave 
the party the potential influence to bring people to the table.   
         Despite a substantial victory, Strickland recognized that he would be unlikely to 
have such a favorable electoral environment in the future. He remained tasked to deal 
with a unified Republican legislature in the state. Consistent with Galvin’s view of the 
president’s relationship with the national party,173 the executive was motivated to engage 
in party building to win party control of the legislature. Yet without a history of 
competitive local elections or leadership from the state, many county parties were 
moribund with little in the way of resources and expertise. This was reflected in a 
statewide audit and listening tours of county parties conducted in 2006, which showed a 
strong demand for resources on the local level. “Doug (Kelly, the party Executive 
Director at the time)…let everyone beat up on them about how they didn’t get what they 
																																																								




wanted in 2006…the party had historically been under resourced, there was lingering 
tension.”174 (Twigg) 
      Beyond organizational decay, the party also had to deal with strengthening 
alliances within its coalition. Both Strickland and Redfern, in their respective 
gubernatorial primary and party chair races, beat out African-American challengers 
seeking more diversity in party representation. As nationally, the social-choice problems 
of navigating a multi-racial coalition were never far from the fore. Despite being a largely 
white state, and still majority white party, African-Americans made up a significant 
minority of the party’s voters and elected officials. Yet representation on the state level 
through both party and political office remained nearly exclusively white.175 
Congresswoman Stephanie-Tubbs Jones and other African-American leadership had a 
history of not always seeing eye to eye with Strickland as well as much of the state 
party’s white power structure.  
         In a state that did not feature the same growth in demographic diversity as the 
nation, the party’s electoral viability remained largely in generating and maintaining 
support of a nearly 90% white populace. Organizationally, the party was wedded to 
hierarchal institutions of machines and labor unions. Leadership was a result of seniority 
and paying dues more so than diversity and democratic responsiveness. These factors 
gave little opportunity for African-American leadership to develop institutionally within 
the party, outside the machines of African-American districts. The result was a sense of 
suspicion and alienation among many black political leaders. Strickland’s electoral 
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courting of a more rural electorate stoked these fears, yet victory, and its spoils—
including the soon to come presidential largesse—led to improved, if not yet quite 
smooth, relations.  
 
Building for the Presidential Election 
        Foremost for the state party was building for the eventual takeover of the state 
legislature.  The assembly was a realistic option in the short-term future. Yet district 
apportionment and the structure of the electoral cycle presented significant barriers. The 
senate’s gerrymandering kept it largely insulated from even a significant Democratic 
wave election such as 2006. Years of Republican control resulted in districts highly 
favorable to the GOP. In addition, with seats up once every four years, the senate 
remained electorally insulated from the majority preference of any given election.  
        Most important however is the opportunity that would come with the influx of 
resources into the state for the presidential election. For Redfern, a reinvigorated state 
party would offer the opportunity to channel these resources in ways productive for state, 
not just presidential goals:  
“When Bill Clinton was setting up his organization in 1996, or Al Gore in 
2000, or Kerry in 2004, they had to build their own organization and it 
involved the Ohio Democratic Party. But it was just a framework, it was a 
pass-through organization for the whims and the wishes of the presidential 
candidate. Once the presidential candidate left, the party was left as a 
shell…I vowed when I was elected not to allow that to occur again.”176 
     
																																																								




      State party leaders were early and strong endorsers of the Clinton campaign. 
Ohio’s stature as a battleground meant the Clinton’s had deep ties with the party 
infrastructure dating to the 1992 and 1996 elections. Obama was a long shot, and one 
whose campaign strategy was not particularly congruent with the characteristics of the 
Ohio party. In a race in which the primaries wound up roiling racial cleavages, Ohio’s 
party leadership, populist and white, stood in stark contrast to Obama’s coalition. Obama 
had little in the way of institutional support within the state. Indeed, the language used in 
the run-up to the Ohio primary, even by the normally restrained Strickland,177 was 
evidence of a highly competitive election, and one in which the delegate math was 
making the Clinton campaign increasingly desperate to find a way to alter the candidates’ 
coalitions. Such a tone however would further exacerbate tensions that threatened 
coalitional unity. 
        Yet if state-level competition frayed nerves, it also created a strong inducement to 
take advantage of intra-party competition and mobilization to build the party. Unlike 
many other states, the ODP gave both Obama and Clinton campaigns access to voter and 
volunteer files, with the understanding that each would build the database with their 
activists and voter contact data once the primary concluded. Ohio, whose primary came 
relatively late178 in the contest, was important ground for Clinton to stop Obama’s 
momentum. Clinton’s win by a 54-44% margin, represented both her demographic and 
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institutional strength in the state. Obama however, would nonetheless claim the 
nomination, and be the vessel on which Ohio Democratic futures depended.   
 
OFA Comes to Columbus 
        The Obama campaign’s general election staff began arriving in the state in May 
of 2008.  OFA and the state party folded, as it conventionally does, into a coordinated 
campaign, a legally structured joint venture of OFA, DNC, and the ODP, called the Ohio 
Campaign for Change.179 This allowed money and coordination to flow freely through 
this structure. Significantly, in respect to state coherence, there was no U.S Senate race 
on the ballot in 2008. Another key election at the state level could have potentially caused 
tension. A presidential campaign, especially one targeting a somewhat non-traditional 
state Democratic electorate, might have been in jeopardy of butting heads with another 
high resource statewide race in play. 
       Tensions between national and state parties are largely inevitable. Disjuncture is 
not just a matter of strategy, but tactics. Differences will arise not just over narrative and 
coalitional structure, but the modes of campaigning used to communicate and organize on 
the local level.  The national party controls the financial resources and the brand of the 
party. Staff implements modernized campaign techniques. These honed through dynamic 
competition, are adapted to highly resourced and competitive political environments. This 
was especially true for OFA, which won a strongly contested fifty state primary 
campaign against a formidable candidate, with the help of new developments in 
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campaign data and field organization. Yet the state party is likely to feel a sense of 
expertise when it comes to the specifics of their own backyard.        
        The state party stands as an intermediary of sorts between the national and local 
parties. Like the national party, it is primarily concerned with statewide turnout, yet its 
own linkage is strongest and most consistent with its county parties. These clashing roles 
can bring to the fore inevitable structural tension. One former county party chair, 
described a meeting with her colleagues where the role of the national party during a 
presidential election year was: “they come in [and] tell everyone what to do and leave 
nothing.”180 State parties are dependent on national resources, yet much of their function 
is in supporting in-state candidates, subject to different electoral rules than federal 
candidates. 
       To bridge this divide, OFA made sure to integrate experienced state staffers into 
their operation. Two veteran Strickland staffer’s, Aaron Pickrell and Greg Schultz, joined 
OFA as General Election and Constituency Directors, respectively.  
“One of the smartest things Barack Obama’s people did, Plouffe did a lot 
of smart things, but hire the very person who beat him (in Ohio) in the 
primaries, and so Pickrell (Schultz and others)…those people know how 
to pronounce Lima. They know they have to understand the dynamics of 
Ohio and respond to them accordingly.” (Redfern)181 
      
        Electorally, the coordinated party strategy reflected not Strickland’s 2006 
coalition, but that of the other successful statewide candidate running that election year- 
Senator Sherrod Brown. Brown, a nationally prominent liberal, was more representative 
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of the electorate Obama (and the ticket) would be able to attract. In addition to being 
more ideologically in tune with the Obama coalition, Brown’s name “sounded black,” 
which gave operatives confidence that his voters would be transferable to Obama.  
     OFA’s first task was to build relationships with a party infrastructure that was 
suspicious, if not in some instances hostile. According to Schultz: 
“My role coming in as both an Ohio native, and having worked on the 
Hillary primary, was to help the Obama campaign with some relationships 
they just never had an opportunity to form during the primary…and then 
part of my role was to introduce the campaign to the rest of Ohio, whether 
they were involved in Hillary or not…Hillary had most of the 
establishment in Ohio…the Obama campaign didn’t walk into the 
campaign for the general election with a lot of relationships to the county 
party structures, local electeds,  because the vast majority of them (sic) 
endorsed Hillary…and I don’t use (establishment) as a pejorative, but 
quite the opposite, truly infrastructure.”  
      
        Statewide OFA senior staff set up shop within the ODP’s state headquarters in 
Columbus. The spacious former church, while costly, supported integrating national staff 
and grassroots activity in its meeting rooms. Breaking with tradition, staff at the Field 
Organizer (FO) level was tasked with setting up Neighborhood Teams; each with a 
volunteer neighborhood team leader responsible for building up and running their area.  
        Staffing apportionment was itself an attempt to bridge the priorities and 
prerogatives of national and state operations. Focus on high-density areas, while best 
from OFA’s standpoint, competed with a focus on turnout in swing legislative districts. 
Negotiating these priorities was a first order of business in building a harmonious culture 




priority was given to urban and university areas central to Obama’s coalition. According 
to Deputy Field Director Chris Wyant “first and foremost…we went where the votes 
were.”182 Luckily, resources can alleviate tensions, and OFA, already directing tens of 
millions of dollars within the state helped pacify all.   
 
OFA in the Field: Giving up Power to Get More Back? 
       Yet, if resources were abundant, OFA’s field strategy was still unusual. 
Relational organizing tactics were nothing new, but they were not associated with 
presidential campaigns. Schultz notes: “It was super old, but was done at a level that was 
new.” Traditionally, the presidential field program is designed to have staff help support 
preexisting apparatus from unions, and other active civic groups, increase campaign 
visibility, and distribute ‘chum’ (lawn signs, buttons, bumper stickers etc.) to loyal 
supporters. The OFA neighborhood team (NTL) model focused on cultivating new 
infrastructure particularly among Obama activists. These were often people previously 
uninvolved in politics, largely indifferent, and perhaps even hostile to traditional party 
institutions, especially at a local level.   
       Field staffers, who traditionally acted like ambassadors from the national party, 
went to work recruiting volunteers, having one on one conversations, house meetings, 
and evaluating volunteer leadership for training in sophisticated voter contact operations. 
This might have been a strange sight to long time party stalwarts. One staffer 
characterized local politicians’ reaction: “I think they viewed us as aliens and were not 
really sure whether we were allies or enemies.”183 According to Schultz: “What the 
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decentralized organizing model of the campaign does as a structure is that it forces (the 
local party) to give up power, but I think at the end of the day, it gives you more as a 
result.”184 While the organizational locus of voter outreach flows through OFA, the 
resources (and down-ticket electoral victories) garnered can help local parties in the long 
term. Yet this would be a difficult sell to many accustomed to their own way of doing 
things.   
        The first task over the summer was increasing voter registration rolls. Ohio did 
not have the same high ceiling on its Democratic electorate as many states with rapid 
population growth: especially among youth and Latinos. Yet outreach in urban, African-
American, and university areas was integral before the late September voter registration 
deadline. OFA was not alone in doing registration. ACORN, a mass national organization 
with a long history of organizing the poor, ran a separate program, with a focus on urban 
minority areas. Organizationally far more unwieldy than OFA, the two organizations 
(unable to coordinate legally) made at times strange bedfellows.185 From OFA’s 
standpoint, data was of the utmost importance, and registering through OFA was the most 
surefire way to have an exact sense of the changing voter universe as registration 
increased. Yet a significant increase in the voter rolls, beyond the efforts accounted for by 
OFA, made ACORN’s contributions difficult to deny. 
       Frustration and skepticism with sympathetic outside organizations is common for 
campaign organizations. This is especially true as voter universe modeling has grown 
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more sophisticated and dynamic. OFA viewed outside groups with suspicion. This went 
beyond mere parochialism. In 2004, blame for the Democrats’ close loss in Ohio was 
directed at organizations such as ACT and MoveOn. Such groups had the advantage of 
being able to raise large unrestricted sums of money from wealthy donors, however 
firewalls between each organization and the actual campaign/party led to confusion and 
redundancy in organization and voter contact activities.186 As a result, OFA (and the 
ODP) signaled strongly to leave the field to them in 2008. This would give the campaign 
the advantage of having up to date lists of the voter universe and voter contacts, 
necessary to ensure turnout models are dynamic and accurate. Information is power, and 
other groups meddling was assumed counterproductive. Activists were encouraged on a 
local level to fold their activities into the OFA organization.  
         Incongruity between the party brand and Obama brand continued to cause 
difficulty. Indeed, in Ohio the primary campaign was bitter, encapsulated by coalitional 
fragmentation through both racial and generational divides. Yet if OFA was to run the 
mobilization effort it intended, it was essential to put the party back together for the 
general election. The campaign often ran a concurrent if (by varying degrees) cordial 
campaign with local Democrats. Local party and candidate outreach efforts lacked formal 
integration into OFA. This was in part due to fundraising restrictions that did not allow 
local candidates using ‘state raised’ money to use literature featuring Obama. Conversely, 
while OFA was legally able to use federal money to support state races, they resisted 
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systematic coordination with local candidates.187 It was viewed on the state level that 
deciding which local candidates to do ‘asks’ on behalf of could impact local cohesion and 
cause headaches and distraction for field staff. Better for all to focus on mobilizing on 
behalf of Obama, letting local candidates ride the coattails of an efficient operation.  
        If OFA organization tended to remain separate from local party infrastructure, it 
seemed to do significantly better with local liberal activist networks. Learning from 2004, 
MoveOn, rather than form its own IE on the ground, instead encouraged its members to 
go to their local Obama field office and volunteer with the campaign. While MoveOn 
activists and other local groups provided support for the campaign, less clear was large-
scale integration into the neighborhood team leadership, so important to the OFA model. 
        Indeed, almost without exception, sentiment among the OFA staff interviewed 
for this project was that high-level volunteer leadership (NTLs and other ‘captains’) 
tended to be new to political activism. They were not formerly involved with the party or 
issue activism. Obama’s appeal as an outsider candidate, attracting people often alienated 
and frustrated by the political process, may help explain this. It is also likely that building 
organization around activists with a blank slate was simply easier than if they had 
preconceived notions of campaigning at odds with the OFA model. 
        Why such divergence in electoral campaign activity between an ‘OFA’ and 
‘traditional’ model? Here, variation in electoral competition comes to the fore. Whereas 
the OFA model blossomed in a highly competitive environment, many local activists 
remained cut off from infrastructure developed under dynamic strategic incentives to 
experiment with field mobilization. Without consistent and intense party competition, 
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local party infrastructure is primarily tasked with managing power in a governing party 
and safe electoral districts rather than building infrastructure for constant mobilization. 
State and national party competition is the state and national parties’ problems. 
Challenges on the local level more oriented toward managing the majority through 
control of government. Keeping the peace is normally a higher priority than mobilization.   
       Relationships between local parties and OFA seemed to vary greatly as the next 
chapter makes clear. In many localities, warm and cooperative relationships were 
reported. With local elected and party leaders impressed by the OFA organization. Yet 
even in these spaces, organizational integration was not usually significant. In other 
areas, often with more horizontal fragmentation, mutual suspicions persisted between 
OFA and the local party. In Columbus, however, relationships remained friendly with 
operatives from the Strickland, Obama, and Clinton universes all united behind a field 
plan that would mobilize a coherent Democratic electorate across the state. 
 
Targeting and Voter Contact 
        Field campaigning has two overreaching goals: mobilization and persuasion. 
While the mechanics of voter contact are the broadly the same, effective approaches 
differ. Mobilization targets are usually new or sporadic voters with high probability of 
voting for the candidate (and likely his or her party). Mobilization is largely a function of 
registration, identification at point of contact (the correct address/phone number), and 
repeated contact in the days leading up to Election Day (what campaigns colloquially 
refer to as ‘touches’). This culminates in ‘knock and drag’ on Election Day to make sure 




tactics. For example, the longer the gap between the end of registration and the election, 
the more difficult mobilizing sporadic voters either unregistered or without updated 
registration will be.  
        Perhaps most significant is whether there is an ‘early vote’ period, in which 
voters can vote in person before Election Day. 188 Early vote creates significant 
advantages for campaign mobilization. Rather than using the period before the election to 
prime voters contacted to get out on Election Day, it allows the campaigns to run a 
days/weeks/months long knock and drag operations, allowing any voter contacted to vote 
immediately. On Election Day, this lends itself several advantages.189 The universe of 
voters to mobilize is significantly smaller and more manageable and the infrastructure 
can therefore be more focused and efficient. At the polling site, itself, lines will be 
significantly shorter, as well as the number of voting irregularities the campaign must 
deal with, allowing campaigns to be better able to stay on top of and address any such 
complications.  
            In Ohio, this is consistently a pitched battle around election time. Control of the 
state executive branch, who oversees elections, is critical in this respect. In 2004, 
Republican Secretary of State Ken Blackwell was accused of attempting to depress 
Democratic turnout by limiting early/absentee voting opportunities and putting too few 
voting booths in high-density urban areas, leading to hours long lines and depressing 
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turnout.190 Strickland on the other hand supported a significant early vote period, the first 
week of which overlapped with voter registration, effectively creating what functionally 
amounted to an opportunity for same day registrants to vote.  Republicans attempted to 
block and curtail many of these measures in court, yet despite some temporary 
injunctions,191 early voting went off rather successfully.   
       Persuasion, on the other hand, focuses on consistent voters who are demographically 
likely to be undecided or ‘swing’ voters. While these voters are easier to find, campaign 
effects are notoriously difficult to ascertain.192 Research shows that most contemporary 
self-identified independents are in fact partisans, who do normally vote a straight party 
ticket.193 Yet in a state like Ohio, which featured a smaller pool of ‘mobilizable’ base 
Democrats than many other competitive states, there were further incentivizes for the 
campaign to focus on persuasion. If the mechanics of effective voter persuasion are still 
mysterious, one important tactic for OFA was the recruitment of local volunteers to do 
this voter contact. While out of state volunteers were often voluminous, much like the 
Dean orange hat brigades, they were thought to have lower levels of efficacy than 
organically built local teams. Policy would move voters less than the credibility of local 
activists vouching for the candidate.194 
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       What is the profile of a persuadable Ohio voter? Overrepresented in the Ohio 
electorate are those who at least superficially look strongly like the type of voters who 
have vacated the Democratic Party over the past several decades. They are working class, 
white rust belt voters, like those profiled in Macon County by Stanley Greenberg.195 Yet, 
Ohio has still (relatively) high union density196- a strong predicator of retained 
Democratic loyalty among the white working class.197 In addition, the economic 
devastation in Ohio that took place under Republican state and national regimes had 
reduced whatever loyalty many Ohioans might have gained for the GOP. This was 
evident in Strickland’s landslide victory and the strong Democratic showing of 2006.198 
Yet, if these voters were open to the Democratic Party, it was not certain they would be 
for Obama’s’ Democratic Party. This was strong ‘Clinton Country’ after all, in the 
Democratic primary. It remained a major question as to whether a candidate with 
Obama’s particular appeal-- so mismatched with the typical Ohio Democratic voter-- 
could build a winning coalition.  
       The goal was for GOTV (scheduled for the entire last week of the campaign) 
was to have staging locations run by trained local volunteer leadership. With the voter 
universe narrowed by early vote, identifying and making sure Democratic targets made it 
out to vote was more manageable. Capacity to track and project the voter universe greatly 
improved by 2008, yet uncertainty persisted. Were persuadable voters actually 
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persuadable? Were canvassers getting positive IDs? Were the turnout targets right? From 
a local party perspective, would a rising Obama tide lift all Democratic boats? 
       Election Day was an uneasy experience. Early vote numbers were not current, 
creating uncertainty. Internal accounting also was far from reliable. Polling places 
seemed ominously sparsely attended. ‘Project Houdini,’ a system that was supposed to 
give OFA up to date information on which voters had turned out, allowing them to adjust 
canvassing accordingly, broke down early in the day. 
       Yet less than two hours after polls closed it was clear that both Obama and the 
ODP were on their way to a resounding victory in Ohio. Obama would win the state 
51%-47%, while Democrats would take back the state assembly and make gains in the 
senate. Overall turnout had dropped modestly from 2004. Yet this could be the result of a 
decline in state population over this period rather than ineffectiveness of mobilization.  
       Concerns that Democrats would suffer down ballot did not come to fruition. 
However, there were exceptions.  This was especially true in county judge races, as 
judges do not have a partisan indicator on Ohio ballots. While sample ballots with ‘the 
ticket’ proved largely unnecessary for those listed as Democrats, without the partisan cue, 
many Obama voters simply left those races blank. If the OFA model was largely 
successful, this illustrates that getting the party ticket into voters’ hands still matters. 
 
2009-2010: Organizing for America and the Midterms  
     OFA 2.0 would get off the ground in Ohio in March 2009.  Leading the 
organization was Greg Schultz, now a former Obama and Strickland staffer. Without any 




challenging. Schultz started out, much like the ODP in 2006 by conducting a listening 
tour of forty cities. County chairs were invited to kick off the meetings, encouraging 
relationships with local parties. Schultz found a generally warm reaction from the county 
parties. Yet warm did not necessarily translate to knowing what to do, or what could be 
done, with such an organization: “We understood that what we had done was new to 
almost everybody, particularly at the scale with which we did.”199 
       Local politics were outside of the explicit OFA 2.0’s mission. Yet the 
overarching aim was to institutionalize the Obama organization as an electoral 
infrastructure. This was sold as being to the significant benefit of local parties, too. 
“we tried to encourage the county establishments to say (sic) now is this 
the time (for those who had not embraced OFA during the campaign)… 
we were here to grow this coalition…how do we keep (the volunteers) 
engaged for the forseeable future.”200 (Schultz) 
 
         Yet OFA, centered on national issue advocacy,201 was not at the outset 
particularly relevant to local political actors. As the next chapter will discuss in detail, the 
party at the local level looked less like an assemblage of a singular party, and more like 
silos grafted onto the federal system. This meant a lack of local integration into the party 
as it faced an election without Obama at the top of the ticket. OFA 2.0’s potential for 
local parties meant channeling its activist networks into local campaign work, yet this 
was a far bridge to cross for volunteers whose political linkage was to Obama, not local 
party politics. According to Schultz, the sell to the local parties had mixed success: 
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“Some were open (but for some the argument is) you’re bringing new 
people in who don’t know how things have been done…those people have 
been around for decades, they’re part of the structure and that’s a good 
thing. But you have people that have just shown up six months ago and 
were then given control of turning out their neighborhood, standing next to 
someone who had for 20 years been in charge…They saw resources that 
they thought should have been dedicated to them, and look we had two 
staff and maybe a laptop, so we weren’t taking up anything, but what 
people thought is usually you elect a president and three, three and a half 
years later, they come back. But we weren’t going away, some people 
were encouraged by that, but some people were like well, you need to be 
doing this.  
 
So we said we were going to work on issues and certain people said well 
you should work on electing Democrats, which is certainly fair, but some 
of our belief, well more my belief, is you can’t have a perpetual campaign. 
You can have a perpetual organization and I think people, especially new 
people, were not involved because they loved the Democratic 
infrastructure. They were involved because they wanted to see a change. 
Now many people involved in the Democratic infrastructure wanted to see 
a change as well, but these new people were involved because they 
believed a person and a presidency could make a difference, and I think 
our assumption was if you wanted to keep them engaged, ok now we’re 
going to elect every other Democrat, part of it is how do you show what 
the president’s doing and connect it to other Democrats.”202  
      
         If the party infrastructure could not be immediately integrated, could OFA at 
least maintain its networks and hope that in the long term such a transition was possible?  
																																																								




Institutionalizing the neighborhood teams was proving to be a significant challenge. OFA 
2.0 had few203 staffers in the state, tasked with maintaining the capacity of organization 
that took several hundred staff to build. Issue advocacy helped bring a significant number 
of new volunteers in. Yet there was a sense that many activists were burnt out from the 
presidential election, found the tasks confusing, or were disappointed by what they 
viewed as capitulations from the White House.  
        Another concern was that this new vessel would be competing for not just 
activists, but financial resources with the party’s electoral organizations: 
“I think there was skepticism about OFA’s capacity to organize around 
issues…people just don’t get as jazzed, and these legislative battles would 
be unfolding at the same time as mayoral campaigns, city council 
campaigns, that are lifeblood to the structure of the Democratic Party”204 
(Twigg) 
 
“I’m sure many Dems were saying well look OFA, you’re spending all 
this money, you’re getting these activists out to do things that don’t 
directly help us. Why worry about this healthcare stuff when you’re not 
going to make a difference, when you can help us get ready for this state 
house…I don’t know what the right answer is, but I think that’s why there 
was frustration.”205 (Wyant) 
        
        As the 2010 election approached, strong national headwinds against the 
Democrats created a conundrum for Strickland and the ODP. Should Strickland, who in 
2006 showed an ability to transcend the national Democratic coalition, distance himself 
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from Obama and the national party, or attempt to reconstruct the Obama infrastructure 
and coalition? Strickland did have the advantage of being an incumbent, raising over $30 
million dollars for his campaign. This gave him the autonomy to construct his own 
electoral organization separate and autonomous from OFA and national Democratic 
financial arms. If OFA was the chief resource driver to the state party in presidential 
years, they were, financially at least, a minor player compared to what Strickland himself 
could raise in 2010. Yet, OFA still had its volunteer networks and expertise that if 
activated could take much of the field burden off the Strickland campaign’s hands.  
“As we were contemplating Ted’s path to victory, we all wanted to keep 
as many of the voters of the president’s as we possibly could, but we were 
under no false notion that could get them all or that we could even get a 
majority of them. Tensions remained between the White House and Ted 
that were very real, very tangible (from the 2008 primary)”206 (Twigg) 
      
        Strickland’s electorate would look similar, if perhaps smaller, than 2006. Yet 
with the hopes of greater support of high-density urban African-American voters: 
“There wasn’t a contentious primary, and so the governor had been 
through the win as governor and announced programs and just had 
developed a greater level of comfort in some of those cities that he had 
never been in before.”207 (Twigg) 
 For Twigg, his strength in the black community has less to with 2008 and more to do 
with his transition from a congressional representative from a white, rural district to 
statewide officeholder with a significant African-American constituency: 
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“(He didn’t) have deep roots in these communities. Four years later as 
governor for a long time it’s just a different proposition. He had an 
opportunity to work with these civic leaders in a formal capacity, he built 
better relationships, and then you probably get invited more places and 
feel more comfortable seeking out richer opportunities.”208 
      
      Strickland would wind up losing a close and contested election, with significant 
Democrat loses in the legislature. African-American turnout remained constant with its 
percentage from 2008 and share of the state population. Yet turnout was depressed, 
especially among youth and women voters. Despite Strickland faring better than national 
dynamics might have suggested, a loss in politics is nonetheless a loss, and viewed so by 
party insiders. Increased black turnout was a positive and evidence of Strickland’s 
improved relationship with black constituencies since 2006. Yet without significant youth 
turnout, the national party brand presented a seeming liability among the white working 
class voters that were integral to Strickland’s 2006 electorate. At minimum, no 
mechanism existed to remobilize necessary portions of the 2008 democratic coalition. 
        How close Strickland hewed to Obama, is a point of contention. Strickland had 
Obama in the state six times and built a field program to attempt to remobilize the 
Democratic coalition. Yet this infrastructure was not integrated with OFA. While OFA 
encouraged volunteers to go to Strickland’s field offices, Schultz believes there was a 
significant cultural difference in the field program: 
“Wave elections happen nationally, that being said the state of Ohio did 
not run an Obama-model organizing effort in 2010…people didn’t knock 
on doors, (instead) people jumped onto a phone system that would lead 
																																																								




them into a central system and they would call people 13 counties away. It 
was the exact opposite of the Obama model…The volunteers who came 
(out for Strickland) through the Obama model…saw that the culture of the 
2010 campaign did not reflect the culture of the 2008 campaign…(there 
was) a lack of understanding of the model by some decision makers… I 
don’t know if it was a lack of faith...I don’t know if it was a belief that if 
you don’t have 500 field organizers that it’s not possible…what I don’t 
understand is when you are between two presidential elections with a 
sitting president with (sic), maybe excitement’s the wrong word, but (a) 
knowledge base of a group of volunteers, why would you change the 
structure? And I understand why, people said well look this worked in ’08, 
but ’08 will never happen again. More African-Americans won’t vote, 
more youth won’t vote, but in 2012 we surpassed that…and (the people 
running the 2010 campaigns) are good people, but there are different 
models of organizing. In 2010 we used a more traditional model…and I’m 
not saying that people didn’t listen to us and if they did we would have 
won, I do believe that the model is more productive and would have 
yielded more votes…and change is hard, you know that you’ve run the 
last 20 gubernatorial campaigns a certain way and one presidential race a 
certain way, and you’ve won (a number of races in the past) that 
(traditional) way, so you have one proof point and you have twenty. The 
culture’s not there…it requires buy in and an acceptance of 
decentralization.”209 
      
        The consistency of weak midterm results for the incumbent president’s party 
remains a systematic hurdle to party building. The salience of presidential elections 
presents the opportunity to shift and restructure a national majority coalition. Yet if 
unfavorable conditions are present as the party seeks consolidation of that coalition in the 
																																																								




next federal election, party office-seekers are likely to turn away from constructing party 
resources. If put in a persistently vulnerable position, office-seekers cultivating their own 
electorate and financial resources is a quite understandable strategic choice. Insulation 
from competition by taking advantage of incumbency to cultivate strong personalized 
fundraising networks provides a clearer path to electoral stability than movement toward 
long-term building of a party.210 
       There was little to suggest at a local level that OFA was of great benefit in the 
midterm elections. Party activists are traditionally different from that of presidential 
campaigns. The post -2010 period was a struggle for the party in Ohio as well as 
nationally. A return to unified GOP control of state government was particularly poor 
timing with post-census redistricting immanent. Such efforts would make regaining 
control of the House significantly more difficult in the near future and depress incentives 
for robust party building in many localities. 
 
Regaining Momentum for ’12: The 2011 Referendums 
        Failure at the state and national level left a sense of disappointment among many 
Democrats. The pre-presidential year in Ohio is often a sleepy one, with no federal or 
statewide offices decided. Yet, 2011 would be different. Resurgent Republicans quickly 
attempted to capitalize on their victories. The Ohio GOP would move in two areas with 
far-reaching consequences for Democratic resources and constituencies: legislation to 
restrict unions and voting rights. These efforts however would provoke a counteraction, 
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galvanizing progressive forces who would push referenda eventually leading to the defeat 
of both bills. 
        On March 31, 2011, freshly elected John Kasich and Republican legislative 
majorities passed Ohio Senate Bill 5 against unified Democratic opposition. It featured 
numerous provisions restricting the power of public sector unions: allowing members to 
opt out of political dues, as well as restricting the unions’ rights to collectively bargain 
and strike. The bill provoked a strong response by the Ohio (and national) labor 
movement, who in conjunction with state and federal Democratic interests formed the 
“We Are Ohio” campaign to repeal the bill via a referendum in November of 2011. The 
repeal referendum passed overwhelmingly, with nearly 62% or the vote, and over 2.2 
million voters supporting it. This was over 400,000 more voters than had turned out for 
Strickland one year earlier.211  
       During this period, another polarizing bill passed, this time involving voting 
restrictions. House Bill 194 cut the early vote period from one month to two weeks, along 
with reducing polling hours for early vote and Election Day. By fall of 2011, a 
referendum campaign, largely driven by African-American constituencies, was gathering 
steam. After collecting more than a million signatures, rather than having to face a 
referendum likely to drive Democratic turnout, Republicans reversed path, repealing the 
bill with the hopes of returning to the issue after the 2012 election.212  
       Both bills drew key Democratic constituencies, who organized in collaboration 
with the Democratic infrastructure in the lead-up to the 2012 election. If national issue 
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campaigning through OFA 2.0 was not having a transformative grassroots effect, the 
threat of losing labor and voting rights reenergized and unified progressive forces within 
the state, as well as bringing attention (and resources) from national interests.  
“You re-woke the Ohio working class…you were able to remind Ohio 
voters…that elections matter and probably more importantly that they 
have a role. So you think about in 2011, (with the anti-union bill) you had 
white working class in particular, it was much broader than that, and then 
you have African-Americans, you’ve got a legislature that directly has 
gone after one of the most sacred obligations we have to our citizens-- the 
right to vote. So in one calendar year after 2010 you had reminded every 
part of Obama and the Democratic coalition that elections matter and they 
have a role. You had citizens stop a legislature from doing something and 
that is one of the most empowering things (you can do). And so we had in 
African-American churches people talking about Selma, with this 
president, a year before Election Day. I would say without HB 194, 2012 
was always going to be tough…it would have been closer…You can’t 
replace getting a million signatures…we had lists, we had leaders, we had 
people speaking out, and you could say this is why we need to 
vote.”213(Schultz) 
     
        Yet if these referenda were integral in the build up to 2012, another that did not 
get off the ground reflected tensions between national and state Democrats. The ODP 
wanted to challenge the state legislature’s redistricting plan-- which would both reduce 
overall competition as well as the number of seats in play, through a referendum. Yet, it 
was not such a priority for the national party: 
If we would have collected the petitions in 2011, we would have stopped 
the implementation of the gerrymandered map, not because we would 
																																																								




have won in the ballot initiative, we would have stopped it because the 
timing meant that those elections could have not been held and that a 
federal judge would have had to come in and make the map…so that’s a 
big deal, we’re Ohio, why wouldn’t you get involved if you were Steve 
Israel and the DCCC…but he doesn’t care (where his districts come from), 
his job is to (get to a majority)” (Redfern)214 
     
         While the national party has a strong interest in the state as a presidential 
battleground, this does not necessarily extend to the national congressional committee, 
whose priorities differ. For the DCCC, as Redfern states, districts can come from 
anywhere in the nation.  While redistricting and a subsequent lack of competition could 
have significant effects on state party building, and therefore the party’s presidential 
chances in the state, such concerns are several steps removed from the calculations of the 
congressional campaign committee. 
     The two issues, in which referenda were successful, were of high salience to 
national organized interests, local activists, as well as voters. In both cases, the 
infrastructure of ODP/OFA was essential in providing staff, data, and activist resources to 
bring coherence and scale to the campaigns. Yet redistricting, not yet seen as the 
existential partisan threat it would become, was not able to garner such support. With 
political salience, the party organization appeared integrated and effective. However, in 
the case of the district map, the party was not able to manufacture such focus and 
cohesion on an issue with few natural stakeholders able to provide raw political resources 
that the party infrastructure could then channel into campaign organization.  
 
																																																								





        If OFA 2.0 did not save state Democrats electoral fortunes in 2010, it did leave 
an important proto-infrastructure of staff and volunteers in place for a quick transition to 
the 2012 election. This allowed the campaign to begin to scale back up in Ohio during the 
first quarter of 2012. In 2008, Democratic success was attributed to a positive national 
environment for Democrats, and excitement around Obama’s campaign. However, 2012 
was more reminiscent of 2010’s climate. The presidential election would test 
organizational capacity and strength of the Obama coalition under election fundamentals 
not conducive to Democratic success. In persuasion-heavy Ohio, coming off a 
gubernatorial loss, a tough election was ahead. 
        OFA valued continuity in personnel. Greg Schultz, Ohio OFA 2.0 director 
remained to run the campaign for OFA in 2012. Chris Wyant, a former Deputy Field 
Director also returned as General Election Director. Despite a challenging national 
climate, several developments would complement Democratic efforts. Fundraising would 
reach an even grander scale than 2008. While this would be the case for both parties, the 
struggle to scale the field operation that plagued Democrats in 2010 would not be an 
issue. Tens of millions of dollars went into in the general election field infrastructure by 
spring of 2012.  While many Democrats, including the president, greeted Super PACs 
ambivalently, Democrats conceded their apparent success in helping GOP efforts in 
2010. This led Democrats to a weary acceptance that that they would have to create their 
own Super PACS to keep pace.  Priorities USA and others complemented party and 
candidate money both in the battle over the airwaves, as well as targeted field 




       Most significant however were advances in data that made voter targeting more 
precise and dynamic. Cross-tabulating consumer data with previous voter contact 
information allowed the party’s data analysts to construct a highly nuanced and accurate 
profile of the electorate, including the likelihood of an individual voter to be an Obama 
supporter and Democrat. OFA used its influx of data and field resources to run field 
experiments in the hopes of better framing individual-level voter contact interactions. 
Scripts were A/B tested215 for efficacy in moving voters toward the Obama support 
column.216  Ohio, as the most lavishly resourced state was central to these efforts.  
“At its core it was about our data. It was so different, our analytics while 
very sophisticated in ’08, and way beyond anything we’ve ever seen 
before in campaigns, (but) you were flying blind largely in that your kind 
of like ok these five or six factors: a person’s age, race, precinct, voting 
history, maybe a couple other things. Here’s the likelihood that this 
person’s supporting us, and we had the pulp persuadability score, but it 
wasn’t really a persuadability score. Fast forward four years and just the 
accuracy of the support models…was just phenomenal. To know that you 
called this universe of people and you talk to them enough times and from 
these hundred people, you’re probably going to get five new 
supporters.”217 (Wyant) 
     
        These new data tools were a boon for the development of the voter file and the 
identification of the Democratic electorate. Yet they also shifted the organizational 
culture around OFA’s field program. Whereas team building was the central focus in 
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2008, many staff saw 2012 as increasingly motivated not by the building of neighborhood 
structures, but by reaching data metrics. Increasing confidence in the location and 
majority status of your electorate would indeed make such strategy understandable.  Yet, 
this could come at the expense of an organizational focus on network and skill building 
that would be the mark of any long-term residue left by OFA.  
        When organic teams presented the best linkage to the electorate, OFA focused on 
team building. Yet with precision targeting, an even greater influx of field staff, and an 
environment in which locally based activist activity might not reach the levels of 2008, 
these networks might have taken a backseat in the grind toward a close victory.  Could 
the increase in field resources possibly be a double edge sword? In 2008, most staff 
joined the campaign over the summer. Yet the steady trickle of hiring in 2012 might have 
disrupted linkages between staff and local volunteers. According to 2008 and 2012 Ohio 
OFA field staffer and co-author of “Groundbreakers: How Obama's 2.2 Million 
Volunteers Transformed Campaigning in America.”: 
“All of that relationship building…having been the foundation…in’08 was 
impossible to do while onboarding a (field organizer) while doing dry runs 
for GOTV. So it was…onboarding people during the mobilization period 
(instead of) the organizational period. Then there’s also the question of 
overabundance of resources. So in ’12 we had all this money, the sense 
that we got was (we) didn’t know what to do with this money: Do we need 
more printers? Do we want more chum? More organizers?”218   
      
          A GOP governor also made for significantly more resistance to early voting, 
through efforts to restrict the hours of county locations. Yet, technological advances were 
																																																								




a major asset. The further development of user-friendly call tools allowed an out of state 
volunteer to have their own virtual personal phone bank, directing millions of calls into 
Ohio. These calls were not high quality as persuasion. However, they helped to keep 
mobilization lists clean and data dynamic, allowing in state staff and volunteers to focus 
on actual persuasion, and knock and drag, through the early vote period.  
        With Sherrod Brown’s senate seat also up for grabs, there was another 
competitive statewide race. While Brown was previously the template for Obama’s 2008 
coalition, as the senator’s profile grew in the state, his campaign believed that it had the 
opportunity to play a map that hewed close to Strickland’s, running up votes in rural 
areas. This would protect against an overdependence on mobilization of base Obama 
Democrats. In an election year in which Ohio and the nation were likely to be highly 
competitive, and with the president having sagging approval ratings, insurance seemed 
prudent. A separate high resource field program ran through the ODP with efforts 
focused on mobilizing a wider and more rural electorate.  Yet this produced tension 
between OFA and the Brown campaign/ODP.  
“I think that the biggest challenge was having a presidential race and a 
senate race in the same place during the same cycle and trying to navigate 
that because, frankly OFA was going to be far more resourced, and there’s 
a ton of data that makes clear that people rise and fall with the 
presidential, with the top of the ticket. I think many of the people on the 
OFA side would have said you should just trust that we’re going to run a 
really good turnout operation and you should be thoughtful about your 
communication strategy and we’ll ID for you where we can, but ultimately 




trust us we got this. Obviously if someone’s political fate is on the line it’s 
hard to…just trust that we’ll take care of it.”219 (Wyant) 
 
        Without field coordination, efforts could become redundant, much like the 527 
chaos of 2004. Given the importance of volunteer-led infrastructure, the campaigns 
would risk competition for the same activist support, rather than building a coherent 
apparatus.  Perhaps even more concerning in a close race was the possibility that the 
other statewide Democratic campaign could be expending resources to mobilize Romney 
voters. Such scenarios did not sit well with OFA.   
“Certainly, I would have loved if there was no one (else) in the field 
organizing, and people hired for other campaigns were doing events, or 
political connections, or communications…it can be an interference. When 
you have two people in the same turf who have goals for doors and 
knocks…it makes it less efficient.”220 (Wyant) 
     
        Yet from the ODP’s standpoint efforts were seen as qualitatively different, 
according to Elizabeth Brown, the 2012 ODP Executive Director (and Sen. Brown’s 
daughter): 
“We didn’t use (the NTL) model and that’s a pretty big differentiation I 
think. We were also because OFA was here, we were able to fill in parts of 
the state where they didn’t concentrate as heavily: the Mansfield’s, the 
Zanesville’s, the Middletown’s…places like that, what we called the 
hometowns. So you have the three biggest cities, then you have the next 
five, and that’s where most of your driving up turnout happens, and then 
there that other (sic) set of cities where organizing looks very different”221 
																																																								
219 Personal Communication  
220 Personal Communication 





Whereas for OFA, the level of cooperation with local parties was contingent, the ODP 
side focused largely on supporting the county infrastructure: 
“We would hesitate to open up an office space outside a county party 
headquarters…when you’re organizing via a state party you inherently are 
thinking about the long-term value of the campaign. That does not mean 
people who work for OFA don’t [care] about long-term value, but they are 
two different mechanisms.”222 (Brown) 
  
        By October, an increasingly bullish outlook on the party’s presidential odds 
coupled with the overwhelming capacity of OFA in Ohio, led to the Brown campaign and 
state party relenting in its ancillary field plan, and folding its ground operation into OFA. 
This helped the party run a coordinated GOTV effort. Obama would wind up victorious 
in Ohio by a closer margin than 2008. Yet with only 100,000 fewer voters than 2008, this 
seemed to reflect stability in the Democratic electorate in a more challenging political 
environment. Brown would also have a slightly smaller vote total than his first senate 
race (although he would outpace Obama’s percentage). Top of the ticket success once 
again translated down ticket. Gerrymandering however, prevented state vote share from 
translating into dramatic state legislative victories.  
        There was a sense that at the least the culture of the OFA model was filtering 
through the state: 
“I think in a lot of the bigger counties there is now a really good 
integration…you’ve got new blood…and by 2012 you had the 
overwhelming majority of Ohio county parties understand we can all work 
together and actually these new voters are an asset and it’s how you 
																																																								








       Like 2008, once the general election campaign concluded, its staff structure was 
quickly dismantled. Based less on explicit presidential electoral considerations and more 
on supporting grassroots activity wherever they sprouted, OFA 4.0, “Organizing for 
Action” had fewer resources dedicated to Ohio than 2.0. After two elections, even if not 
the norm, there would be neighborhood teams across the state that appeared to be durable 
as activist networks. Because of the 501(c)4 status of OFA, these teams could not be 
explicitly channeled into party activity, at least not by OFA staff. Yet, in a number of 
counties, OFA organization had penetrated the county party and local politics. The 2014 
campaign would be a challenge as it lacked OFA’s presidential resources and activist 
passion, as well as Strickland’s incumbency and personal popularity. Given a challenging 
environment, finding Democrats for the top of the ticket was a difficult task.   
         One task of parties not yet discussed is that of the candidate recruitment. 
Presidential elections often feature competition between highly resourced candidates 
acting as proxies for various alignments of interest groups. In most other elections, 
parties must recruit a singular ‘viable’ candidate. While an impressive resume is useful 
for a potential candidate, more important is a base fundraising network. In return for what 
could be viewed a down payment on viability, the party might pledge staff support and 
further assistance in fundraising. The state coordinated campaign director focuses on 
prepping and grooming candidates new to the statewide ticket. When the party brand and 
																																																								




its resource network is strong, it will be more likely to draw top rate amateurs into 
politics, and lower level politicians into bigger competitive races. Yet, when the brand is 
a liability and the party can offer little in the way of support, there are few inducements to 
coax the best candidates. Potential candidates will be reticent to jump   into races with 
little chance for success. 
        Incumbency is an overwhelming predictor for victory, as its likelihood increases 
through the fundraising advantages it confers. The lack of this can be devastating for 
party building. A lack of incumbent resources over time is likely to have the effect of 
starving the party infrastructure, further depressing its capacity for candidate recruitment. 
Long-term incumbency by candidates not facing term limits and parties in safe districts 
will likely institutionalize into patronage machines that further buttress party support. 
Strong candidates bring with them robust fundraising networks, which even if not 
directly becoming institutionalized as an explicit party resource, allow other candidates to 
free ride on financially strong Democratic candidates’ campaigns. If over time, the 
candidate pool is weak on the federal level and for other high resource campaigns, this is 
likely to hurt down ticket party strength, further dissuading new potentially strong 
candidates to run for office. Winning begets winning; losing begets losing. These patterns 
will alter party logic over time. 
         In 2014, the political environment pushed several high profile Democrats 
away from taking a chance at the top of the ticket. This included Ted Strickland, as well 
as Betty Sutton, a prominent former congressional representative from the Akron area, 




2016 presidential year, and the hope of better conditions in 2018, neither was willing to 
fight an uphill race during the midterm year. 
        The party settled on Cuyahoga County Commissioner Edward Fitzgerald. A 
less well-known pol without an established fundraising background (and as it would 
happen a less than well-vetted background in general).  The lack of star power at the top 
of the ticket would harm down ticket recruitment. It would also lead to fundraising 
effects that affected other statewide down ticket races. Yet the hope would be that better 
targeting, complemented by the increasing sophistication of the party’s data tools could 
perhaps help to pull an unexpected upset, or at least help the party pull a few surprises 
down ballot.  
       The goal was to raise $30 million dollars for coordinated efforts. While reaching 
Obama-levels of youth vote was seen a bridge too far for this election, the party’s 
strategy was focused on maintaining turnout within the black vote, while making 
significant gains among white woman who are likely Democrats, yet sporadic midterm 
voters. Advances in targeting hoped to better identify Democrats among broad-based 
demographic profiles.  By identifying low turnout voters within higher turnout groups, a 
more modest field apparatus could be more efficient. Better targeting of precincts with 
loyal Democratic voters could capitalize on those likely to be responsive to campaign 
mobilization treatment.   
          Yet Fitzgerald would quickly wind up failing to meet his modest expectations. 




work of fundraising and campaigning. When personal scandals hit the press, any 
momentum and veneer to maintain a credible campaign quickly collapsed.224 
       The lack of a strong top of the ticket would subsequently halt momentum for the 
entire party. This illustrates the precarious nature of even a well-resourced and coherent 
party. Party institutions could not cultivate resources outside of the strength at the top of 
the ticket. Fundraising and activist resources are dependent on a baseline level of 
enthusiasm, harnessed on behalf of the lead candidate.    
       While a couple of statewide candidates maintained respectable fundraising and 
poll numbers through the fall, Election Day would be an unmitigated disaster for the 
party. This suggests both the importance and relative helplessness of the contemporary 
party as an institution. Without strength at the top of the ticket, idiosyncratic coalitions 
and resource construction have little chance against a consolidated opposition. As an 
institution, the party as a brand cannot induce support from its loyal voters, activists, and 
donors absent a figurehead at the top of the ticket that can inspire confidence.  
 
State Parties and the Top of the Ticket 
     Clear over the period of study is the importance of the top of the ticket to state 
party organization. While the state party represents the institutional expression of the 
party team, its ability to provide resources rests on the candidate positioned at the top of 
the race. State parties have little in the way of an independent fundraising apparatus, 
without at the very least a credible candidate. Fundraising is still a result of interpersonal 
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relationships. Candidates, not the party, are under most circumstances expected to make 
the pitch to donors. The party may be an intermediary vessel, important in providing both 
networks and the brand signature of a major party. Yet if it is to provide a connection 
between a team of politicians and a state electorate, it remains largely a prisoner of its 
premier candidate.  
        In Ohio, where the gubernatorial election (along with much of the state 
legislature) tracks with midterm federal elections, the party seems situated to have a top 
of ticket candidate amassing resources for the party apparatus. Yet evidence from the 
period under discussion presents several impediments to the institutionalization of an 
every-other-year apparatus. Despite an Ohio electorate that is more homogenous, and 
perhaps therefore ‘less complicated’ than much of the nation, we have seen different 
strategies to constructing a Democratic majority.  At least a portion of the rural 
conservative electorate has demonstrated a willingness to vote for at least some 
Democratic candidates. Disagreements over whether to pursue these voters at the 
strategic expense of a more demographically dependable, yet irregular electorate, 
pervades even the top of the ticket. Even in 2012, such tensions persisted between an 
incumbent president and senator’s respective organizations.  
       Further, as impressive as Strickland and the ODP’s efforts at fundraising and 
party building were from the period of 2006-2010, it was not enough in a bad Democratic 
year to replicate the coalition that won with ease just two years earlier. Despite all the 
resources of the presidential year, Strickland’s own success at using the office of 
governor to unite the party, and make it a fundraising force, was not sufficient in 2010 to 




revolve around short-term campaign-centered resource construction, making steady state-
level party building difficult.   
  
  Fragmentation in the Coordinated Legal Structure 
      A point of consistent frustration for ODP staff interviewed is how campaign 
finance law makes it difficult to mobilize on behalf of a party ticket. While federal laws 
are far more restrictive than that of the state of Ohio, its election law does not allow 
federal money in state races or vice versa. This means that money raised by the state 
party, cannot feature the president and other federal candidates often most strongly 
associated with the party brand. While these resources can be devoted to field operations, 
identification with the leader of the party who is the most salient cue for the party’s 
irregular electorate is a violation of campaign finance law.    
      By fall in presidential years, national party donors will often have reached the 
fundraising limits for national campaign and party committees (now jointly organized as 
‘Victory Funds’) and therefore often donate large sums to the state party state election 
campaign funds. Yet the inability to produce campaign literature or coordinate with 
federal campaigns prevents using these resources efficiently. The state party can then do 
little with this money, but supplement paid media campaigns of local races. This might 
win the goodwill of some local actors (and perhaps even offices), yet will do little for 
long-term party integration and organization building. 
       If one consequence of campaign finance law is fragmenting and weakening party 
organization through coordinating firewalls, even more severe is the advent (and 




structures completely. The macro story of the rise of Super PACs and other IE vehicles 
has been discussed in earlier chapters. Yet from the standpoint of the state party, what is 
apparent is both the frustration and relative unawareness as to how IE’s have affected 
campaigning.  
       While the development of the Democracy Alliance225 has made liberal IE’s more 
coherent and efficient as a network,226 this is of little consolation to state party actors. Put 
simply, without coordination, the ODP has no real idea what IE’s are doing and how 
effectively they are doing it. Precision in voter targeting is a function of up-to-date voter 
ID’s that are made impossible if the contact is done through an IE vessel, as they cannot 
share data. While some efforts by labor are thought of more forgivingly, the consensus 
appears to be that IE’s are offering little help on the ground to the party’s efforts.  
        What IE’s do accomplish is to give big donors alternative vessels to give money. 
This has accelerated the process of consultants channeling political resources away from 
more efficient, if unexciting vessels, such as parties. These sentiments might reflect 
frustration that organizations that used to hold a near monopoly on political resources 
must compete in a marketplace of sorts (in which campaign finance rules handicap their 
ability). Yet when considering both efficiency in campaign mobilization, as well as 
normative academic considerations of party function and value, the evidence seems to 
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suggest that IE’s play a distorting role, adding another layer of fragmentation to the 
American political system.  
 
Digital Diffusion      
        In addition to money, another resource diffused unevenly through national-state 
party mechanisms was its data tools. The two most significant forms of information 
developed by OFA were its voter and activist data files. The anticipated transfer of this 
information was for the ODP, an opportunity to connect its candidates to the Obama 
volunteer base and electorate.      
        In 2008, the post-election transition of OFA and its activist networks from 
presidential campaign into the national party, gave it paternal considerations regarding 
the data. Hopes were that using the OFA brand to keep the Obama network active could 
mean a permanent army for the party. Yet this meant keeping the data as an OFA 
resource, as the volunteer networks were thought best activated maintained by OFA, not 
the local and state party. This led to tensions as local and state actors wanted to translate 
such enthusiasm to their own efforts and saw the potential for party building squandered. 
This reinforced preexisting perceptions of an obtuse party in D.C. Once again, so the 
story goes, the autonomy and prerogatives of the national party would leave the local 
party organization out in the cold. This would be another example of the winds of a 
national campaign that blew in and blew out without local parties having much tangible 
to show for it. What is telling is the ‘lists’ as reflections of differing campaign practices 
and culture among party actors: 
“Everybody wanted the list, everybody wanted the list. The list was 




wanted the volunteer list. I was telling people the DNC was holding the 
list, but we are facilitating the relationships. The list is not worth anything, 
the relationships are worth everything, you have the one on ones, people 
come for Obama, but they stay because of the relationships with other 
people…that took a long time to communicate…we want to build 
something that is more meaningful than a bunch of emails.”227 (Schultz) 
  
        After 2012, it again hoped that OFA data would quickly filter to the local and 
state parties, especially since OFA had now abandoned attempts at explicit national party 
building. Yet the story of who got the data is a muddled one. Many different actors have 
different perceptions of how and when the data finally made its way to the state and then 
local parties. This is at the least, once again evidence of fragmentation between national 
and state party, as once the presidential campaign leaves, so too do the relationships and 
accountability between the varying levels of the party. State OFA operatives and the data 
shop disappear. There is nobody left at a desk handling the specifics of data transmission 
to the state party.   
       If big data is the future of campaigning, confusion and tension remains over 
exactly why and how it is important. From the standpoint of many the OFA staff 
interviewed, frustration over when and what data made its way to the Ohio party is 
misplaced. The networks that OFA constructed do not come from the Voter Action 
Network (VAN), but the real world, where it is the state and local party’s responsibility 
to take those relationships and channel them into their campaigns. Yet from the state 
party’s perspective, it is the data, and efficiency of contact facilitated by it that is a 
necessary first step for that cultivation. The inability to receive the data quickly and 
																																																								




transparently is a reflection of the indifference and perhaps even mistrust of the national 
party.  
 
Voter Contact and Identification 
      One outstanding question raised by the last several presidential elections appears 
in the cross-sectional data available on voter contact. While significant technological 
advancements in field campaigns have taken place in 2008 and 2012, surveys have shown 
that the height of voter contact made by campaigns happened in 2004.228 One should 
however be careful when delineating between quantity and quality in this regard. 
Elections, especially national ones, fought on the margins mean efficacy in individual 
voter outreach varies greatly because of contingent factors. Sending a piece of literature 
to millions of dependable partisan voters in non-competitive states will not have the 
impact of just a handful of well targeted door to door canvassing attempts to reach 
persuadable or irregular voters. 
     It follows that large-n national and state analysis taken with caution. Efficacy 
comes from the communicative impact of a mixture of individual (and media) 
communication techniques over the course of the election. As influenced by Donald 
Green and Alan Gerber’s research,229 the general rule for presidential campaigns is to 
make three successful door contacts in the months leading up to the election for those in 
the persuadable universe. The development of more precise voter targeting might mean 
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fewer people overall contacted, with efforts more economically focused on those whose 
behavior is likely to vary from campaign treatment. 
        Voter identification for individual campaigns over this period can also lead to 
tension in joint organization through the party. Lower-level campaigns will often want a 
top of the ticket race to do identification on their behalf. Yet such asks become logistical 
hassles and can impede volunteer activity (for instance, those canvassing for Obama may 
not be comfortable campaigning on behalf of down-ticket candidates).  As a result, the 
decision made at the state-level was to eschew having OFA do voter identification for 
candidates other than Obama. This was out of the belief, as one of OFA staffer said: “A 
rising tide lifts all boats…we were confident that Obama voters would be Democratic 
Party voters…”230 On the local level, OFA staff had more flexibility to ‘carry lit’ for 
other candidates,231 yet this too was generally resisted. Such efforts were seen as 
logistical hassles during a campaign period in which building infrastructure and 
efficiency among volunteers was paramount: “I mean if you carry lit for one race, when 
does it end? soon your carrying around a different lit piece for every Democrat 
running…I get that trust us, let us handle it can sound arrogant…but look at the 
results.”232 Yet from the standpoint of local candidates, it reflected enough of an 
insensitivity toward their own interests that there was little incentive to integrate voter 
contact into OFA operations.  
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        In the presidential elections of 2008 and 2012, no state was more prized than 
Ohio. As a locus of high resource campaigning, development in party organization 
associated with an OFA-like campaign model should be more apparent here than 
anywhere else. In the most basic and important sense, variation was clear: Democrats, 
after losing the state in three straight presidential elections, carried it twice. On a macro-
level, Obama’s vote totals held down ticket.  This success cannot be explained by the 
major demographic shifts affecting the nation, which were largely absent in Ohio.  
        Yet this success did not transition to midterm election years. In these cases, an 
older and whiter electorate carried the GOP to victory. The party could not reconstitute 
the money, staff, and volunteer base necessary for the mechanics of high-level voter 
mobilization efforts. If we expect office-seekers to turn to parties to solve their collective 
action problems, why the continued struggle for cooperation across campaigns to build an 
apparatus that could like serve as a determinative factor in many of their electoral 
fortunes? A large part of the answer is the feast or famine of resources associated with the 
presidential year. Politicians do not decide to construct a joint apparatus by committee, 
but ride the wave of resources procured at the highest reaches of politics. When those 
resources contract in non-presidential years, the lines of fragmentation, never erased, but 
overwhelmed by a national infrastructure and electorate that can make effective, if 
perhaps somewhat resentful, free-riders of those underneath it, come back to the fore. 
Parties and party organizations matter. Yet the most durable party vessels, state parties 
themselves, are limited in their own resource construction, often in function being an 




nature of candidate campaigns focused on party mobilization, while comparatively 
durable structures of party building face neglect, presents an apparent conundrum in the 
institutionalization of an organization that can consistently mobilize a loyal party 
electorate. In the next chapter, these dynamics and their consequences will be discussed 
in more depth.   
     Yet, despite the tensions and frustrations involved, Redfern remains confident OFA-
like turnout and mobilization can indeed be institutionalized: 
“It can happen. Sure, it can happen. You have to have a strong political 
directive and confidence in the state level parties to ensure that it does 
happen. Here’s the deal: it doesn’t mean anything unless you understand 
data. If you can get the data, you can manipulate it and start turning out 
folks down ticket. If you start turning out folks down ticket, you’re going 
to pull up not just county commissioners, but state legislators. If you pick 
up state legislators, you’re going to start getting control of legislative 
chambers. Then you can end gerrymandering and become more 
competitive going forward from a DCCC perspective….Now there’s an 
ability to walk down a sidewalk now and in real time download all the 
information about that particular voter from the value of their house, to 
what college their kid goes to, and whether or not they have a hunting 
license and tailor a door to door message...(make) sure that that 
technology is going to be fungible and that it is going to be able to 














Local Party Organization in Ohio 
 
“All you can really ask a party to do is mind the gaps, right?” 
-  Elizabeth Walters, (D) Akron Councilwoman at large, Former OFA staffer and ODP 
Executive Director 
 
      This chapter looks at local level electoral organization. Up to this point, this 
dissertation has viewed the party through national and state politics. At these higher 
altitudes, money flows and macro-strategic decisions happen. Yet, scenes of Washington 
D.C. and even Columbus, OH remain far removed from where such strategies take place. 
They succeed or fail on the ground, precinct by precinct. In this chapter, I will attempt to 
sketch local party organization: the point of contact between campaigns and voters. Most 
importantly, I suggest how mechanisms of micro-level fragmentation impede 
institutionalization of an efficient party mobilization apparatus. At a superficial glance, 
this may seem like a function of interpersonal tensions among the political actors 
involved. Yet, I argue that such tensions result from structural conditions that create 
different incentives and practices for party actors. Previous chapters have presented a 
temporal narrative of specific sets of actors. Because of the idiosyncrasies of local level 
politics, in this chapter I focus less on a detailed singular case, and more on situating 
tensions and challenges that exist in the local setting.   
       Central to this discussion is the contrast between OFA and the local party. New 
research has begun to reimagine contemporary political organization, focusing on 
‘hybridity.’234 Information Communication Technologies have led to increased flexibility 
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in modal forms of political organization. If organization has become increasingly 
mercurial, our political system still imparts different institutional logics to intra-party 
actors. These are challenges not mediated by smart phones and social media alone. In 
fact, the incongruity between campaign environments that incentivize adapting to these 
developments, and those that do not, can exacerbate these tensions further. 
       Recent academic works have discussed the development of the Obama 
model,235 along with the diffusion of new forms of campaigning.236 Yet these shifts are 
neither linear nor complete. They are characteristic of high resource, high competition 
campaigning that is not reflective of most contemporary elections in the United States. At 
the local level, presidential campaigns in states like Ohio penetrate deeper than ever 
before with robust high resourced field operations. Yet this does not mean integration 
with preexisting local party structures, developed under a very different electoral logic.   
      OFA brought unparalleled resources to the local level for presidential 
campaigning. Staff worked close to the ground, organizing volunteers. This was not just 
to engage in voter contact, but to develop and thicken horizontal relationships to 
institutionalize Obama’s grassroots enthusiasm. Data deployed and cultivated by the 
campaign offered a far more precise understanding of the electorate, and where its 
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Democratic voters could be found, than ever before. Yet continuing institutionalization 
would not fall in the long term to OFA, but instead to local party structures.   
 
A Tale of Two Democrats 
         Picture a scenario.  You are a young field staffer for the Obama campaign. You are 
sitting across the table from the chair of the Democratic Party in a midsized Ohio county. 
This is perhaps your first or second political campaign. Yet you are a representative of a 
near billion-dollar organization whose chain of command leads directly to the highest 
profile and most respected strategists within the party. You have been trained in the most 
cutting edge campaign techniques, developed and instituted by a large and sophisticated 
organization. Your campaign is at the forefront of using data and advanced voter turnout 
modeling, while incorporating the outpouring of grassroots support for your candidate 
from millions of activists, many completely new to the political process. Your job is to 
build an organization to mobilize new and sporadic voters, while persuading voters who 
might be undecided, through contact with trained campaign activists. You are confident 
that by following the program you are in this county to implement, you will not only 
mobilize voters for a presidential majority, but on behalf of the down ticket candidates 
the local party supports.  
        The chair sitting across from you seems skeptical of your approach. He or she is 
several decades older than you, and begins to tell you about how politics are ‘done’ here 
at the county level. The chair boasts of his or her years of experience in local politics. Yet 
the chair has never been a full-time staffer or worked for a national campaign. Perhaps it 




organized the most dominant force in Democratic Party politics of the last several 
decades (you did happen to notice the Hillary bumper sticker still on the chair’s car as 
you passed it). Maybe it is 2012, and you are rebuilding the organization that carried 
Ohio for the Democrats for the first time in twelve years in 2008; that won the first 
national majority for the Democrats in several decades by mobilizing this new electorate 
(that Hillary sticker is still there…if now next to an Obama one). You have the money, 
the activists, and the computer scientists in Chicago. So why is this person talking your 
ear off about palm cards with local judges? 
        A slightly different vantage point. You are the chair of the Democratic Party in a 
midsized Ohio county. You are sitting across from a young staffer from the Obama 
campaign assigned to your area. You grew up here, lived most of your life here. You 
have spent most of your adulthood active in local party politics, slowly rising through the 
ranks. Perhaps you have held office in local government at some point, or maybe you 
have stayed within the party infrastructure, moving up through the county central 
committee to your positon now. It has never been particularly glamorous work: potluck 
fundraisers, dropping off lawn signs, distributing literature at the Veterans Day parade.  
The lack of panache though makes it all the more important: after all, someone has to do 
it.  
      Every four years there is a kid like the one sitting across from you. Nice and 
enthusiastic, probably from New York or the Bay area (they usually are), who 
nonetheless seems to think he or she knows a bit more than actually may be the case. The 
kid will be gone in six months anyway; off to DC, or law school, or whatever. But you’ll 




what streets you need to hit at 5:00 PM on Election Day to get out those last couple dozen 
Democratic votes; who has the house right off of Main Street that will let you put up the 
6 x 6 sign for the top of the ticket candidate; who you can depend on to host a local 
fundraiser; what local civics teacher or  professor can be depended on to steer a few 
interns your way; the names of the group of older ladies who will stuff envelopes on 
Thursday evenings for all the campaigns; which streets not to waste time with because 
they vote Republican, or just don’t vote. You know how politics work here, and when 
that kid and their laptop are long gone, you will still be here, talking with the next kid 
four years from now. 
 
Fragmentation on the Ground 
         If this scene is marginally a work of fiction, it nonetheless is one that 
approximates many of the conversations that take place in the summer and fall in local 
party offices across Ohio (and the country) during the presidential season. Many good 
national campaign staffers and local party officials will learn to work together and use 
their disparate resources and knowledge for mutual benefit. Yet the tensions that 
undergird this relationship are not interpersonal, but based within the deeply embedded, 
fragmented institutional logic of American party politics. Both sides are in the right. Yet 
the varied structural incentives within the American federal system mean that, on the 
local level, where campaigns large and small actually interact with the citizenry, different 
sets of resources, strategic templates, and even cultures will exist. This is as a response to 




exist side by side, but rarely do they truly integrate as a party apparatus- into a unified 
and efficient mechanism to mobilize the party vote. 
       If parties are multifaceted, we assume that a party organization remains 
patterned coherently on the federal system: with national, state, and county party 
organizations. Perhaps they are stronger or weaker based upon the idiosyncrasies of the 
political era, but they are still holistic as entities. Yet in a given place during election 
season, the party apparatus may be several different entities, working with little 
organizational coherence beyond a rough understanding of an allied electorate.  We 
might think of this through the prism of the candidate-centered era, where party 
organization was largely replaced by individual campaigns looking to idiosyncratically 
aggregate majorities for singular candidates.  Yet these are not candidate-campaigns in 
this sense.  Data, polarization, and money have changed campaigning in ways discussed 
in earlier chapters. These organizations are built as centripetal forces over political 
resources. They operate on behalf of mobilizing a defined and coherent party electorate. 
Put plainly, many political organizations, and OFA especially, should be considered party 
organizations. The last chapter illustrated OFA’s centrality to the state-level Democratic 
ticket. Despite this, OFA did not integrate seamlessly into a joint organization with the 
local party. It was however responsible for the bulk of party resources, in ways not 
always aligned with other, often more durable, party actors. 
     The varying modes and scale of resources around each election create multiple 
iterations of campaign templates, all operating in their own overlapping yet distinct 
universes. Competitiveness and control/representation within government influence the 




Electoral organization remains an awkward combination of slick billion-dollar 
modernized campaigning and old school ward heeling, in which party organizational 
unity is contingent on wedding this diversity under one schematic. This remains a steep 
challenge.  
      One thing most will agree upon is that when looking at the county level, is there 
is very little generalizability. Each county has its own idiosyncratic culture based a 
laundry list of variables. Competition, and intertwined strategic importance, activism 
levels, and the organic political enthusiasm of the electorate will all affect local party 
development. Yet in Ohio, we can make a crude contrast between different types of 
dominant electoral and party organization that overlap, yet are largely without 
integration, while representing multiple distinct political cultures.   
 
Figure 4.1: Party Organizational Templates 




      Resources, responsibilities, and tactics will vary on each level of the party 
structure. Modes of field campaigning and voter contact look very different depending on 
the resources available to the campaign.  High resource models have become data 
intensive and dynamic. OFA also introduced relational organizing techniques that 
changed the responsibilities of both staff and volunteers on the ground.  Organization 
centers on the NTL/snowflake model, which requires a largely front-loaded staff presence 
to construct a volunteer campaign mobilization apparatus. This however exists 
independent from the local party structure. While the scale of OFA dwarfs that of local 
organization, life for the local party goes on. City council candidates run small canvasses; 
the county party has its summer fundraiser, and the Democratic Clerk of Courts candidate 
gives her supporters T-shirts and lawn signs. 
 
Mapping the Party Assemblage 
       Rasmus Nielsen, in his valuable description of the campaign assemblage in a 
2008 Connecticut congressional race, traces campaign resource construction as mediated 
by the congressional campaign itself.237 Nielsen describes the assemblage as an 
ephemeral organization that draws from durable institutions such as parties, unions, and 
civic groups, while also cultivating its own makeshift staff and activist networks. At the 
base of the assemblage is the explicit campaign infrastructure, charged with integrating 
the exogenous raw materials channeled into an electoral apparatus. It is: 
Not a thing “out there” in the sense a human being is, but rather a name 
for a combination of technologically augmented organizations, groups, 
and individuals whose combined capacity for action is brought to bear on 
																																																								




a shared project. In a few corners of the United States, where the finely 
meshed networks still exist or have found new forms, one can perhaps 
think of personalized political communication as something pursued by a 
single organization or a set of firmly institutionalized practices.238 
      
       Yet Nielsen argues that such institutionalization is uncommon today. Entrenched 
electoral organization has been replaced in politics by weak yet diffuse networks, and 
money.239 This new environment makes local field organization construction ad hoc and 
idiosyncratic. Campaigns use professionalization, aligned interest groups and activists; a 
party, what the particulars of their situation allow. 
     The choice to focus on a congressional race makes sense in a state like 
Connecticut—a non-presidential battleground, where the most highly resourced 
campaigns are likely to be at the congressional level. Yet this description is contingent on 
a campaign scaled accordingly, and the ancillary resources available to it. This is 
unrepresentative of OFA, which had the financial capacity and organic activist support, to 
build its own assemblage largely from scratch through the neighborhood team model. 
OFA had the resources to subsume whatever skeleton of infrastructure existed in other 
local races. It remained largely divorced in many places from the local party 
organization, a significantly more modest, yet perhaps more durable assemblages. 
      A distinction between a campaign assemblage and party organization rests upon 
the level of institutionalization of the organization. As networks and data become 
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increasingly critical to electoral politics, organizational hybridity makes both modes of 
organization, and the strategic incentives associated with them less defined. Whether 
aligned with a current formal organization, candidate networks exist as a potential party 
resource. For example: after 2004, Howard Dean supporters who got together at local 
meetups through the primary, might have transitioned themselves into Democracy for 
America (DFA), the formal organizational outgrowth of his campaign. Yet it is possible 
(and given the modest size of DFA, even likely) that the network could be at least 
partially maintained outside this formal organizational vessel. They might have organized 
for John Kerry in 2004, perhaps after Dean became party chair, integrated themselves 
into the local party, or for a progressive local candidate; potentially they joined or formed 
the local MoveOn chapter or another local progressive group; maybe one of them even 
eventually became an OFA NTL and brought the rest of group into their team. Networks, 
once cultivated are likely to exist outside of the organizational apparatus that fostered 
them. They exist, at least latently, beyond the structures that brought them into being. 
     Because assemblages are so unwieldy, creating efficiency among them can be 
difficult.  In the gap between local parties and presidential campaigns, are races that 
command both financial and activist resources at the scale necessary for 
professionalization. In a resource-heavy state where the federal is under the presidential 
brand, such efforts would likely to be redundant. As discussed in the last chapter, in 
2012, Sherrod Brown attempted to do this with a more modest, yet distinct field program 
run through the state party. This created tension as the different Democratic campaigns 
jostled over activist networks. Ostensibly, this was a function of the Brown campaign 




carried over into urban areas, where at the micro-level it got in the way of building 
efficient economies of scale.  Campaigns wound up recruiting from overlapping 
volunteer networks and engaging in overlapping voter contact. 
      Linkages between local party organizations and OFA did exist. Local parties can 
often provide know how and even networks to OFA. The first point of contact for most 
OFA staff when ‘getting on the ground’ is the local party chair. Many of these 
interactions are warm and integral in helping OFA get off the ground locally. Elizabeth 
McKenna, recalls her 2008 experience in Ottawa County initially meeting the county 
party chair: 
“(We met) over chicken salad, Wendy’s is a big deal in Ohio. She was a 
Hillary supporter and so the training that I got on the Obama campaign 
was simply to talk about myself…why I was interested in working for the 
Obama campaign, and elicit her expertise on the county that I just 
parachuted in to….talk (sic) about what we hoped to do in the county in 
the next three or four months. Not just to elect Obama, but to strengthen 
the progressive Democratic Party structure.”240 
     
      Yet this cooperation is largely idiosyncratic as there is no systematic 
organizational apparatus or incentive to fuse party campaigning together under one roof. 
OFA’s field plan was fundamentally distinct from that of the local party; as was its later 
post-campaign bridge organizations Organizing for America (2.0) and Organizing for 
Action (4.0). Politicians may share offices, know how, and even their homes with 
national staff, yet they often remain organizationally balkanized, practically speaking 
different languages.  
																																																								





Figure 4.2: Party Organizational Flow 
 
     The figure above illustrates the flow of resources from the national party down 
through the local level. OFA’s joint fundraising ventures do indirectly filter to the local 
party through the state party. Yet there is no direct organizational linkage between OFA 
and the local party, financially or otherwise. The state party will channel resources to 
both the county parties and individual candidates running for state/federal office. These 
candidates will run their own smaller voter contact operations, culling assemblages like 
those described by Nielsen. At the local level, candidates will attempt to run their own 
modest idiosyncratic campaigns with county level support. Such campaigns however, 
will be a drop in the bucket, in both sophistication and output, of the federal level 
campaigning going on around them.  
     There is no formal chain of command between local OFA and the local party.  




chair, not local elected officials will have a working relationship with OFA. The county 
party chair is likely to want to preserve their own chain of command and not want 
interference from an outside force. Conversely, from OFA’s standpoint, since they do not 
run coordinated campaigns with local candidates, there is little need to be in 
conversation. While such a schema reflects a short-term electoral logic, there is no 
mechanism for party-wide integration of networks and expertise. According to 2008 
Regional Field Director and 2012 State GOTV Coordinator Max Lesko:  
“There’s both the city level and the county level. I recall the county level 
being the mama bear and ultimately trying to protect [the interests of the 
local party]. The county executive was the starting point in conversation 
between myself and the local community. There’s three entities: the 
county party, the county executive’s office and the city elected 
(officials)…but I never really spoke with the third group…(The county) 
wanted things from us, we weren’t necessarily willing to do that, but 
there’s ways to be approachable and receptive without necessarily 
agreeing on everything. ”241 
 
The Role of the State Party Locally 
      The state party derives its power, at least in a technical sense, from its county 
party clients.  Local candidates usually do not have access to significant fundraising 
networks or large campaign staffs. They are dependent on the state party to help navigate 
developments in campaigning as well as providing them with professional resources. 
Actual locally dedicated financial resources are fleeting and often contingent on the 
strategic importance of districts. Yet the state party is influential in directing federal-level 
resources. This includes money, statewide campaign staffing, and events for principals 
and surrogates. As put by Janet Carson, chair of the Ohio Democratic County Chairs 
																																																								




Association (ODCCA), and Geauga County chair: “Most chairs work outside their party 
chairman duties and most are older and have never had the professional training party 
staffers have.”242 
     Permanent state staff such as the Executive Director and Political Director spend 
much of their time working with county parties, assessing their needs and attempting to 
procure the resources to meet them. Positions such as data and field directors exist on a 
semi-permanent basis, as they scale for the height of the campaign cycle. This staff also 
works with county parties often traveling the state attempting to train county party 
leadership on data and organizational techniques early in the campaign season.  
     Compared with an organization like OFA’s presidential campaign, resources are 
scarce. State staff is responsible for complementing 88 counties with largely volunteer 
leadership, all with their own issues and demanding the state party’s finite attention and 
resources. Urban vs. rural, majority vs. minority districts, and other variables all lead to 
different considerations and challenges. For Carson, responsibilities and challenges 
include: 
“Bring(ing) county organizations into the 21st century (through) help with 
technology, data and fundraising. To develop a regional structure so chairs 
could mentor and communicate with their local peers, sharing best 
practices to strengthen every county organization and to hold annual 
listening tours to learn what is important to our members and their 
constituents.”243 
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     State parties get little in the way of support nationally as independent 
infrastructure. Instead, the ODP’s role is often as firefighter of last resort in mediating 
tensions between presidential campaigns and local parties. The small monthly DNC 
contribution helps to support their bare bones staff, but state party building is largely a 
function of the electoral clock and its impact on national fundraising. As a point of 
comparison, there were on average several OFA organizers for each county during the 
presidential elections.   
     If the state party exists as a mediating structure between national and local 
parties, it only has the resources to do so in a passive sense. At the height of presidential 
campaigns, its job is to build cohesion or at least keep the peace between the presidential 
and local parties. State party staff will relay to local party leadership presidential 
campaign events and surrogates coming to the state and their region. Yet as previously 
seen, the state party’s resources are tethered to forces such as control of government. 
Absent state level executive power, close support of localities, let alone the coercive 
power necessary to promote party integration appears unrealistic.  
 
The Challenge of Party Congruence 
      From the general perspective of the party, an efficient field strategy should be a 
singular apparatus in which all resources of aligned party office-seekers combine to 
mobilize a coherent party electorate. Money, volunteers, data would all integrate in a 
single organization that conducts outreach in the service of mobilizing a party electorate 
for its candidate slate. This however is not empirically the case, as various assemblages 




resource top of the ticket campaign carrying the organizational burden with smaller 
campaigns orbiting. Yet without integration, election-to-election resource disparities will 
hamper the party’s ability to translate its latent coalition in the electorate into government 
power. 
       From the local party’s perspective, it may be that there is little that OFA can do 
to help build its organization. OFA recruits volunteers under the Obama brand, trains 
them on a high resource campaign model that is based on organizing others around that 
brand; and then institutes a sophisticated volunteer-led mobilization apparatus based on 
targets that come from national headquarters, developed by dedicated targeting 
professionals, once again on behalf of the specific appeal of the Obama brand to its voter 
targets. The brand and resources that OFA capitalizes upon therefore is not easily 
replicated. Yet even other forms of institutionalized resources can have difficulty 
translating to the local party. Progressive activists are often loyal to ideological 
candidates, not the party operating under constraints of government and/or sensitive to 
other considerations of resource construction. From one long-time county chair’s 
perspective:  
“Obama activists have not become a part of local parties and though we 
worked hard to court them, their interests weren’t in helping the party but 
in supporting their candidate…many chairs felt this was a failing on the 
part of OFA.”244 
    
      The lack of brand congruence on a local level is a function of the structural 
impediments to a joint local party structure. Different political teams, linked to different 
campaign assemblages and electorates, all exist within the same party. Methods of 
																																																								




campaigning all develop due to the political culture fostered in response to peculiar 
conditions. According to McKenna, older county party leaders: 
“…were weary of the organizing techniques that Obama organizers were 
taught to implement. So house parties, one on one meetings, neighborhood 
teams, these were all an entirely different lexicon for establishment 
Democrats. They were used to pot luck dinners, debate watch parties, and 
yard signs.”245 
      
     Critiques of national organization are usually around what many consider a 
cookie-cutter national template that does not prioritize the local idiosyncrasies of politics. 
The long-term personal relationships that undergird local organization have little use in a 
high resource election where turnout and salience is significantly higher. For Elizabeth 
Walters: 
“There’s always that push and pull between folks whether they be voters, 
or volunteers, or donors who only show up during the presidential year 
and wanting to encourage their activism and make a place for them within 
the party and the operation. But then you also have that huge group of 
long term activists who maybe they don’t knock doors as much as they 
used to, they may be a little more old school, but they carry the banner in 
the mayoral races in our communities every year and so…the (local 
politicians) say yeah that’s nice Barack Obama, that you say if you win 
it’s going to help me, but how do I know that the voter in my county even 
knows my name when you won’t invest in a sample ballot, you won’t 
carry my lit. If I go into your local campaign office on the ground, I’m 
being told I can’t even leave my lawn signs or my literature there. It’s hard 
and I don’t know what the answer is because I see both sides of the coin.” 
246 
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     Organization must be scaled beyond the local party organization, and it must be 
done quickly. From the standpoint of the national organization, local strategies are often 
ineffective. Based upon the management of moribund structures not subject to robust 
electoral competition. Infrastructure appears hollow compared to the model OFA 
implements.  For one Regional Field Director, describing these divergent perspectives: 
“Get a truck with a big poster on it and drive around these key 
neighborhoods with a megaphone. That’s what folks thought of as turnout, 
and we were saying, you know this idea of micro-targeting, where (sic) we 
want to hit a lot of the voters in those areas, but we also want to hit these 
traditionally maybe Republican neighborhood(s) where there’s key 
pockets of Democratic voters that don’t always turnout. The pushback on 
our universes was always a contentious argument. As a (Regional Field 
Director), I didn’t have a firm understanding of how that (sic) universe 
was created and I also didn’t necessarily have the ability to communicate 
that.”247 
 
      From the standpoint of the local party, highly resourced organizers show up, 
construct their own organization out of largely non-party activists, and leave. They may 
well win and carry local candidates with them, but they will just as sure skip town after 
the election and deconstruct their apparatus. They, nor their organization, will be there for 









Local Organization       
      In their book on Obama field organization, McKenna & Han contrast the OFA 
model with traditional campaigning.248 They give comprehensive treatment to the 
differences between electoral campaigning in the past and OFA. Yet this was not so 
much of a transition from one method of campaigning to another. Instead, one form has 
largely grafted itself over the other, ebbing once the presidential season has ended with 
questionable impact on durable local party institutions.  
      Local campaigning tends to be a low resourced affair. Small donor events pay for 
a modest staff, office space, mailings, and perhaps modest media buys. Much 
campaigning still resembles the iconic picture of yesteryear’s parades and potluck 
dinners. Visibility in low salience elections is important (or at least is perceived as so), as 
is the party brand and ticket for politicians fortunate enough to be in the majority. Lawn 
signs, literature, and downtown handshakes make up the lynchpin of a typical campaign 
template.  Voter targeting is an oral tradition of blocks, precincts, and wards that make up 
the party vote. Walters, discussing the varying roles of the local party: 
“It greatly varies by county. Some county parties say we’re going to drill 
in, raise money to do a sample ballot, or raise money to support a judicial 
candidate piece, because judicial candidates have a harder time raising 
money at the local level… Very few counties have full time staff, usually 
it’s just the bigger urban ones that are able to afford it. They provide office 
space, they provide telephone lines, they provide connection to donor 
networks if they exist in the county…time saving things that would take 
the candidate or a volunteer two days to tack down, the county party does 
it.”249 
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       The party can provide basic resources, institutional memory, and a venue to 
workout conflict and build cooperation among party politicians. Tammany may be dead, 
but the party, as a physical place, is still how politicians can coordinate on behalf of 
shared interests and electorates. Large urban counties, and robust smaller ones, will have 
offices that serve as meeting spaces for the community as well as political figures. These 
venues can be integral for phone banking, fundraising, and morale of party loyalists. Over 
the period under study, one major institutional development is the procurement of office-
space for medium to smaller-sized county parties. Carson discussing the importance of 
this for the county party: 
“The (Republicans) had never had a HQ or office except during limited 
campaign cycles. We have had a HQ open year round for the last six 
years. Now the (Republican)’s have felt compelled to spend funds and 
have their own HQ, although not permanent as ours is.  This gives us a 
presence in the county and makes it easier for Dems to find us.” 250 
 
     County party chairs and most elected officials are not full-time politicians, but 
have significant experience with the local party. The prerequisites for these positions is 
often mastering the local party template as candidate or campaigner. 
      Extra-organizational resources will vary significantly from one county to another. 
A cornerstone of ODP organization in urban and industrial areas is still unions that have 
significant resources to get out voters (especially members and their families) in many 
places. In urban and liberal enclaves, there are often local progressive organizations such 
																																																								




as MoveOn that have built a presence. These may be important fundraising networks as 
well as provide ground troops for voter contact. These networks may constitute the basis 
of resources on a local level, where they remain more durable than OFA activist 
organization. In some instances, these more ideological organizations have been outlets 
for activists groomed by OFA and other campaigns, who have remained ambivalent 
about participating in explicit local party institutions. 
    Candidates however usually must provide basic campaign resources for 
themselves. For those in small counties that nonetheless fall in major media markets, 
television advertising is impractical.  Viability is a function of demonstrating the 
fundraising prowess necessary to build a campaign. County party endorsements in 
primaries can be an important signifier in low turnout elections for party stalwarts. Yet 
parties find themselves caught between wanting to put forward the strongest ticket 
possible and risking making choices that could alienate stakeholders.  
     Local party organizations are highly institutionalized with clear hierarchies and 
rules for advancement. They are not large organizations in the popular sense, but are what 
is necessary to maintain an effective local apparatus for low salience local politics. They 
are the institutional memory, and often gatekeepers, for political amateurs looking to 
enter the electoral arena. 
       This presents a marked contrast with what the presidential template developed by 
OFA looks like on the local level. Local organization is the tip of a highly sophisticated 
and bureaucratized national organization. Financial resources are significant. So are the 
raw materials that could be cultivated locally, especially volunteers. This is a function of 




appeal. Despite having to build an organization from scratch, OFA’s resources can very 
quickly dwarf the organizational apparatus of the local party. Money, volunteers, data, 
and staff infrastructure (especially when aggregated from the national level—such as the 
data and communication staff in Chicago that work with local organizers) all are orders 
of magnitude higher than what can be summoned by the local party.  
       Professionalization also operates through a very different landscape. While 
volunteer networks are ‘snowflaked,’ at the staff level, the campaign remains very much 
hierarchal. Strategies are dynamic, having come out of a national template through 
electoral competition. Social media, data implementation, and even field tactics can all 
quickly move from experimental to institutionalized within a national campaign 
apparatus, when proven effective.  Development and diffusion of new tactics is necessary 
in this environment: with data, organizing, and communications strategies developing 
rapidly to be best appropriated by the campaign. For example, resource intensive voter 
contact A/B testing took place all over Ohio in 2012. This requires computer scientists 
building a sophisticated model; field staff in place building the voter contact apparatus 
months (if not years) before the election; and activists to go out and conduct voter 
contact. Such a program would be impossible to scale without millions of dollars in 
necessary campaign infrastructure.  
      The NTL model locally, is in function, independent from the party organization. 
Senior volunteer cadre get significant training by dedicated local staff on the OFA model. 
Focus is not just on the mechanics of voter contact, but relational organizing techniques 
to build network capacity over the course of the campaign. The snowflake model further 




the volunteer neighborhood team leader who responds directly to the OFA field 
organizer. This will usually take the place of whatever social diffusion might happen in a 
local party campaign office. Some county party chairs relayed a sense that OFA is often 
poaching their volunteers. This may stand at odds with claims by many of the same 
people that OFA volunteers are qualitatively different from that of the party. Yet it is 
evidence of the frustration of party regulars that local organizing is escaping the grasp of 
the permanent party infrastructure.  
“There was cohort of maybe a dozen to twenty folks (that) were the party 
volunteers. We worked with them as the campaign continued. We 
collaborated on how we can best lift all boats, but we could have 200 
(OFA) canvassers across the county one day and they could say, nope 
we’re going to do this thing that we’ve always done. That’s fine, the real 
question is, it’s the people who have been involved in local politics, and 
do they gravitate to that core of a dozen, or do they go on over to the 
presidential. Do they go to the kids?”251 (Lesko) 
 
     While idiosyncratic, OFA volunteer networks are often built from scratch with 
little channeled from preexisting organization. Some local party activists and even 
politicians may join, but many will continue in their local party activities. OFA has 
access to most of the existing party activist data. Yet it also has a linkage to those who 
have signed up through OFA social media. Staff can continue to build networks through 
early voter contact and the social networks of their prime volunteer targets. The point of 
the community-organizing model is indeed to maximize their impact by drawing on their 
																																																								




social networks, rather than throw volunteers “onto doors.”  This allows them to largely 
bypass the party infrastructure and focus on molding new volunteer cadre. 
      Yet it is a resource intensive model that would be impractical for local 
organization.  There were instances reported of local party leadership participating in 
OFA organization. Yet, OFA leadership is a labor-intensive task (NTLs are expected to 
volunteer 10-15 hours a week) that would even in the best of circumstances be difficult 
for volunteer party leadership, which must assume responsibility for normal party 
functions.  
 
  Competition and Resources 
      In previous chapters, the fight over resources¾ where they go, and when they go 
there¾ has been at the fore. Yet there is another important factor in incongruity, most 
salient at the local level. Highly competitive national elections remain juxtaposed with 
local politics—where increased spatial sorting and gerrymandering has stunted the 
competitive environment.  
      A lack of competition at the county level is not a new phenomenon. County 
level competition also does not guarantee higher-level party sponsors. Chairs in 
competitive counties complain that they are also ignored, as statewide resources often 
filter to Democratic ‘base’ turf. Yet the sorts of races that would be receptacles for 
statewide party targeting, that encompass districts larger than many small counties, such 
as congressional or state senate races, have been gerrymandered out of competition. It is 
the varying and crosscutting levels of competition that so impacts the institutional logic 




counties that (are perceived to252) receive the bulk of resources for statewide base 
mobilization, and the high level of OFA resources dedicated there.   
      Long-standing theories explain how the party system is influenced by robust 
electoral competition. Competitive two-party systems can lead to dynamic shifts in 
leaders and representation.253 Under these conditions, competition can incentivize 
individuals, and most importantly parties, to expand participation to construct their 
majority.254 Yet, one-party systems display collusion among party elites, incentivized to 
conspire and restrict competition.255 A narrow and managed electorate is under the 
control of the leadership of the dominant party, who ensure stability through patronage 
and the repression of countervailing organizational power, which could lead to 
competition and threaten the status quo power arrangements.256        
       Historically speaking, the machine’s strength came from its control over the 
mobilization apparatus.257 The local party held a monopoly over the institutional 
knowledge of the precinct-by-precinct party vote. Yet this today is no longer the case on 
the local level. There is a registered, at least latent electorate, loyal less to the local than 
to the national party. This linkage is characteristically through the personalized brand 
associated with the presidency. Indeed, it is the incongruity between the national brand 
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and the local party organization, which is at the center of the struggle for organizational 
integration. If the heart of the historical party was the local boss, it is now a voter file and 
a presidential slogan.  
      Local parties often still display characteristics of the traditional political 
machine. They are durable, hierarchal organizations. Advancement comes from working 
your way up the party hierarchy over time. Robust competition on the county level is 
rare, where electoral turnout and public attention is low. Majority parties will have some 
amount of patronage to pass around. Minority parties meanwhile will have little in the 
way to offer politicians and activists to engage them.  
      Yet safe counties today in battlegrounds such as Ohio are, if one-party dominant, 
still analytically different from historically non-competitive systems. They are over-laid 
by state and national campaign organizations that are functioning under the logic of a 
competitive two-party system-- where high turnout elections are necessary. This does not 
create a classic one-party system, but an incongruence between a permanent local 
organization whose most narrow prerogatives (control of local government) remain 
unaffected by mobilization, yet share a ticket with state and national campaigns whose 
outcome will be decided by marginal gains in state-wide turnout. The increasing scale 
and professionalization of national politics has increased the field presence of national 
campaigns: to the point in that they now often create robust parallel organization, scaled 
well beyond the durable party apparatus. This is especially true in Ohio. Its strategic 
importance means building presidential assemblages exponentially larger and more 




however, has taken this to a new level. Hundreds of organizers built sophisticated local 
organizations reliant on community-based volunteer cadre.  
      As an orchestrator of assemblages, the local party still best aggregates the local 
apparatus, even if that organization exists largely outside the explicit hierarchy of the 
party machine. This is to say; it falls largely to the party to capture whatever networks 
exist for local candidate campaigning. It maintains institutional memory and 
infrastructure, which provide necessary if not sufficient resources for new candidates. 
Whatever latent tension might exist between OFA activists and the local party, there is 
little to suggest long-term, large-scale competition between them in any systematic 
fashion. OFA largely demobilized or continued to work on behalf of national politics, 
paying little attention to the local organization. The label and narrative of OFA remains 
strongly connected with national politics and that of the president. OFA 2.0 felt it would 
be unsuccessful if it attempted to involve itself in local politics. The local party and 
politics, if viewed with suspicion by those OFA successfully tapped into, generally 
remained ignored as a vessel of contention. Yet true party building must be a function not 
of segmentation of these networks and organizations, but integration.  
 
Competition and its Consequences 
       History shows that managing of a one-party system will create a very different 
logic and mode of organization than parties operating in competitive environments.258 
Where a party operates outside of robust competition, its central focus is likely to be the 
																																																								





management of patronage-based resources that fortify its dominant position.259 Intra-
party conflict is handled not through democratic competition, but highly institutionalized 
hierarchies. Success depends on the management of conflict to keep entrenched powers 
satisfied enough to not have large scale revolt.    
     In competitive electoral environments, party cohesion is not a function of 
maintaining the status quo, but creating structures that can increase electoral support.260 
This means exerting centripetal force on electoral resources to create an efficient 
economy of scale to mobilize for a party ticket.  With this cohesion, resources 
amalgamate to construct the infrastructure necessary to mobilize a dynamic electorate 
and consolidate electoral coalitions. Yet cohesion comes out of an alignment of interests 
among party stakeholders. If the county parties are not aligned with temporary high 
resource presidential organization, as they are not responding to the same competitive 
mechanisms, whether on the county level or overlapping state legislative districts, there is 
little inducement for integration necessary for efficient mobilization.  
     Growth in the quantity of non-competitive elections, even in localities that 
suggest strong competition, exacerbates these differences. Carson explaining the 
consequence of this in minority districts: 
“Unsuccessful local races tend to perpetuate the views that Democrats are 
unelectable, we don’t have qualified candidates and that there aren’t many 
Democrats in the county.   These perceptions have to be reversed for 
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voters to identify as Democrats and be willing to become active party 
members.”261 
      
      Historically, one-party systems were typologically characteristic of the solid 
south. Today, advanced gerrymandering techniques and more precisely targeted electoral 
strategies have created patterns in which insulation from competition is the norm.262 This 
is regardless of federal, state, or local nature of the race; and is even so in places like 
Ohio that remain highly competitive on the state level. There is evidence of this as part of 
a deliberate conservative strategy to curb representation away from an emerging 
progressive majority.263 Resource construction has also become significantly more 
idiosyncratic as advances in polling have incentivized the concentration of resources in 
peculiar areas and elections in which they are likely to produce marginal strategic gains.  
       The strange consequence is that despite financial resources increasing by orders 
of magnitude, and data innovations revolutionizing political communication, this 
explosion of resources is being driven into increasingly narrow channels of electoral 
competition: battleground states, battleground districts, battleground wards; with 
precision focus on a select group of persuadable or sporadic voters. Almost unimaginable 
resources are directed toward mobilizing the party vote, yet are applied on the ground in 
ways that impede the development of something that looks like a traditional mass party 
through unified and durable joint structure. Electoral strategies follow short-term logic, 
with precision targeting of resources and voters. Yet, this precision creates strategic 
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idiosyncrasies that hamper institutionalization of a mass party. Voters are not economic 
or social classes, but individuals measured by party confidence scores based on data 
points, histories of voting behavior and consumption habits, and their strategic need for 
any given election.   
      Stunted competition manifests itself within the same geographic space, creating 
overlapping but largely disconnected party structures.  The resources, strategies, and 
people involved are all largely different. This can translate to the brand, or lack of one at 
a local level, and mistrust between the divergent activists and networks at the county 
level. Without salience or resources, local activism has a much stronger relationship with 
traditional patronage, or close personal relationships with the local party infrastructure. In 
a micro-sense, activist patterns fall into different universes under different logics of 
participation. OFA activists, conditioned for high resourced data intensive campaign 
activities, follow national-level structures.  
     The local party infrastructure is seen as disconnected from the party’s 
presidential electorate and activist base. It represents the management of the status quo. 
For the local party, these activists present an inconsistent and undependable resource as 
well as electorate. For locally dominant parties however, if it isn’t broke, why fix it?  It is 
unrealistic to expect the modal shift to come from politicians protected under the status 
quo. 
     This tension was central to Obama’s narrative appeal in the Democratic primary. 
Earlier chapters have discussed in-depth horizontal conflict. Yet it is worth reflecting on 
how this conflict might play out at the community level between the party, its activists, 




imagine a national Democrat. Yet attitudes among these voters often reflect high degrees 
of suspicion toward the institutions of the party. If this seems a paradox, it may be less so 
when the national party profile is often absent at the local level, where voters actually 
interact with the living breathing expression of the party. One OFA organizer relayed: 
“(The party was) older and white…there were some leaders of color who 
were excited to build this out in way that was different from the party, 
(they saw the party) as not very responsive or interested in building 
community leadership capacity.”264 
      
    Barack Obama represents the national party profile; and party solidarity 
expresses itself through personalistic loyalty to him. At the local level, party precinct 
captains and city council members: older, whiter, etc. can come across as vestiges of the 
past. If the brand remains untethered to a local institutionalized organizational linkage, 
there is no apparatus to connect the party to the electorate. Another OFA organizer: 
“Our capacity exceeded what we could organize out of the local party 
office and they had a volunteer coordinator and office manager and they 
told us they wanted us to find another space and kicked us out of the 
office…I got the sense that the local party leadership was old and out of 
touch and not interested in running the kind of campaign that the Obama 
organization was building…they were more interested in handing out lawn 
signs then relational organizing.”265 
      
     The irony remains that when aggregated, the inability to connect the local party to 
the national electorate leads to depressed turnout that harms the party on a statewide and 
national level. National politics remains personalistic in the attachment to a particular 
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candidate,266 or perhaps ideological demands.267 This exists in a different space from that 
of the local party seeking to manage resources and power through transactional and 
interpersonal relationships. Without an organization successfully mediating this however, 
everyone is underrepresented. 
      From a partisan vantage point, this seems like a maddening disconnect. Political 
actors whose cooperation would be to their overwhelming mutual benefit cannot find an 
effective structure to come together. For Walters: 
“There’s only going to be so much a county party chair or a county party 
structure can do to engage an activist in a party structure, but what needs 
to happen is that the county party has to be the bridge that takes the 
activist who is passionate about their president and helps them become 
just as passionate about their mayor.”268  
 
     Yet a collective action problem persists in that no actor is properly incentivized 
to bridge the gap between the differing path-dependent party organizations. All are 
responding to highly institutionalized peculiar logics. Whatever they have to gain is 
counter-posed by what they have to lose—the autonomy to run campaigns in a way 
consistent with customs dictated by their own structural conditions. Campaign finance 
law also create high barriers to the construction of organization that transcends them. Put 
simply—who would create such an apparatus? Local parties composed of elected 
officials who are in safe seats? The national party constructed to prime turnout once 
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every four years? A state party caught in between these two party forms with no true 
local presence? 
      OFA 2.0 presented the most explicit organizational attempt to overcome these 
boundaries, yet would be hard to characterize as transformative on the local level. Caught 
in some ways between these structural boundaries, it lacked the resources, brand, and 
institutional knowledge, to be effective as a permanent bridge organization bringing these 
diffuse actors together. 
     Indeed, if the national and local parties are qualitatively different entities on the 
local level, the state party remains largely absent. State parties remain stuck between on 
the ground relationships and national salience. Even effective state campaigns are, as 
seen in last chapter, based on the cultivation of financial resources and empowering 
patronage based local organizations, rather than building grassroots organization such as 
during presidential elections.  
     The Obama era has marked an observable decline in down ticket competition. 
This has the consequence of reducing resources in a competitive national environment, 
where donors and national organizations will channel resources where marginal gains are 
most likely. While top of the ticket campaigns garner the greatest amount of resources, 
competitive congressional races are also multi-million dollar campaigns that can affect 
the party ticket. Republican-led gerrymandering has not only given the GOP a 
representative advantage, but has also inhibited long-term Democratic resource 
development.  Both a reduction in incumbency and competitiveness have hurt Ohio 
Democratic congressional fundraising. As the Democratic congressional caucus has 





Table 4.1: Mean fundraising total per Ohio Congressional Democratic candidate. 
Source: Opensecrets.org *After 2010 redistricting Ohio congressional delegation 
was reduced from 18 to 16. 
 
Year Average Congressional Campaign Fundraising 
2004 $376,777  
2006 $712,420  
2008    $1,108,976  
2010 $977,231  
 2012* $641,844  
 2014* $414,190  
 
      
In addition, the state legislature has been subject to a reduction in competition 
over this time. Perhaps the greatest prize for Democrats on the state level was victory in 
the state assembly in 2008. This victory was short lived however. Republicans 
recapturing the state house in 2010, would consolidate these gains through redistricting, 
making their majority virtually unassailable in the short term. Table 4.2 illustrates the 
precipitous drop in competition since 2010. In 2012, races decided by less than three 
points dropped to their lowest level in four elections. In 2014, a strong Republican year, 
only five races were decided by less than ten points. This was significantly fewer than 
any other election over the last decade. The senate, which already displayed a Republican 
lean, had only one of its 15 seats up for grabs decided by less than ten points in 2012, and 











Table 4.2: Competitive races in 99 member Ohio State Assembly. Source: Ohio 
Board of Elections. 
 
Year Less than 3 pts       3-5 pts 5-10 pts 
2004 3      2 9 
2006 5      4 9 
2008 5      0 8 
2010 7       5 8 
2012 3       5 8 
2014 2       1 2 
 
      
As discussed in the previous chapter, this lack of competition decimates the 
Democratic farm team, as there is little inducement to run for office and build fundraising 
and organizational networks that can have positive effects on local party building. These 
races would be the most resource heavy at the sub-state level. Local party building, 
generating resource networks on behalf of state-level and congressional races, is not 
feasible if there are no competitive races to build on behalf of.  
 
Collusion or Inertia? 
       Piven & Cloward269 raise a serious caveat with Schattschneider’s assertion that 
party competition creates equalitarian political institutions. Parties may at times socialize 
conflict, yet are also inhibited by oligarchic tendencies that make them just as likely to 
restrict and mange competition through collusion. The one-party system is every bit, if 
not a more prevalent force in the American party system, as truly competitive electoral 
equilibrium. This is not as an accident, but as a natural outgrowth of general 






     Yet when looking at contemporary Ohio, we often see both in the same place and 
time, party organization based on high resource, high competition strategies, overlaid 
with sturdy hierarchal local organization often responding to one-party dominance. From 
a systematic standpoint, such stunted competition quite clearly appears caused by the 
partisan motivations of the opposition party. Yet what motivations underlie Democrats 
inability to respond effectively? This gap appears less the consequence of collusion in the 
restriction of competition, than inertia. This is a result of the lack of a mechanism to 
transcend local templates for ones useful for state and federal competition. These are 
forces not so much resistant to change and dynamism, but without strong enough 
incentives to institute a massive modal shift in resource construction. The institutional 
logic of their position remains in the netherworld between the old machine and a newer 
networked politics. Repertoires slowly seep through in many cases, yet there is no 
organizational capacity to institutionalize OFA-like mobilization. Party actors are not 
actively resistant, but have neither the resources nor strong incentive in their non-
competitive districts to adapt.  
     Mediating structures have been absent, at least at levels strong enough to bridge 
networks, repertoires, and brand. OFA 2.0 and the ODP attempted to provide this 
function. Yet neither statewide organization had the resources to work closely and 
entrepreneurially with stakeholders such as local parties to convince, nor coerce, them. 
Data and mobilization strategies have unevenly diffused into county calculations, yet 
there is little systematic evidence that this has altered local practices in significant ways. 
Local party leaders discuss these tools and strategies. They may quite sincerely want to 




capacity to build, nor do they feel they receive sufficient resources from higher levels of 
the party. 
 
Literature, Lawnsigns, & Laptops 
     Campaign tactics and the tension over their priority, effectiveness, and 
application; illustrate how structural fragmentation plays out on a day-by-day basis. 
While perhaps seeming pedestrian, such issues illustrate the gaps in practice that persist. 
Data distribution seemingly comes with few transaction costs. Indeed, the VAN’s intent 
was to establish a centralized user-friendly vessel for Democrats to have real time access 
to voter and activist files. Yet the diffusion of data from presidential campaigns to county 
parties has been uneven at best, with responsibility difficult to untangle.  
      While data for voter turnout is applicable on a small scale by local campaigns 
(even without advanced universe modeling, ‘cutting’ lists of high probability Democrats 
is simple), there is no real mechanism to integrate such tactics into local campaigns and 
parties. While the state party attempts to coordinate with and train the local parties, they 
do not have the staff presence to continually service local politicians and campaigns on 
data maintenance. Without the resources to professionalize, many local party actors will 
be unlikely to overcome the learning curve and integrate data into party activities.  
      Local party leaders are not luddites. They talk often and excitedly about data and 
its current and potential importance to their efforts.  Several smaller county parties have 
volunteers dedicated to data maintenance: 
“We have a full time VAN person who spends hours on the system 
providing data to candidates. He is constantly checking the data imputed 




candidates use (the) VAN extensively and it’s an appreciated asset the 
state party provides to counties.” 270 (Carson) 
 
      Yet as the last chapter illustrated, OFA personnel remain adamant that data itself 
is worth little outside the OFA networks and culture that many local parties remain at a 
distance from.  
      Mechanically, it is conceivable to do voter contact and even recruit volunteers, 
while eschewing the OFA model and its associated network. Yet for OFA, ignoring the 
philosophy of volunteer empowerment will stunt contact capacity and therefore the 
ability to reconstruct Obama’s coalition. Conversely, local party actors feeling of having 
vital information withheld increased distrust of OFA, making them less amenable to the 
integration of tactics and networks. It is this propriety view of data, held across multiple 
party factions that illustrates a lack of a truly joint party mechanism. 
     Another constant tension in campaign coordination involves the carrying of 
candidate literature. For national staff, campaign literature pieces are a necessary but 
largely anachronistic campaign focus. Voter persuasion is most effective when done 
through the personalized narrative of volunteers (supplemented with the support of 
analytics). Split ticket voting is not a concern when a Democratic majority is identified, 
and certainly not one that can be addressed by a palm card.  As one OFA RFD says: 
“One big question is always how much lit will you carry? So when you’re 
doing voter contact…will you carry down ticket candidate lit, how far 
down ticket? Often there’s an agreement where there’s one presidential 
piece of lit and one county-wide piece of lit that’s all the down ticket 
(races). I think that was kind of assumed that we would do that, and the 
idea that we wouldn’t would have been thought of as inconsistent with 
																																																								




previous practice and so there’s a little bit of tension there in that it’s 
assumed that we’re going to do this, but we haven’t agreed to do this 
yet…it’s all on the margins of voter contact impact. The reason we do 
voter contact is because it changes behavior, because (of the impact of) 
someone who talks to their neighbor about why their supporting Obama. If 
undecided, of every hundred voters they talked to, that changes two or 
three, or four, or maybe five as the top end of that prediction, right? If the 
message is more complex that dilutes our core message. For turnout…you 
leave a piece of lit at the door as a reminder of who the candidate is and 
what our core message is. But if you have two pieces of lit, it is more 
likely to end up on the coffee table or end up in the trash.”271 
     
       Local parties and candidates however have long maintained their linkage to the 
electorate through the ‘party ticket.’ They find it integral for campaigning. Their brand 
and name recognition is a function of Democratic ‘literature drops’ that anchor them 
within the community. For local candidates in low salience races, candidate visibility 
along with the party identifier, are thought vital campaign tactics. Indeed, while broadly, 
Obama’s victory carried Democrats, Obama’s votes did not always necessarily carry 
down ticket candidates. Federal level candidates largely paralleled Obama’s success, yet 
the further down ticket one looks, the more evidence of under-voting and even in some 
cases party switching.  
     While perhaps exceptions to the rule of increased coherence of party voting, it is 
understandable when politicians see evidence of colleagues in competitive seats losing 
close races in districts that Obama easily carried to be reticent to defer to the national 
party.  Can office-holders be expected to trust new ways of campaigning if the top of the 
ticket effects remain idiosyncratic? 
     
																																																								





      Fragmentation between OFA and the local party infrastructure is not always the 
case. In a small number of circumstances, OFA organization has not just integrated 
unevenly with county party structures, but has taken them over. This has tended to be the 
case in rapidly growing exurban areas such as Warren County. This should not be 
surprising. Such ‘high social capital’ areas are often most conducive to OFA style 
organizing. Areas which are experiencing rapid population growth may also give people 
increased motivation to create social bonds through organizational participation. Because 
many of these communities tend to lean Republican, minority status may make activists 
feel their political identity more acutely and instill bonds on that basis. 
     Yet another important consequence of Republican domination is weak county 
party structure. These activists face little to no resistance in taking parties over, as there is 
no strongly entrenched organization to resist. Weakly institutionalized party organization 
may indeed present more opportunity for newer networks to institutionalize as a party 
vessel. As these counties continue to grow and competiveness increases, they may be 
able to respond with greater success in mobilization-- and perhaps with the integration of 
national and local apparatuses.  Whether the capture of formal party structures increases 
network durability, campaign effectiveness, and party integration will be important 
questions for further study.  
      Ohio has been at the fore of the rapid development of new presidential 
organizational strategies in 2008 and 2012. These strategies have emphasized voter 
contact and the scientifically targeted mobilization of a Democratic electorate. They 




the ground, these shifts remain unevenly integrated into the permanent institutions of the 
party. They would be measurable in resources including money, data, activists, and of 
course most importantly an electoral coalition, that replicates presidential ticket success 
in off-year elections. 
       On the national level, coalitional and institutional fragmentation impede efficient 
resource construction. When we move to the micro level, these forms of fragmentation 
become even more complex. At the local level, activist cultivation is a function of 
networks instituted by multiple campaigns, all with different brands, in uneasy alliance 
with the formal party structure. Peculiar electoral organizations develop varying modes of 
campaigning ranging from precise micro targeting to blunter instruments of traditional 
visibility.  
      Institutional variation at the local level is not just a product of the electoral cycle 
and fundraising rules, but also highly idiosyncratic levels of competition and resources in 
each locality. Competition attracts resources, as well as gives incentives for dynamism in 
campaign strategies. While such resources are in abundance on the presidential level, 
interaction with highly institutionalized local party structures, developed under very 
different structural conditions, impedes diffusion and institutionalization over the few 
months that are the zenith of the campaign season. 
       This is not to say such efforts have not had a significant effect on party resources. 
The voter file gives the party a map to its electorate not even dreamed of a few years 
earlier. Voters are now known block-by-block and precinct-by-precinct, with near 
pinpoint precision. Local party’s live in an ocean of newly constructed activist networks, 




    Further, these tensions do not mean integration is completely nonexistent. Almost 
all interviewed had anecdotal examples of activists, networks, and on occasion even 
large-scale local organizational diffusion into, if not the explicit local county party, at 
least what could be viewed as durable resources accessible by party institutions. Many 
long-time party officials were greatly impressed by OFA’s operation and looked forward 
to incorporating both activists and organizing techniques.  Yet such integration was not 
deep and systematic enough to move turnout in ways evident at the state level.   
     What remains absent is effective mediating mechanisms to bond these varying 
institutions, networks, and campaign modes together in the service of a joint electoral 
organization.  Fragmentation at the upper echelons of the party has impeded the 
development of high resource vessels that could serve as such a bridge in local level 
organization building. A disconnect remains between resources exhausted under short-
term campaign imperatives and the need for long-term institution building. Relationships, 
while patterned by structural forces, matter deeply in politics. Mediating structures that 
bring financial resources, institutional know-how, and (perhaps most importantly) put 
people in a room together long enough to gain mutual understanding of their institutional 












          
Fragmentation is at the core of the American electoral system. Yet, the early 
twenty-first century brought vast and swift changes to modes of political participation. If 
we think of parties as the vessel of a would-be majoritarian coalition, there are reasons to 
suggest a strengthening of their logic. For Democratic Party office-seekers, the 
institutionalization of the Obama coalition presents the clearest, and perhaps only, path to 
electoral success. Yet, moving effectively and efficiently toward an apparatus in service 
of this task has remained challenging. Institutional barriers to party building remain steep. 
       In its formative stages, this project sought to answer simply whether campaign 
trends that favored mobilization strategies, provided evidence of strengthening party 
organization and resources. Parties however are not simple. On the one hand, Obama 
mobilized more people to vote for Democrats than ever before. Yet, the formal 
institutions of the party, along with its representation in government across the country, is 
significantly weaker than when he took office. Consensus around the New American 
Electorate’s destiny appears shattered. In 2016, Democratic performance among the 
white working class hit lows often thought unimaginable even in the post-Obama era.272 
OFA projects, Organizing for America and Organizing for Action, designed to turn the 
presidential grassroots army into a permanent force, far from revolutionized American 
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politics. Rather, the right-wing populist insurgence of 2010 led to increased 
gerrymandering and restrictive voting laws.   
      Conventional wisdom in 2007, found Obama’s electoral strategy audacious and 
unrealistic. The same would be said of Mr. Trump’s eight years later. Certainly, if 
nothing else, many assumptions about American politics seem ready for discarding. 
Economic stagnation and social change have had profoundly alienating effects on the 
average citizen’s relationship to political institutions.273 The media has made information 
significantly easier to access, yet facts are more difficult to ascertain.274 From YouTube 
ads to ‘fake news’ websites, campaigns and parties exploit these changes, yet can only 
harness them for a short time. Long-term effects are more difficult to disentangle and 
manage. Political communication advances quicker than professionals can master. Its 
consequences unclear. 
      The future is difficult to predict. Yet what this project illustrates are the multi-
dimensional barriers that parties must still hurdle under the American system. However, 
invention in politics is often a consequence of desperation and necessity.  The party, as a 
collective good that can connect office seekers to a stable majority electorate, remains a 
potent potential asset. A template has been developed that can provide networks and 
legibility of such a party electorate, yet ironically, an organizational template to harness 
this remains at a distance.  
      In this concluding chapter, I draw attention back to the key themes of this 
dissertation, pointing to what this research might suggest about contemporary parties 
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empirically and conceptually. I will also briefly discuss the 2016 election and how the 
findings of this project can be reconciled with its results.  
 
The Future of Competition 
      Competition sits at the center of the theory of party democracy. As we have seen 
however, the peculiarities of the American system create many opportunities to insulate 
politics from competitive dynamics and their consequences. Historically, the Electoral 
College and senate distorted expressions of national majoritarian preferences. Yet new 
challenges have also interceded. Spatial sorting of the electorate in states, regions, and 
localities has created less organically competitive elections. Gerrymandering further 
exacerbates this process. 
     Big data has also had a complicated impact on competition. Information lowers 
costs and creates potential to mobilize voters, easing the task of finding an electorate that 
could make a candidate or party competitive in a previously safe district. Those looking 
to restrict competition however have the same tools available. Precision in electorate 
mapping can also restrict party building strategies. A better understanding of where 
chances for marginal effects are greatest means an increasingly narrow focus for resource 
distribution. Ironically, this may lead to resource overkill in a district, as knowing where 
voters are does not mean parties and campaigns know what and how much treatment is 
necessary to influence voting behavior. The marginal impact on a district does not mean 
that such an infusion of resources is effective, especially when deployed late in a 
campaign. Once again, campaigns still operating under a candidate-centered paradigm of 




organizational force, there is little to correct this. Without a strong party organization to 
manage and ration resources to build mobilization infrastructure with an eye on the long-
term, resources will be concentrated on haphazard infusions in few areas with the greatest 
predicted short-term marginal effect. 
     The decline of local level competition presents an extraordinary challenge for 
not just party building, but democracy. Grafting parliamentary parties on a system such 
as ours is not easy. Yet, districts siloed by party, where one-party is destined to rule, are 
not sustainable in the American system. Our system’s design does not account for such 
extreme polarization. A patchwork of one-party fiefdoms is simply unworkable under 
American institutions designed for deliberation and compromise. Reforms for fairer 
districting would help, yet as polarization has turned this into a zero-sum game, the 
impediments to reform seem profound.  
     Could electoral reform gain popular salience? The public consistently derides the 
gridlock that has become characteristic of late period American government.275 Yet mass 
pressure for complicated procedural reform, subject to multiple levels of government, 
through a patchwork American system, remains a difficult ask of the average citizen. 
Democrats have claimed that if they were to win broad majorities, this would be at the 
top of their agenda.276 Yet such concurrent majorities will not happen tomorrow, and 
even if they were to exist, such notions of reform are easy to support in the abstract, but 
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more difficult when they can harm the electoral fortunes of constituent party politicians. 
Office-holders rarely legislate themselves out of a safe seat.  
 
RPG and Polarization 
     Responsible Party Government advocates yearned for the grafting of 
parliamentary parties over the American system. They imagined that the development of 
strong and deliberate parties could overcome systematic barriers that our constitution puts 
in the place of majority governance. Yet, fragmentation at the core of our system, led to 
new developments that weaken the logic of parties. Politics were in fact nationalized, yet 
institutions that political actors must be responsive to maintain decentralizing and 
segmenting dynamics. Political contention is national and ideologically coherent, but 
electoral institutions remain largely the providence of state-level rules.   
       If coherence makes parties more responsible, it does so at the price of 
introducing a new set of mechanical problems for the majority party. A minority party 
has many opportunities and the incentive to use its vested power to complicate the 
already near Herculean task of majority rule. Recent history has shown nationalization 
and polarization can create an ideologically and politically coherent minority, that can not 
only limit a majority party’s agenda through obstruction, but capitalize on perceived 
government dysfunction electorally.277 RPG assumes that by simplifying the process, the 
average voter can better ascertain who to reward and punish come election time through 
party cues.278 Recent work however, has laid doubts to even the most modest claims of 
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retrospective voting.279 Yet even if one remains vigilant in their optimism for this basic 
democratic linkage, polarization and coherence combine to produce a strong logic of 
minority obstruction to majority rule, and produces a dynamic of presidential party 
weakness. Cross-pressures of party, ideology, and section historically incentivized 
cooperation for a critical mass of congress. Contemporary minority parties’ members, 
need only concern themselves with constituents largely antagonistic toward the ruling 
party, and interest group allies dependably opposed to that party’s agenda. In such an 
environment, little power exists for the president and their party to influence opposition 
party office-holders.   
     A myriad of electoral rules can further stymie institutionalization of a majority. A 
coherent minority party, with the help of aligned interest groups, increased 
gerrymandering.280 In an immediate sense, this distorts representation in both state and 
federal government. Yet really, its most devastating long-term impact is its effect on 
party building. Variation in competition lies at the center of coordination problems facing 
a party’s constituent politicians. The lesser the level of competition, the less dependence 
there is on the party as a necessary electoral tool.  
       Minority coherence has also supported efforts to erect barriers to the franchise. 
Judicial and legislative strategies have made voting harder over this period in many 
states.281 Historically such strategies have been the domain of the local party. 
Nationalization however, has produced greater coherence and concentrated in service of 
																																																								
279 Achen, Christopher H., and Larry M. Bartels. Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not 
Produce Responsive Government. Princeton University Press, 2016. 
280 Daley, 2016. 





the purveyors of such tactics. Once again, the clear immediate impact is the depression of 
the vote to the partisan advantage of the party with the smaller but more consistent 
electorate. Yet a less direct, but more significant, consequence is such barriers impact on 
the political calculation of politicians to pursue mobilization. If costs of mobilization 
make it ineffective as an electoral strategy, office-seekers will not to pursue it. This 
means on a local level, eschewing party vessels for efficient mobilization, and leads to 
further disjuncture between the local level and any national party apparatus pursuing 
party mobilization. High resource national campaigns have a chance to overcome 
marginally higher barriers to voting by still pursuing mobilization; for low resource local 
races, this will usually not be the case.  
      If RPG hoped coherence could strengthen American democracy, it appears to 
have undersold how many bullets it leaves in the chamber of a threatened coherent 
minority to take advantage of institutional rules. This does not just impede majoritarian 
efforts to govern, but wreaks havoc on the endogenous logic that undergirds party 
building. Minority parties have opportunities for all sorts of mischief to weaken 
unconsolidated coalitions in our system. Notably this does not entail peeling off factions 
from that majority coalition, as ‘healthy’ party competition under democratic regimes 
suggests,282 rather using the ample tools our system presents to weaken the internal logic 
of the majority coalition. This makes mobilization and the resulting programmatic 
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The System of 2010? 
       Changes in campaigning have affected party organization on the national, state, 
and local level. Communication structures, activist networks, and the electorate itself 
have been upended by recent political and technological change. Yet party organization 
still must struggle against a system designed to stymie the institutionalization of a 
majority coalition. Madison himself, who as constitutional architect and philosopher 
railed about the dangers of the majority faction,283 was quickly rebuked by Madison the 
politician, who saw the largeness of the republic itself as more than enough to constrain 
majoritarian passions.284 Yet constitutional barriers to party government persisted and 
grew as a function of minority faction entrepreneurs taking advantage of anti-party 
sentiment to protect against threats of consolidated majority power. 
     Schattschneider, describing what he called “the system of 1896” argued party 
competition at the turn of the twentieth century dulled through state level electoral 
monopolies.285 Since then, nationalization and party coherence have had a complicated 
effect on competition. At the statewide level, competition in strategically important races 
is more important than ever.  Mobilization efforts (and demobilization efforts) have 
become increasingly integral to campaigning. Yet local organization remains hollowed 
out. Mobilization is counteracted by anticompetitive strategies that dissipate the internal 
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resource construction of local parties and increase their incongruity with national 
organizations. 
      In 1896, the Democratic-Populist coalition failed because of an inability to link 
urban immigrant party machines with rural farmer populists. Coalitional fragmentation 
presented an opening for antagonistic forces to install further barriers to its possible 
future success. Bryan’s would-be coalition was still a threat to powerful interests. They 
responded by passing electoral reforms that reduced competition, mobilization, and the 
broad outlawing of fusion voting. This curtailed the organizational logic of the Bryan 
coalition.286 With the machine and fusion weakened, building such a coalition was 
doomed. Perhaps a tempting historical counterfactual is that a Bryan victory, having 
established this coalition at the federal level, could have invested in it the power to resist 
eventual changes in electoral rules that ultimately made its viability untenable.  
      Yet in 2008 victory, not just for a president but a party coalition, was still not 
enough. Like 1896, a set of powerful interests pursued a national strategy of institutional 
reform designed to curb a potential consolidated majority. That redistricting would come 
after a midterm election is an unhappy coincidence for Democrats.  Minority status did 
not prevent these counter-forces from capitalizing not just on this historical accident, but 
the institutional advantages conferred on minority interests. The American electoral 
system gave them capacity to pursue multiple strategies, preventing party government 
and further undermining competition and organizational development. If the Democratic 
electorate can only be competitive in presidential years, it will remain at a disadvantage. 






over electoral rules, starving the party of its potential farm team for higher office, and 
limiting the programmatic power of party to deliver policy goods for its constituents and 
consolidate its coalition. 
      The system of 1896 was one in which the threat of a majoritarian coalition with 
an eye on brokering class-based preferences was thwarted by various localized 
mechanisms that undermined competition and the logic of mobilization. Today, party 
mobilization remains frustrated by oppositional attempts to erect new barriers to voting 
and limiting local competition through partisan redistricting. Only through victories at the 
state-level and control over electoral institutions, can such structures be reshaped and 
overcome.   
       Indeed, the electorate of 2008 is frustrated by the system of 2010. Momentary 
success created a profound threat for an opposition party, supported by a smaller yet 
more coherent electorate and powerful aligned special interests, united in concern about 
the consequences of Democratic governance. Institutional fragmentation further 
exacerbates coalitional tensions bound to rise as majority status is threatened. The system 
of 1896 was only undone decades later after American economic catastrophe. Such 
devastation finally bonded Bryan’s urban/rural majority as the New Deal coalition. 
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Top of the Ticket-Centered Campaigning 
       In the late twentieth century, elections were ‘candidate-centered,’288 with party 
organization passively complementing individual campaign constructions as a ‘party-in-
service.’ Yet polarization and digitalization may be altering this dynamic. If parties have 
not regained their machine-like centripetal force on resources, coalitional coherence and 
transparency have increased incentives to focus electoral strategy on mobilizing a party 
ticket.  However, resources are cultivated and deployed by top of the ticket campaigns, 
not a party boss.  In the place of robust and institutionalized party organizations are 
individual high resource campaigns that build a mobilization apparatus, which down 
ticket party candidates can free ride upon. Yet these constructions are idiosyncratic, 
ephemeral, and should not be confused with a satisfactory replacement for a durable mass 
party organ. Top of the ticket races control resources. As such, the top of the ticket 
maintains primary responsibility for electoral resource construction. The conundrum yet 
remains that the top of the ticket changes from election to election. Party organization 
traditionally, at the least, intendeds to be a bridge between such campaigns. Yet the 
candidate-centered era has exacerbated vertical fragmentation in the American system. 
Numerous vessels, with varying relationships to parties, exist for electoral resource 
construction, all serving different specific prerogatives. Top of the ticket candidates 
control resources, yet there are deep barriers to the construction of collective goods, even 
at the state level, where presidential and gubernatorial candidates seek to mobilize similar 
electorates.  
																																																								




      All top of the ticket races are not created equally. While at the presidential level, 
incumbency is not the chief driver of funding, this is often the case for gubernatorial 
candidates in states such as Ohio. Incumbency dictates fundraising, not just for the 
candidate, but the state party organization. Incumbency also gives coherence to the state 
party as an organization. Yet presidential victory does little to institute resources or 
manage political actors on the state level. Fragmentation continues, as the primary 
resource provider changes from election to election. This variation is not just at the 
individual level, but is an institutional logic. Presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial 
candidates all have not only different strategies, but also varying institutional linkages 
with down ticket candidates and considerations.    
     The central paradox is that despite incentivizes for mobilization and party 
coherence, organization struggles to escape candidate-centered vessels.  The top of the 
ticket must reconstitute the party repeatedly, assuming the costs of doing so, bringing 
latent networks back to life or starting from scratch.  In yesteryear, the party boss’ 
durability solved the collective action problem of permanent infrastructure building. Yet 
today, party chairs (at all levels) are either brokers of a top of the ticket incumbent, 
serving at their pleasure and structurally aligned with their institutional logic; or they 
preside over an out-party, which will often struggle at the state and local level to raise the 
resources necessary to develop organization and build infrastructure. One way or another, 
the incentives and resources for robust party building do not line up. Institutional 
weakness begets institutional weakness. 
       The party, as a set of latent resources is perhaps stronger than we have ever seen. 




possible.  Yet fragmentation impedes organization building, as party actors still reach out 
for their idiosyncratic slices of the party pie absent the quadrennial presidential top of the 
ticket. Who can create the boss, but the boss? Nationalized parties mean coherence is 
subject to the coordination problems of the federal system. When party resources were 
under local control, organizational logic and development followed. Yet national parties 
have the entire panoply of fragmenting mechanisms in the American system standing in 
the way of their development. If the burden falls on the national top of the ticket, 
incentives for party building are weaker and challenges far deeper than for the 
amalgamated local machines of the mass party era. Such campaigns will not have the 
capacity to reconstruct the party locally, but must use their resources to override it.  
      Mobilization has two primary components: data and field. Party organization has 
advanced greatly in building data infrastructure. Any candidate with VAN access has a 
knowledge of the (and their) electorate that could only be dreamed of just a few years 
ago.  Yet capitalizing on this requires an equally robust field program. Here, the 
development of durable party infrastructure has been significantly weaker. Instead, it is 
the responsibility of the top of ticket to construct such an apparatus. Capacity and desire 
remains idiosyncratic.  Resources and electoral competition remain necessary pre-
requisites.   
 
The 2016 Election: The Failure of Party Building  
        In liberal democracies parties are supposed to serve as a linkage between the 




doubt.289 Party and civil society decline has resulted in a vicious cycle of delinking 
citizens from the institutions expected to represent them.  Communication is more 
democratic, but the state as a mechanism to protect citizens has been weakened and lost 
legitimacy in the eyes of much of the public. Alienation from, and antipathy toward, elite 
institutions has been thought to have aided in the rise of not just Donald Trump on the 
right, but Bernie Sanders on the left.290 
      The election of 2016 presented a compelling test of whether Democratic victory 
in 2008 and 2012 was a function of institution building or simply Obama’s narrative 
appeal. Superficially, the case for the former is difficult. Democratic vote share regressed 
across the country. Turnout among the various groups within the Obama coalition 
declined.291 Beyond this, the ramifications of a coalition overrepresented in urban areas, 
structurally underrepresented in American government, were laid bare.292 Much was 
made, in the weeks and months following the election, of how this has starved Democrats 
on the state and local level over the past eight years.293 
    Bernie Sanders, a self-proclaimed independent socialist, whose primary challenge to 
Hillary Clinton¾now the preferred candidate of Obama and his team-- was far more 
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successful than even his most optimistic supporters could have imagined.294 That a 
candidate, who does not even identify as a Democrat did so well, demonstrates how 
difficult consolidation over this period has been. Significant amounts of Democratic 
primary voters were moved by a message openly hostile to the Democratic Party as an 
institution. Moving beyond Obama’s insurgent message, Sanders often advanced a 
critique of a broadly coopted party duopoly. This critique found resonance among liberal 
and especially young voters—staples of Obama’s primary and general election coalition.  
      The 2016 primary seemed to suggest a reopening of the intra-party tensions that 
plagued the party’s progressive wing before Obama. Sanders had great success among 
the youth vote, but struggled greatly with African-American voters.295 This could in part 
be attributed to his distance (and perhaps critique) of Obama, as well as an outsider 
strategy that often did not cultivate community leaders effectively. Yet the difficulty of 
holding the Obama coalition together without Obama, is a clear indicator that no 
institutional mechanism has been built that can be depended on to bind the party’s 
presidential electorate together.  
      The success of anti-establishment and anti-institutional frames point to both the 
failure of the party to provide this linkage, as well as the consequence of party weakness.  
A lack of organizational consolidation could in part explain the aggravating of coalitional 
rifts. The party could not consolidate its majority; it could therefore not provide sufficient 
programmatic goods for its majority; and so the party turned to recriminations of itself. 
This tension continued into the general election, with many Sanders loyalists continuing 
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to be skeptical and critical toward Clinton. In addition, while Clinton was successful in 
mobilizing the black primary electorate, she fell well short of Obama’s numbers in the 
general election.296 This and her continued struggles with young voters were clear factors 
in her loss. 
      The effectiveness of Clinton’s field efforts has been a point of contention since 
the election. While her data team were confident that they were gliding toward a modest 
but safe victory, her modeling appeared off.297 Yet her field trouble might have been less 
attributable to faulty mechanics than a simple lack of enthusiasm.298 Integration and 
efficient distribution of financial resources cannot overcome the necessity of a robust 
volunteer activist base to run a successful high turnout field apparatus.  While it is 
incumbent on party officials to structure organization in ways open and efficient for 
building volunteer voter contact infrastructure, top of the ticket activist enthusiasm is also 
an integral ingredient.  
 Was weak party organization causally determinant? In an election as close as 
2016, any number of variables are a safe bet for having a deciding influence. Field 
campaigning pays dividends in high resource states decided on the margins. Here, 
Clinton did far worse than Obama, losing several deciding states by fractions of a 
percentage point. One can blame Clinton the candidate, or her campaign. However, party 
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infrastructure is supposed to protect against such idiosyncrasies, especially with an 
opponent who is anathema to the party base. As mentioned above, all tops of the ticket 
are not created equal. A party over-dependent on its momentary lodestar is always 
assuming substantial risk.  
 
What the Future Holds 
Political professionals have become increasing interested in field experiments, 
attempting to identify scientific mechanics of mobilization.299 For all their hope, no set of 
practices has so far overcome the scourge of low salience. Voter contact remains an 
inexact science. Yet faith persists that it remains the future of value-added campaigning. 
However, if hampered by inefficient party organizational structures, even the most 
precise campaign treatments will produce suboptimal results.  
      More and more money goes toward narrow, yet dynamic localities. Local 
institutions, not subject to influxes in resources and consistent competition, are charged 
with (quite literally) carrying the party banner.  Strengthening majoritarian institutions 
follows strategically from the tenuous electorate of one of the major parties. Yet it must 
navigate both internal tensions that turn its own actors away from this long-term strategy, 
as well as an opposition party devoted not to finding their own majority through 
competition, but limiting the Democratic vote through anti-competitive practices.   
      What can a party dependent on a sporadic high salience coalition do in low 
salience elections? Demographic drift is unlikely to stop. Presuming coalitional stability, 
the Republican Party will find itself operating on increasingly unfriendly electoral turf. 
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Marginal effects of barriers that minimize turnout, and even the most efficient of 
gerrymandering efforts, can only go so far in mitigating this. 
        Mechanisms of fragmentation will appear different depending on the perspective 
from which you view them. Yet what remains consistent is coalitional and institutional 
incongruities between political actors and their party team. This disjuncture is a process 
of path dependent history that any actor must navigate. An abstract notion of the 
importance of party building does not obviate the short-term electoral prerogatives that 
predominate for office-seekers who constitute a party.    
      At the national level, we see fragmentation through its two baseline dimensions: 
horizontally in the big tent party of a large republic and vertically through institutional 
rules. The closer one gets to the ground, the more granularly one can see how campaign 
organization remains at the mercy of these tensions. One party, many factions, many 
logics. An opposition happily jumping on already tilted scales is not a new phenomenon 
in American elections.  
      National level politics is an amalgamation of this disjuncture, as it affects the 
various actors in the party. This is clear in the national party structure, itself fragmented 
by organizational vessels focused on different offices. As has been illustrated, the 
president as party leader, even one with long coattails, constructs organization at odds 
with the priority of many party actors. Aggregating a national presidential majority is a 
tough enough task in itself.  Yet bridging the gaps that separate various faction within the 
Democratic Party is critical if it is to actualize the Obama coalition as a governing 




        This dissertation does not provide a precise measurement of (1) how responsible 
field was for Democratic success and failures over the period of study, nor (2) how 
generalizable the processes described have been.  Several studies have attempted to 
ascertain the effects of field treatments,300 yet to what extent field organization could 
have improved Democratic prospects remains an open question. This project does not 
pose an answer, instead accepting that field organization is one important treatment that 
influences voter behavior, and that more of it practiced effectively produces marginal 
gains for campaigns. Further, micro-processes describing organizational tensions rest on 
largely qualitative characterization that nonetheless reflect rough consensus among party 
actors, as illustrated by primary research and journalistic accounts. They are nonetheless 
broad attempts at characterization of highly idiosyncratic processes. Yet they aim to 
provide empirical description and conceptual heft to a set of phenomena that frustrate 
party organizational development.   
     This project hopes to have initiated a cursory attempt to conceptualize and map 
contemporary party organization. It attempts to put forth a framework describing the 
national, state, and local level: illustrating how electoral resources are constructed, and 
the structural constraints that impede even and efficient party building. Much further 
research is needed, adding detail and generalizability to these processes. State party 
																																																								
300 Green, Donald P., Alan S. Gerber, and David W. Nickerson. "Getting Out the Vote in Local 
Elections: Results from Six Door-to-Door Canvassing Experiments." Journal of Politics 65.4 
(2003): 1083-1096: Gerber, Alan S., Donald P. Green, and Christopher W. Larimer. "Social 
Pressure and Voter Turnout: Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment." American Political 
Science Review 102.01 (2008): 33-48; Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. "The Effects of 
Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment." American 
Political Science Review 94.03 (2000): 653-663; Green, Donald P., and Alan S. Gerber. "Getting 
Out the Youth Vote: Results from Randomized Field Experiments." Unpublished report to the 





organization remains understudied, despite states being the locus of American electoral 
institutions. Ohio, as a case, illustrates the advantages and difficulties of attempting to 
build state infrastructure while being a top priority presidential battleground. While its 
successes and failures map reasonably neatly on the national story, the study of other 
states will yield significant variation and value. States that are not competitive at the 
presidential level, or in other statewide elections, will follow different logics. This will be 
a function of competition, as well as relationship to national party structures. Whatever 
difficulties the ODP faced organizationally, it was still responding to dynamics of 
competitive statewide elections. Deep blue and red states will likely function very 
differently.  
    Local organization is also only discussed here in the broadest terms. This project 
sought to sketch the logic of general intraparty incongruities as they manifest themselves 
on the local level.  Contemporary local party organization also suffers from a lack of 
scholarly attention, especially using qualitative research to map relationships. This 
knowledge is hard to gain through existing data sets. Yet as this project makes clear, 
national-level mobilization is a product of the building and integration of local-level 
infrastructure. There is much to gain by detailed mapping of county level organization 
and networks. How electoral campaign organizations function on the ground, over time; 
where, when, and to what extent, it institutionalizes as organization capable of 
consistently mobilizing on behalf of a party ticket, is of utmost importance to 
understanding contemporary American parties and elections.  Understanding how 
variation in resources and competition produce variation in patterns of local organizations 




      While there is a body of emerging research mapping donor and even activist 
networks,301 what this dissertation has hoped to do is place a politician-centered view of 
resource construction back into consideration. All sorts of networks exist exogenous to 
organization controlled by office-seekers. Yet parties, and party weakness (defined as 
incongruity and inefficiency in organization) remains patterned by politicians, not aligned 
interest groups. Analysis that avoids conceptualizing party structures as driven by a team 
of politicians electorally and organizationally linked to a majority, at relative levels of 
strength and coherence, is likely to miss important phenomena.  
       Party organization as traditionally understood, strengthens state-society linkages 
by connecting politicians to an electorate without mediating interest organizations. The 
difficulties of constructing such organization in the American system should be central to 
any analysis of party networks. That interest organization fills the vacuum created by 
weakness of the classically conceived party is the basis of Schattschneider’s framework.  
     What lies in the future for the Democratic Party? After 2016, the lag between the 
presidential election and the race for DNC chair, left the formal organization of the 
Democratic Party unequipped to harness the anti-Trump activism bursting all over the 
country.302 In this vacuum, new decentralized digitally based organization, took hold. 
Most notable was Indivisible, less an actual organization than a how-to manual adopted 
by thousands of local chapters with loose national coordination.303  These networks (at 
the time of writing) have in most cases no relationship with formal party structures or 
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politicians, yet they represent the primary vessel of activity early in the Trump era. How 
they will integrate with the Democratic Party is still an open question.  
        The major puzzle remains whether the party can transcend short-term electoral 
logics on behalf of a long-term strategy of infrastructure building. As this dissertation has 
sought to demonstrate, politicians change strategy slowly and reluctantly. Styles and 
modes of campaigning are path dependent practices. The benefits of incumbency mean 
that successful office-holders are going to be unlikely to adopt to new modes of 
campaigning to win unnecessary marginal benefits. Only when dislodged from stability 
can we expect actors to make a dramatic shift. If nothing else, the Democratic Party does 
appear to be currently dislodged. Rhetorical gestures by party leaders since Trump’s 
election suggest a party with a renewed commitment to organization building. The two 
main candidates for DNC chair both made central to their platform using the DNC to 
revive a more muscular version of Dean’s 50 state strategy, with a focus on local party 
infrastructure building.304 Chuck Schumer, now perhaps the most powerful Democrat in 
office, has articulated strong support for this approach.305 One thing that appears beyond 
contention is that things change very quickly in contemporary American politics. The 
2020 election, a presidential year after which the decennial redistricting process will take 
place, represents a generational opportunity for a presidential coalition to grasp power 
over the process. Whether the party can take advantage of this, not just on the federal 
																																																								
304 Gambino, Lauren. “Meet the DNC Chair Candidates Vying to Take Over the Party.” 
Guardian. Feb 24 2017. https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/24/dnc-chair-election-
tom-perez-keith-ellison-democrats 
305 O’Keefe, Ed. Why Does Chuck Schumer Support Keith Ellison? Because of Bernie Sanders.” 






level, but in state representation all over the country, will pattern American politics 
through the middle of the century. A reconstitution of the Obama coalition in 2018 and 
2020 could have seismic impact on representation and eventually policy. The Republican 
Party’s viability is dependent on institutional insulation from this coalition. Shifting this 
terrain could put the Democrats in positon to overcome the legislative veto powers of the 
GOP. Yet, such ambitions are married to maximizing turnout across the nation in 
elections taking place between now and then, reconstituting and reinvigorating currently 
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